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1 Institutional challenges for China's 
business reforms in a globalized 
economy 
Russell Smyth, On Kit Tam, Malcolm Warner and 
Cherrie Jiuhua Zhu 
1.1 Introduction 
The reform of China's economy and business environment and the opening up 
to the outside world over the last 25 years have occurred against a backdrop of 
increasing globalization and integration into the world economy. Indeed, we 
will argue that it is likely that the latter changes have been the driving force 
behind the former. Most observers of China's reforms are united in the view that 
these have been successful in terms of promoting economic growth and 
improving the living standards of the masses, often with reservations vis-a-vis 
the increasing inequality of income and wealth. Few would question that the 
average Chinese is better off today than when the market reforms commenced in 
the late 1970s. 'Winners', on the whole, are likely to outnumber 'losers'. 
However, China has clearly encountered problems and challenges in the 
building of new institutions required for the economy and society to function 
and thrive in the complex processes of marketization and globalization. 
Foremost among these from the perspective of business is the restructuring of 
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), reform of the financial and banking 
system and concomitant reforms to labour markets and social welfare provision, 
albeit with 'Chinese characteristics'. China has now moved to a more efficient 
system of resource allocation. The link between economic restructuring and 
globalization was most recently brought into sharp focus following China's 
accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), with China's enterprises 
confronted with increasing levels of competition from foreign sources. 
The essays in this edited volume collectively provide an overview of how 
China's economic reforms have evolved and how policy-makers and market 
participants are responding to the challenges of increased global competition. 
Many of them provide a fair degree of detailed analysis about how this has come 
to pass. Section One of the book, which consists of the next five chapters, 
examines corporate governance reform in SOEs and listed companies and the 
development and restructuring of China's financial sector. It is fair to say that 
these are the two major institutional reforms that have occupied the business 
policy agenda in China over the last decade. Section Two of the book contains 
chapters on the evolution of human resource management (HRM) and labour 
market reform. One of the accompanying features of the increasing 
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marketization of SOEs and corporate governance reform in listed companies has 
been the evolution of HRM in China and the growing pressures of 
unemployment as SOEs change their work practices. The chapters in Section 
Two review these developments. 
Section Three of the volume focuses on the changing nature of social welfare 
prov1s1on. There is increasing recognition among many scholars that 
globalization is more than likely a 'double-edged sword' (see Guan 2001a, 
Kapstein 2000, Milanovic 2003). While the globalization process has 
contributed to rising incomes in developing countries such as China through 
increased trade and investment flows, it has also made the need to create a 
sophisticated social protection regime to protect those who are made vulnerable 
from increased competition more pressing. These include the elderly, the 
unemployed and those in poor health. The chapters in Section Three examine 
how China has responded to the need to develop a social protection regime to 
protect the 'losers' from the globalization process and, at the same time, make 
the marketization process sustainable into the future. The final section of the 
book contains two chapters assessing the impact of China's accession to the 
WTO on the economy and the emergence of the private sector and new breed of 
entrepreneur in China. We conclude the book with these two chapters since both 
examine topics that look to the future of Chinese business. How China adapts to 
being a member of the WTO will be probably the most important issue for 
business in China in coming years. The emerging importance of private 
enterprises has been one of the major developments in China's business reforms 
in recent times and it is likely that private enterprise will play an even greater 
role in the future as the state-owned sector shrinks further. In the remainder of 
this chapter, we provide an overview of the institutional challenges facing 
China's reforms and examine the contents of the chapters that make up the 
balance of this volume in greater detail. 
1.2 Section one: corporate governance and financial reform 
Effective corporate governance, most authorities in the field agree, helps protect 
and enhance the interests of stakeholders in a company, particularly 
shareholders. Corporate governance now occupies the centre stage of enterprise 
reform in China (Tenev et al. 2002). The Fourth Plenum of the Chinese 
Communist Party's Fifteenth Central Council, held in September 1999, 
identified corporate governance as 'the core' of the modem enterprise system. 
The main tenet of China's approach to corporate governance development is the 
adoption of key features from the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance, which requires the existence of certain institutional conditions 
including a well functioning financial and regulatory system for it to operate 
effectively (Tam 1999). The 1997 Asian financial crisis and the problematic 
mass privatization in Russia have highlighted the importance of having effective 
corporate governance arrangements in emerging and transitional economies 
(Frydman et al. 1996, Estrin and Rosevear 1999, Claessens et al. 2000). For a 
developing 'transitional economy' such as China, in which the government 
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retains considerable influence, even if the apparatus of the old command 
economy has been virtually dismantled, the role of corporate governance is now 
widely accepted by scholars and policy-makers to be critical to the country's 
enterprise and financial reform and to the development of a globally competitive 
economy (Chen 2003, Clarke 2003, Walter and Howie 2003). Globalization and 
corporate governance issues are now more intertwined than ever before, 
problems of corruption notwithstanding. With fast expanding international trade 
and inward foreign direct investment, the need to develop effective corporate 
governance and an efficient financial and banking system has taken on added 
significance. 
Chapter 2 by Die Lo and Russell Smyth, Chapter 4 by Alice de Jonge and 
Chapter 6 by Jayne Godfrey and Wei Lu examine different aspects of corporate 
governance development in Chinese enterprises. In Chapter 2, Lo and Smyth 
provide an overview of reform of SOEs, focusing on the contribution of large 
SOEs and enterprise groups. There is a spirited debate in the literature on the 
role of large SOEs. Some authors see large SOEs as inefficient 'dinosaurs' 
dragging down the state-owned sector (see for example McNally and Lee 1998, 
Shieh 1999). Others, more controversially, argue that large SOEs have played a 
vital role in China's economic success through supplying producer goods and 
establishing substantial linkages which have fuelled growth in downstream 
industries (Nolan 1996, Nolan and Zhang 2002). Lo and Smyth, whose 
sympathies lie with the second camp, focus on the positive contribution of large 
SOEs at a time when the role of the state sector has been shrinking. To explain 
how the share of large SOEs has held up over time, they offer a 'non-orthodox' 
account of industrial restructuring and changing corporate governance, focusing 
on the match ( or mismatch) between the institutions and external demand 
conditions. 
In Chapter 4, de Jonge examines the emerging corporate governance 
structures of listed companies, focusing on the internal structure of Chinese-
incorporated companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (H-share 
enterprises). This demarche is particularly timely in a period when high profile 
accounting and corporate governance scandals in the United States have 
emphasized to the business community the need for improved corporate 
governance standards in securities markets throughout the world. De Jonge 
examines the way in which recent developments and reforms in laws and 
regulations governing H-share enterprises have started to alter the composition 
of boards and the relationship between shareholders and management. The 
chapter demonstrates both how things are changing for the better and the many 
deficiencies that still need to be addressed. 
Another aspect of corporate governance reform, which was highlighted by the 
US-based Enron and WorldCom collapses and other non-US 'basket-cases' such 
as the Italian conglomerate Parmalat, has been the need to develop sound 
financial reporting practices. Godfrey and Lu positively address this issue in 
Chapter 6. Existing research points to differences in the manner in which 
investors in developed countries value the intangible assets reported in firms' 
financial statements. There is no research, however, into the association 
between the market value of firms in developing countries and their book values 
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of intangible assets. Since the promulgation of China's first 'Western-style' 
accounting standard in 1992, accounting standards and regulations issued by the 
Chinese government have become increasingly internationally compatible. This 
move opened up opportunities to examine the economic relevance of accounting 
in the emerging economy of China. Using a large sample of Australian and 
Chinese companies, Godfrey and Lu investigate the value relevance of 
capitalized intangible assets, both in aggregate and as individual capitalized 
items. One of their main findings is that in China, the book value of intangible 
assets is a very small proportion of the book value of total assets and none of the 
capitalized, intangible asset book values are significantly associated with the 
market value of equity. They cogently discuss the implications of this for 
financial reporting reform. 
The 1990s saw the establishment of new nationwide shareholding banks, 
significant expansion of the insurance sector, development of a domestic capital 
market and the emergence of consumer and housing finance. The financial 
sector and particularly the securities market, however, still face many challenges 
that are inextricably tied up with corporate governance reform and in particular 
reform of the SOEs. These state firms receive the bulk of funds allocated 
through the formal credit system and non-commercial considerations, such as 
the need to sustain loss-making SOEs, continue to influence bank lending (see 
OECD 2002 for an overview). In 1999 the Chinese government announced an 
equity-for-debt swap (EDS) scheme to restructure the SOEs and clear up the bad 
loans of the state-owned banks. As Kym Brown and Michael Skully discuss in 
Chapter 3, official figures reported before the asset management companies took 
over bad loans were that non-performing loans were in the 25-30 per cent range, 
but in practice the actual percentage of non-performing loans was much higher. 
The limited empirical evidence which is available suggests that to this point the 
EDS has had limited success in restructuring SOEs or improving the bad loan 
situation of the banks. The problem is that in the end the EDS is only a financial 
scheme, an accounting solution to the problem of bad debts, while SOE reform 
is a real socio-economic problem that is subject to serious socio-economic and 
political constraints (see Smyth et al. 2004). 
Different aspects of the relationship between enterprise reform, foreign 
investment and banking reform in China are emphasized in Chapter 3, by Brown 
and Skully, and Chapter 5 by On Kit Tam. Brown and Skully compare China's 
financial system with others in the Asia-Pacific region, emphasizing the banking 
system and its reform progress. The international perspective is interesting given 
China's emerging financial importance in East Asia. As a proportion of GDP, 
China has the largest domestic banking system in East Asia and, when combined 
with international borrowings, it is third behind Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Brown and Skully make several recommendations for further reform to China's 
financial sector, including: the full publication of financial statistics; the 
continued workout of non-performing loans; more bank supervisors; the 
development of other financing options for investors; and the removal of 
unprofitable SOE funding to policy banks. 
In Chapter 5, Tam analyses the main issues influencing the entry of foreign 
banks into China's banking sector, with particular reference to the government's 
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aim to promote economic development in the western region. It is generally 
recognized that the Chinese banking sector has lagged behind other sectors in 
the reform process. As demonstrated by the beneficial impacts from the entry of 
foreign insurance companies in China during the last decade, Tam argues that an 
increase in the level of market competition in China's banking sector from 
foreign banks will help the reform of this important economic sector while at the 
same time enhancing the country's foreign investment environment, particularly 
in the western region. One of the implications of China's integration into the 
global economy has been increasing regional disparities between the coastal 
provinces that attract the bulk of foreign investment and the lower-income 
central and western provinces. In response to these income divergences, through 
the ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) and the State Council's special 
administrative office, the Leading Group for Western Development, 
development of western China is now seen as a priority. Multilateral lending 
agencies are also targeting funds towards the development of western China. 
Tam argues that more rapid liberalization of market entry for foreign banks will 
assist in the economic development of China's western region. He discusses 
how the entry of foreign banks into the region can have a positive effect on the 
flow of foreign direct investment into the region, thereby reducing the big 
regional income disparities. 
1.3 Section two: human resources and labour market reform 
China's labour force has experienced a profound transformation since the late 
1970s, which has been a direct as well as an indirect result of enterprise 
restructuring to improve global competitiveness vis-a-vis the wider forces of 
globalization (see Warner 1995). In 1978, most of the labour force was 
employed in rural communes or in urban SOEs; by the end of the 1990s, one 
third of the rural labour force was engaged in non-agricultural activities and 
about three-fifths of the urban labour force was employed outside the state 
sector, in urban collectives, joint ventures and private enterprises (Fleisher and 
Yang 2003). Prior to 1978, HRM in China was characterized by the 'three irons' 
policy consisting of the 'Iron armchair' (tie jiaoyi), 'Iron rice-bowl' (tie fanwan) 
and 'Iron pay' (tie gongzi). Labour arrangements under central planning were 
characterized by labour allocation by labour bureaus, the hukou (residence 
registration system), and strict control of the dang 'an (personal file) by the 
danwei (work unit or employing organization; see Meng 2000). 
However, as Shuming Zhao discusses in Chapter 7, since the commencement 
of market reforms, HRM has undergone somewhat of a revolution. The labour 
contract system, earlier pioneered in Shenzhen, was first introduced nationally 
by way of a Labour Regulation in 1986 to cover new entrants into state and 
collective enterprises. In 1987, regulations calling for an extension of fixed-
term contracts to incumbent workers were introduced. This step provided 
enterprises with some autonomy to make hiring decisions for the first time, and 
increased the risk of being laid off for employees who did not meet their 
employment obligations (Fleisher and Yang 2003), although these same 
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regulations left a large residual role for planners to meet regional employment 
targets (Meng and Kidd 1997). A managerial responsibility system has also 
been introduced to link managerial performance and compensation (Groves et al. 
1995), and by the second half of the 1990s some managers in SOEs were being 
employed on three-year contracts, which could be terminated for failure to meet 
performance criteria (Morris et al. 2001: 711). As Zhao considers in more depth 
in Chapter 7, there have been related reforms to the hukou and dang 'an systems 
to make labour markets more flexible. 
Since the late 1990s, unemployment has become a major problem in China, 
with huge numbers of workers being laid off from SOEs. The xiagang (lay-off) 
reforms were first experimented with in 1994 and were officially launched in 
1997 with the intention of resolving the problem of inefficiency in the state 
sector by furloughing a quarter of its workers within four years (1997-2001) 
(Appleton et al. 2002). Between 1998 and 2002 there were 26 million workers 
laid off from SOEs (Armitage 2003, Solinger 2003). This large-scale shedding 
of labour has become a major socio-economic problem given that studies have 
found that those workers who have borne the brunt of the redundancies are the 
least able to find alternative work. This situation has the potential to create a 
'lumpenproletariat' with feelings of betrayal (Morris et al. 2001). For example, 
using household survey data for 1999/2000, Appleton et al. (2002) found that 
the risk of retrenchment was highest for the most vulnerable in society - namely 
women, the less educated, the low-skilled and the middle-aged, and that the 
duration of unemployment was longest for those in poor health, the less 
educated and women with children. The problem of redundancies has been 
exacerbated by China's integration into the global economy, as the state-owned 
sector has been confronted with increasing levels of competition from the time 
of China's accession to the WTO. Over the last two decades the 'Gini 
coefficient', measuring income inequality, has gone up from around 0.20 in the 
Maoist days to over 0.45 in the post-Deng era, more in line with other Asian 
economies. 
In Chapter 8, Grace Lee and Malcolm Warner argue that unemployment, 
hand in hand with poverty, now poses a serious threat to both social stability and 
the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, and that this demands an urgent 
human resources policy response. This concern is reflected in widespread 
documentation of worker unrest, with labour protest an everyday event in 
China's cities (Morris et al. 2001, Solinger 2003). In their chapter Lee and 
Warner first examine the issues of employment and unemployment in China, 
explaining that the low official rate of joblessness of around 4 per cent, is in 
reality double that figure (possibly, indeed, even more), then move on to explain 
the institutional changes that brought the problem about, using Shanghai as a 
case study to explore the policy responses. However, although they find that the 
labour programme in Shanghai may have been relatively successful at first, they 
conclude by arguing that this does not necessarily mean that it would also 
succeed if implemented nationwide; its success in Shanghai, they suggest, is due 
primarily to the particularly rapid growth of the local economy there. 
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1.4 Section three: social welfare reform 
Prior to the introduction of market reforms, China's social security system was 
predominantly a danwei-based (work-unit-based), defined-benefit, 'pay-as-you-
go' type, primarily restricted to the public sector and confined to urban areas. 
For those who qualified, coverage was comprehensive. This policy included: old 
age care; health care; insurance for injury, disability or death irrespective of 
whether they were work-related; maternity benefits; and funeral subsidies (see 
Dong and Ye 2003 for an overview). However, by the mid-1980s it was clear 
that social security was lagging behind economic reform. The main problem 
was that that the danwei-based welfare system undermined the competitiveness 
of SOEs because it imposed a significant financial burden on the enterprise. The 
strategy now is to offload more of the welfare costs, either onto the individual or 
the community, or both. 
In response to the increasing financial pressure on SOEs, commencing with 
the 'Decision of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee on the 
Reform of the Economic System' in October 1984, the state has adopted a series 
of social welfare reforms nationally. A critical feature of the 'Decision' was the 
requirement that enterprises practise independent accounting and assume 
responsibilities for their own profits and losses, therefore breaking the traditional 
tie between government and work-based social security (Dong and Ye 2003). 
Subsequent reforms have centred on the implementation of a number of social 
insurance programmes designed to cover the major risks confronting individuals 
working in both public and private sectors in a market economy (Saunders and 
Shang 2001, Zhu 2002, Whiteford 2003). The new social insurance regime is 
financed by individuals, enterprises and government. It has two major objectives 
(Nyland et al. 2004 ). One is to relieve enterprises in the public sector of the full 
responsibility for welfare provision and ensure that the burden is shouldered 
fairly between the major stakeholders. The other is to have the same social 
security system established in the private sector to protect employees and to 
curtail the prevalence of free-riding. 
Currently, all firms are required to pay a prescribed amount of social 
insurance. The national regulations mandate that employers must contribute 20 
per cent of the wage bill for pension insurance, although in practice the amount 
varies between provinces from 15 per cent to 30 per cent. Employers are also 
required to contribute 6 per cent of payroll for health insurance (although this 
varies in different areas; in Shanghai, for example, it is 12 per cent), 2 per cent 
of payroll for unemployment insurance and 1 per cent of payroll each for 
industrial injury and maternity insurance (Whiteford 2003). Employees 
contribute 5 per cent of payroll for pension insurance, 2 per cent of payroll for 
health insurance and 1 per cent of payroll for unemployment insurance (Zhu 
2002). 
In Chapter 9 Cherrie Zhu, Chris Nyland and Brian Cooper extend existing 
perception research for China by examining the diversity of employees' views 
on social protection reform that prevail across firms with differing ownership 
forms and occupations. This is an interesting exercise because, as they point out, 
existing research on perceptions of social welfare coverage in China has tended 
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to concentrate on views among workers in SOEs at a time when the Chinese 
government is committed to policies that are reducing the number and relative 
significance of SOEs while extending coverage in other ownership forms. 
Therefore, extant studies that focus on perceptions in SOEs are likely to tell only 
part of the story. The chapter suggests that ownership form has a significant 
impact on employee perception of social protection reform, with employees in 
private enterprises having a more positive attitude towards personal risk 
management, labour mobility and the role of trade unions, and a greater sense of 
security and satisfaction with social insurance policies than employees in either 
foreign-invested firms or SOEs. 
One notable demographic problem in China is the rapid increase in the 
dependency ratio in recent times. In 1978, China's old-age dependency ratio 
(number of pensioners to number of active contributors) was 1:30. This figure 
changed to 1:5.4 in 1989 and 1:3.5 in 2001 and is projected to be 1:1.69 in 2050 
(Zhu 2002: 42). Peter Saunders and Lujun Sun tackle this issue through 
examining pension reform in the context of a broader study of income support 
for the aged in Chapter 10. In contrast to most recent studies of pension reform 
in China, Saunders and Sun emphasize the importance of looking beyond 
pensions (and by implication, beyond pension reform) in understanding the 
factors that contribute to wellbeing in old age and the opportunities to influence 
it. Specifically, the chapter reports some results from a project that is examining 
the living standards of the aged in China in 2000 and how these have changed in 
the time since 1992, a period characterized by rapid and expensive reform of 
policies affecting the aged. Saunders and Sun investigate what effect these 
policies have had on the economic status of older people, the role played by the 
family and how attitudes have changed towards these issues. Saunders and Sun 
consider the role of pensions in providing income support for the aged, how this 
has changed, and its consequences for support provided by family. 
Over the last decade China has emerged as the 'world's factory floor', and 
occupational health and safety (OHS) laws, regulations and implementing 
agencies are struggling to keep up with China's rapid economic growth (Brown 
and O'Rourke 2003: 299). In Chapter 11 Chris Nyland, Russell Smyth and 
Cherrie Zhu examine the interplay between fast rates of economic growth, 
globalization and recent developments with OHS and industrial injury insurance 
legislation. Nyland, Smyth and Zhu argue that marketization and globalization 
have had a dual effect on OHS. On the one hand, providing an effective social 
protection mechanism is a precondition for further marketization and opening up 
to the outside world. On the other hand, providing the institutional mechanisms 
to protect workers' occupational health and safety is an integral part of 
protecting workers from the vicissitudes of globalization. Based on interviews 
with key stakeholders in Beijing, the chapter examines how China has managed 
this tension and discusses the extent to which the institutional and legal 
framework that it has put in place is effective in protecting workers' health and 
safety in the face of increasing levels of global competition. 
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1.5 Section four: implications of China's accession to the WTO and 
the rapid growth of the private sector 
The Chinese government has consistently argued that its decision to join the 
WTO is a 'win-win' deal for both sides (see for example People's Daily 18 
January 2000, Economic Daily 21 January 2000). Others are more sceptical. 
For instance, Nolan (2002) expresses grave doubts about the ability of China's 
large firms to compete on a global level playing field. Warner (2002, 2003a) and 
Lee and Warner in this volume emphasize that China's entry into the WTO, by 
speeding up the structural adjustment of industries, will put serious strain on the 
management of human resources and will increase employment pressures in the 
coming years as globalization increases. For this reason, as in any major 
economic restructuring process, China's entry into the WTO is unlikely to be 
'Pareto-improving' (in the sense that some are made better off, while no-one is 
made worse off). Instead, there are bound to be both 'winners' and 'losers' from 
the process, as suggested earlier. 
The real issue, therefore, is whether or not the potential gains outweigh the 
losses. Interest in estimating the potential effects of China joining the WTO on 
both the Chinese and world economies has led to a substantial and still growing 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) literature. The benefits from reductions 
in tariff and non-tariff barriers as estimated in the existing CGE literature are 
generally low, in the range 0.08 to 2.20 per cent of real GDP (see Gilbert and 
Wahl 2002 for an overview of existing studies). Yinhua Mai contributes to this 
literature in her examination of the effect of tariff and non-tariff barrier 
reductions in China in a CGE framework in Chapter 12. In contrast to the 
existing CGE literature, Mai takes account of the effect of endogenous 
productivity growth, which has been considered to be one possible reason for 
previous low estimates. She concludes that China's gain in real GDP from the 
tariff reductions is much higher with the endogenous productivity growth than 
without it. With endogenous productivity growth, China's real GDP is likely to 
be 2 per cent higher than the baseline by 2006, while without endogenous 
productivity growth China's real GDP is likely to be 1 per cent higher than the 
baseline by 2006. Mai also draws some interesting conclusions about the 
regional effects of China joining the WTO, with the coastal cities/provinces such 
as Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Fujian (which have 
high levels of export-oriented light manufacturing industries) expected to benefit 
most from tariff reductions. 
The private sector in China has experienced spectacular growth over the last 
few years (see Krug 2004). Between 1996 and 2001, private enterprises in China 
grew at an average annual rate of about 24 per cent. The final chapter, by 
Marika Vicziany and Guibin Zhang, contains a case study of the Hope Group, 
which is a particularly interesting example of private entrepreneurship because it 
has its origins in western China where the private sector is far smaller and less 
dynamic than in the more prosperous (and more often studied) coastal provinces. 
One of the reasons for this, as Tam discusses in Chapter 5 and elsewhere (Tam 
2004), is the lack of access to capital. In spite of this obstacle the Hope Group 
has emerged as one of the most successful private companies in China and, 
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according to Forbes magazine, the Liu brothers who founded it are the richest 
men in China today. 
1.6 Conclusion 
We can conclude from the above discussion that the quest for economic growth 
and modernization through marketization and globalization has set the scene for 
a wide range of structural and infrastructural changes in the Chinese economy. 
The transformation of the economic system and the growing involvement of 
China in the international economy since the Open Door policy was launched in 
1978 has resulted in the abandonment of structures of the old command 
economy and the building of new institutions created either from the grass roots 
or in a top-down fashion, reflecting China's gradual and experimental approach 
to reform and development. China today is dramatically different from what it 
was when the Open Door policy began, let alone in Mao's times. The 
contributions to this volume exemplify this theme in their respective ways but 
all reveal the breadth as well as the depth of change that has taken place. They 
have shown that on the whole China has dealt with the challenges in pragmatic 
and effective ways in creating a more vibrant and functioning business 
environment that contains sectors capable of competing in the global market, 
although there are clearly areas that require more fundamental changes. 
In many ways and for a variety of reasons, the Chinese government has tried 
to keep its changes ostensibly 'Chinese' (see Warner 2003a). Similarly to the 
development experience of other countries, it is clear that adaptation to the wider 
processes of globalization may often have a distinctly 'national' flavour. The 
transition to a market economy and a competitive society may well be mitigated 
by China's historical and cultural incubus. However, a determination to keep 
control of the extension of market forces that may ultimately undermine the 
domination of the Party and state apparatus has also played a critical role in 
shaping the country's economic and societal transformation in recent years. 
The last decade has nonetheless seen an even bolder foray into the world 
economy and greater political institutionalization, as well as further steps to 
'civility' and 'legality' (Dittmer 2003), all of which suggest that outgoing 
President Jiang Zemin's political legacy, intertwined with ex-Premier Zhu 
Rongji' s pragmatic economic steering, was in fact more important than most 
observers would initially have expected. The next 'Fourth' generation of 
leadership has a tricky balancing act to perform. Already President Hu Jintao 
and Premier Wen Jiabao have, since their elevation to high office in late 2002, 
indicated their willingness to carry the torch of reform one pace further, but at 
the same time shown their compassion towards the 'poor' and the 'laid off. The 
message is clearly that 'winners' must support 'losers', if political stability and 
social cohesion in contemporary China are to be maintained. 
SECTION ONE 

2 Industrial restructuring and corporate 
governance in China's large-scale 
state-owned enterprises 
Die Lo and Russell Smyth 
2.1 Introduction 
China's record of economic development in the last two decades of the twentieth 
century was spectacular by international comparison. Whilst most parts of the 
non-Western world were experiencing sluggish economic growth or outright 
stagnation, China's per capita income on average increased by 9 per cent a year 
over a period of more than twenty years. This record, in particular, stands in 
contrast to the economic depression in countries of the former Soviet bloc which 
also underwent similar processes of systemic transformation. However, while 
China's development record is generally admired, the explanation for its 
achievement has been a matter of debate among observers. A prominent 
assertion, mostly in journalistic writings but also in the scholarly literature, has 
been that China's success has occurred in spite, rather than because, of its 
theoretically dubious approach to systemic transformation. Indeed, orthodox 
economists tend to argue that. by avoiding or delaying mass privatization and 
rapid liberalization in certain key sectors (such as finance), China's systemic 
transformation is likely to have contributed, on balance, negatively to economic 
development. The outstanding record of actual development, therefore, has 
rested on factors other than those attributable to the reformed economic system. 
Understandably, this assertion has been confronted with counter-arguments by 
scholarly studies from heterodox orientations. 
At the heart of the debate is the division of opinion in assessing the reform 
and development of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Given the 
predominance of SOEs in the economy (particularly in industry) throughout 
most years of the reform era, the division thus amounts to a fundamental divide 
over the success or failure of the systemic transformation in toto. The process of 
industrial restructuring, and with it the evolution of corporate governance, has 
also been viewed in this light. Orthodox economists and lending agencies offer 
a three-part argument. First, large-scale SOEs are 'dinosaurs' which represent a 
drag on the state-owned sector and illustrate the dangers of the relationship 
between government and enterprise being too close, which was the root cause of 
the Asian financial crisis (McNally and Lee 1998, Shieh 1999). McNally and 
Lee (1998: 46) reflect the orthodox view on promoting large SOEs: 
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The Achilles heel of [developing large enterprise groups] is that this 
policy can easily lead to the formation of large, unmanageable and 
monopolistic corporate empires that are closely tied to the state. It is 
exactly this type of 'incestuous' government-enterprise relations that 
are held responsible for the Asian financial crisis. 
Second, the gross inefficiency of the corporate governance of SOEs is 
responsible for all, or most, of the alleged problems in the Chinese economy, 
such as unsustainable public debts, ballooning non-performing loans of state 
banks and the distortions that exacerbate mass unemployment. Third, the 
proliferation of small enterprises and the thriving non-state sector is responsible 
for China's growth (Sachs and Woo 1994, World Bank 1997a, OECD 2002). 
The first claim in particular has been disputed by non-orthodox scholars on 
empirical and conceptual grounds. There is an emerging literature which argues 
that large-scale SOEs have been crucial to explaining China's growth (Nolan 
1996, 2001; Nolan and Yeung 2001a, 2001b; Nolan and Wang 1999; Nolan and 
Zhang 2002; Lo 1997, 1999b; Smyth 1997, 2000b). Nolan (1996) argues that 
there has been rapid growth in upstream industries and that through supplying 
producer goods and establishing substantial linkages this has fuelled growth in 
downstream industries, which are usually depicted in market-oriented accounts 
of China's growth record as the engines of growth. Lo (1999a) shows that the 
share of industrial output of large and medium enterprises, most of which are 
SOEs, has increased over the reform period and that the financial performance 
of large and medium size enterprises has been as good as, or better than, small-
scale industries. Holz (2002) goes further and questions the second and third 
orthodox claims. He argues that the performance gap between SOEs and non-
SOEs can be explained by two factors: SOEs face higher circulation tax rates 
than non-SOEs and SOEs have higher capital intensity. Holz (2002) further 
suggests that the decline in SOE profitability over time reflects economic 
transition factors, that non-SOE profitability declined following a similar time 
pattern, and that non-SOEs are no better-suited to withstand downturns than 
SOEs. 
This chapter offers a (re)interpretation of China's industrial restructuring and 
changing corporate governance, with a view to shedding new light on the debate 
over the performance of SOEs as well as on China's systemic transformation as 
a whole. The objectives are twofold. First, we base our interpretation of China's 
industrial performance on well-developed economic theories of institutions and 
development, particularly those derived from studies of East Asian 
industrialization. Second, we present, and attempt to interpret some empirical 
observations that are arguably of central importance to the understanding of the 
industrial restructuring and changing corporate governance. In particular, the 
chapter analyses the significance of the reform and development of China's 
large-scale industrial enterprises (LEs), which have been at the core of the state 
sector and of Chinese industry as a whole. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the process of 
industrial restructuring and provides an initial assessment of its general 
significance. Section 2.3 turns to central issues associated with institutional 
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evolution in large SOEs. By linking up these issues with the empirical 
observations on industrial restructuring in section 2.2, and through drawing on 
relevant theories of institutions and development, the section seeks to clarify the 
strength and weakness of China's reformed economic system. Section 2.4 
summarizes the chapter's main arguments and findings and provides some 
speculative observations on the future prospects for China's ongoing economic 
transformation. 
2.2 Industrial restructuring: observations and (re)interpretation 
China's market-oriented systemic reform has coincided with the shrinking share 
of SOEs in the economy, particularly in industry. As can be seen from Table 2.1, 
between 1978 (the starting year of reform) and 2001, SOEs' share of value-
added in Chinese industry as a whole decreased massively, from 78 per cent to 
34 per cent. There are three important points to note concerning this trend. First, 
the rate of decrease was much slower in the first half of the reform era than in 
the second half, with the value-added share still at a high level of 60 per cent in 
1989. More than half of the decrease in the value-added share occurred in the 
few years from 1994 to 1997, which was due to a state-sponsored downsizing 
drive (the significance of which will be discussed in the next section). Second, 
throughout most years of the reform era, SOEs still registered positive growth in 
their value-added; the only years in which there was negative growth were 1994 
and 1995. On average, the real growth rate per year from 1978 to 2001 was a 
respectable 7 per cent. It was the much faster rate of growth, of 11 per cent a 
year, for Chinese industry as a whole that has accounted for the decreasing 
value-added share for SOEs. Third, the much faster rate of growth in total 
industrial value-added has been largely due to the expansion of rural, informal 
industrial enterprises. These enterprises, however, are not in direct competition 
with SOEs. Regarding their position in the formal sector of Chinese industry, the 
value-added share of SOEs did decrease but at a much less dramatic pace, from 
82 per cent in 1978 to 74 per cent in 1989 and further to 52 per cent in 2001. 
Another important aspect of China's industrial growth record has been the 
good performance of LEs. Not only did these enterprises manage to retain their 
vital position in Chinese industry, but they actually increased their value-added 
share from 31 per cent in 1978 to 34 per cent in 2001. This occurred despite the 
take-off in rural industrialization and hence the massive expansion of informal, 
small-scale enterprises over this period. The average real growth rate per annum 
of the value-added of LEs was 0.4 percentage points above Chinese industry as a 
whole over this period of more than twenty years. But it is of note that most LEs 
are in fact SOEs. Before 1992, the year when the state began to implement its 
reform measure of transforming SOEs into various forms of shareholding 
corporations, virtually all LEs were SOEs. In 1993, SOEs accounted for 87 per 
cent of the value-added of LEs. The share subsequently decreased to 74 per cent 
by 1997, along with the expansion of shareholding firms in the country. In view 
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Table 2.1 Value-added of China's industrial enterprises, 1978-2001 
Shares of value-added ( at current Real growth rates(%) 
prices) in Chinese industry as a whole 
Formal SOEs SOEs+ LEs Total Formal SOEs LEs 
1978 95% 78% 31% 
1979 94% 79% 31% 8.7 7.7 9.5 8.9 
1980 90% 74% 37% 12.7 7.7 5.7 32.8 
1981 89% 73% 29% 1.7 0.3 0.3 -20.0 
1982 89% 72% 29% 5.8 5.7 4.4 7.4 
1983 91% 71% 30% 9.7 12.1 9.2 12.1 
1984 90% 70% 35% 14.9 14.2 12.7 34.2 
1985 89% 67% 32% 18.2 17.1 12.7 8.7 
1986 84% 62% 30% 9.6 3.6 1.8 3.0 
1987 82% 61% 32% 13.2 9.9 10.8 19.1 
1988 80% 58% 30% 15.3 12.9 10.8 10.0 
1989 81% 59% 60% 32% 5.1 6.7 5.8 11.2 
1990 80% 57% 33% 3.4 1.5 0.8 6.7 
1991 79% 55% 33% 14.4 12.7 9.3 14.7 
1992 75% 50% 32% 21.2 14.8 11.8 18.4 
1993 91% 51% 35% 20.1 46.3 22.5 29.8 
1994 76% 41% 32% 18.9 -0.6 -5.7 9.7 
1995 62% 34% 30% 14.0 -6.2 -6.1 5.3 
1996 62% 30% 36% 27% 12.5 11.6 0.6 1.4 
1997 61% 28% 34% 27% 11.3 9.9 5.0 11.2 
1998 58% 33% 27% 8.9 3.5 6.3 11.2 
1999 61% 35% 30% 8.5 14.7 13.1 18.2 
2000 65% 18% 35% 32% 9.8 16.2 12.0 18.5 
2001 67% 15% 35% 34% 8.9 11.3 6.1 14.7 
Sources: Zhongguo Gongye Jingji Tongji Nianjian (China Industrial Economics Statistical 
Yearbook), Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), and Zhongguo Tongji Zhaiyao 
(China Statistical Abstract), various years; and Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), 2 December 2002. 
Notes 
Total = Chinese industry as a whole; Formal = township-and-above independently accounting 
industrial enterprises before 1998, and all state-owned enterprises plus above-designated-sire non-
state-owned enterprises from 1998; SOEs = state-owned enterprises; SOEs+ = state-owned 
enterprises plus state-controlled shareholding enterprises; LEs = large-scale industrial enterprises. 
Except for Total, all the value-added figures before 1992 are converted from net output data. The 
SOEs' real growth rates refer to those of SOEs+ from 1998. 
of the fact that state-controlled shareholding firms typically account for around 6 
per cent of total industrial value-added and that most of these firms are LEs, the 
value-added share in LEs of SOEs and state-controlled shareholding firms 
combined is likely to have remained at around 80 per cent even after 1997. 
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The implication is that, because of the gradualist nature of China's market 
reform, SOEs did dominate Chinese industry in most years of the reform era, 
and that to a significant extent this position still remains. In this connection, the 
expansion of LEs is of particular importance. It should be noted that LEs in fact 
form the core of state industry, and that they have been the main carrier of the 
most important reform measures. Any appraisal of the efficiency attributes of the 
changing corporate governance in Chinese industry, indeed of the systemic 
reform as a whole, must take these observations into account. 
However, before moving on to the discussion on corporate governance, it is 
useful also to look at LEs' relative performance in financial terms, in addition to 
that of output growth. Orthodox observers highlight that the weakness of 
China's economic transformation lies mainly in the financial sphere, often to the 
degree that it is argued that the weak financial performance of industrial 
enterprises has threatened the economy as a whole. Pessimists have even 
predicted that a financial crisis of the type that affected East Asia in 1997 is 
most likely to occur in China precisely because of this weakness. Whether or not 
these predictions are valid, again, in view of available evidence, it is clear that 
LEs have outperformed the rest of Chinese industry in this regard. Of immediate 
concern, in the efforts to avoid an 'East Asian-type' crisis, LEs have managed to 
reduce their liability-to-asset ratio from 61 per cent in 1995 to 57 per cent in 
2000. This compares with the reduction from 66 per cent to 60 per cent for all 
SOEs, and from 65 per cent to 60 per cent for all formal industrial enterprises. 
Meanwhile, as can be seen from Table 2.2, LEs have performed much better 
than other firms in coping with the problem of loss-making. For large and 
medium enterprises combined, the ratio of losses of loss-making enterprises to 
total output of all enterprises decreased from an all-time high level of 14 per cent 
in 1998 to 6 per cent in 2000. This compares with a decrease from 16 per cent to 
7 per cent for all SOEs, and from 14 per cent to 7 per cent for all formal 
industrial enterprises. These figures indicate that, contrary to orthodox accounts, 
Table 2.2 Liability-to-asset ratio and loss-to-output ratio, 1995, 1998, 2000 
Liability-to-asset ratio Loss-to-output ratio 
Formal SOEs LEs Formal SOEs LEs LMEs 
1995 65.31% 65.81% 61.42% 11.68% 11.68% 6.30% 8.58% 
1998 63.19% 63.74% 60.24% 13.84% 16.22% 14.10% 
2000 60.12% 60.34% 57.08% 6.66% 6.93% 5.56% 
Sources: Zhongguo Gongye Jingji Tongji Nianjian (China Industrial Economics Statistical 
Yearbook), Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), and Zhongguo Tongji Zhaiyao 
(China Statistical Abstract), various years; and Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), 2 December 2002. 
Notes 
LMEs = large- and medium-scale industrial enterprises. Loss refers to the losses of loss-making 
enterprises. Output refers to output value of all enterprises in each category, and is proxied by sales 
revenue minus cost. 
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Chinese industrial enterprises, and LEs in particular, have survived the most 
difficult period of reform quite well. 
Long term, it is perhaps even more important to note that, along with Chinese 
industry as a whole, since 1998 LEs have managed to reverse the trend of 
secular decline in profit rates. This is no small achievement given the strong 
correlation between the (declining) industrial profitability and the (also 
declining) industrial investment since the mid-1990s. In this respect, the strong 
performance of LEs relative to other firms is of particular importance. The pre-
tax profit rate of LEs has exceeded that of Chinese industry as a whole, by a 
substantial margin, throughout the reform era. Moreover, available evidence 
suggests that the relatively good performance of LEs is not a reflection of their 
monopolistic position in the market. Up until 1998, the profitability gap between 
LEs and the industrial total had tended to widen despite the process of 
progressive marketization of the economy. Even in the least liberalized 
industrial sectors, competition became acute in the 1990s. In the extreme cases 
of the petroleum extraction industry and the tobacco processing industry, for 
instance, by 1997, there were 83 enterprises (of which 52 were SOEs) and 398 
enterprises (of which 289 were SOEs), respectively, making it difficult to 
characterize them as monopolistic. Even if these two sectors were excluded, the 
pre-tax profit rate of LEs still exceeded that of the industrial total in most years 
of the reform era. 
2.3 Institutional reform: depictions and assessment 
These empirical observations should be seen in the context of the peculiar 
characteristics of China's systemic transformation. An important feature of 
China's reforms is the gradual shift in the orientation of the state from socialist 
commitments to developmental concerns. The massive shrinkage of the output 
share of SOEs in Chinese industry is a clear indication of the decline in socialist 
commitments, given that SOEs are by nature the most socialist in the economy 
in terms of the positions of workers in both production and distribution. 
2.3.1 Promoting state-owned big business 
The Chinese government's approach to promoting large-scale SOEs, which was 
reaffirmed at the Fifteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 
September 1997, is reflected in the slogan zhuadafangxiao ('grasp the large and 
let go of the small'). The centrepiece of the zhuada reforms is the promotion of a 
number of large state-owned enterprise groups (qiye jituan) including 120 
groups known as the 'national team'. Running parallel with these reforms, in 
1997 the government announced preferential support for 512 key large and 
medium enterprises, at least 74 of which were core members of the national 
team (XGTGZ 1999: 325-333). While these 512 firms accounted for just 1 per 
cent of all SOEs, they were responsible for 55 per cent of assets, 60 per cent of 
sales and 80 per cent of taxes of the state industrial sector (CDBW, 14 January 
1998, cited in Sutherland 2001). Supporting the establishment of the 120 
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enterprise groups and 512 key large and medium-sized enterprises, in 1994 the 
government began experimenting with the introduction of a 'modern enterprise 
system' in 100 large and medium enterprises (Smyth 1998). Of the 100 
enterprises, 28 were classified as super-large and 67 as large and medium-sized 
enterprises. Together the 100 enterprises employed 1.5 million people and most 
were members of large enterprise groups in their own right (Sutherland 2001). 
The retention of a sizeable and expanding sector of LEs under state control 
indicates that the state has not reoriented itself to embrace the orthodox free 
market model. It denotes instead a primarily developmental concern: that the 
state is to retain control over the commanding heights of the economy and 
thereby to direct the path of overall development, amid the increasing integration 
of the country into the world market. This is in the spirit of the East Asian, or 
South Korean-Japanese model of late industrialization (Amsden 1989, Wade 
1990, Burkett and Hart-Landsberg 2000). It is also in this spirit that the Chinese 
state has adopted a policy of promoting the development of Korean-Japanese-
type business conglomerates. Paradoxically, rather than being deterred by the 
outbreak of the East Asian crisis, it was precisely in the years 1998-2000 that 
the policy made considerable headway in promoting enterprise groups. As can 
be seen from Table 2.3, which gives data on relative value-added per firm (that 
is the evolution of firm scale), there was a trend of relative decline of LEs until 
1998 because of the market reform. In the subsequent years, though, the trend 
was reversed: the average scale of LEs relative to the industrial total increased 
from 290 times in 1998 to 332 times in 2001. 
The late industrialization perspective suggests that there is considerable 
precedent for building large firms and diversified business groups, based on the 
experience of other late industrializing countries (Amsden and Hikino 1994). 
Amsden (1989, 1992) stresses that the development path of conglomerates in 
late industrializing countries has been different from that in industrialized 
countries. Large firms in industrialized countries first specialized in producing a 
Table 2.3 Relative per enterprise value-added, 1985-2001 
FormaVI'otal SOEsffotal SOEs+llotal Large/fotal 
1985 13 49 669 
1990 15 61 664 
1995 9 28 342 
1998 28 41 290 
1999 30 45 302 
2000 32 53 322 
2001 33 62 332 
Sources: Zhongguo Gongye Jingji Tongji Nianjian (China Industrial Economics Statistical 
Yearbook), Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), and Zhongguo Tongji Zhaiyao 
(China Statistical Abstract), various years; and Renrnin Ribao (People's Daily), 2 December 2002. 
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narrow product line based on core competences and then diversified into related 
industries. This was possible because large industrial enterprises that developed 
in Europe and the USA achieved Schumpeterian organizational and 
technological breakthroughs, which created international oligopolies. However, 
as its definition suggests, late industrialization is a process devoid of innovation 
(Amsden 1992). Hence, in contrast to firms in industrialized countries, firms in 
late industrializing countries have been forced to import and adapt foreign 
technologies and depend on learning through doing to compensate for the 
absence of core innovation. 
A common criticism of the zh,uada process is that enterprises have been 
forced together via administrative mergers and, as a result, lack specific business 
strengths. For example, Shieh (1999: 54) states: 'There have been a number of 
reports that government authorities have pressured successful conglomerates to 
acquire loss-making enterprises - raising concerns that conglomerates are, in 
some cases, being formed on the basis of political considerations rather than 
economic ones.' However, it can equally be argued that these sorts of concerns 
misconstrue the real economic rationale for merging big business groups with 
smaller loss-making firms in transitional economies, which is precisely to foster 
business strengths. Nolan and Wang (1999: 190) observe: 
Merger can be an especially powerful process of advancing business 
capabilities in a transitional economy, since business and technical 
skills are not so widely available as in an advanced economy. The 
merger process led by capable firms with advanced technological and 
management skills can have a powerful positive externality effect, 
spreading business capability more rapidly than would be the case in 
the absence of merger. Moreover, the pressure for mergers is reinforced 
in a poor transitional economy such as China. [In China there are] 
especially large incentives for merger that are consequent upon the 
underdeveloped state of market institutions, which inhibits the capacity 
to obtain needed inputs easily and reliably through contracts mediated 
by the market mechanism. 
This last point has been stressed more generally by Khanna and Palepu (1997), 
who emphasize the knowledge-augmenting function of diversified business 
groups in overcoming institutional deficiencies in developing countries. Khanna 
and Palepu (1997) argue that business groups add value through diversification 
because they are better able to imitate the functions of institutions in advanced 
capitalist economies. Thus, while there has been a shift to more focused 
strategies in recent times in advanced capitalist economies, it does not follow 
that focused strategies will give the best results in emerging markets given 
institutional voids. Khanna and Palepu (1997: 51) point out: 
[Groups] should not break up simply because their competitors are 
focused foreign companies from advanced economies. Western 
companies have access to advanced technology, cheap financing and 
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sophisticated managerial know-how. In the absence of institutions 
providing these and other functions in emerging markets, 
diversification may be the best way to match-up with the competition. 
2.3.2 Enterprise-level refonn 
The gradual shift in state orientation from socialist commitments to 
developmental concerns is even more clearly evident in the evolution of China's 
enterprise-level systemic reform. This evolution can be divided into four phases, 
which are well documented in the literature (see Choe and Yin 2000, Groves et 
al. 1994, Hay et al. 1994, Lo 1997 chapter 4, Yao 1997). The four stages of 
enterprise reform were the profit retention reform during 1979-83, the tax.-for-
profit reform during 1983-86, the adoption of the contract management system 
during 1987-92, and the corporatization of SOEs after 1992. This represents a 
gradual transition towards the establishment of a kind of institutional framework 
where SOEs and, to a lesser extent, collectively-owned enterprises, while 
institutionalizing their own interests, maintained close relationships with state 
authorities at various levels. The close state-enterprise relationships, though, 
were in no sense intended to preserve the socialist character of the enterprise 
system. 
In the first phase of reform, in the profit retention reforms from 1979 to 1983 
enterprises began to be allowed to retain part of their profits at their own 
disposal, rather than handing in all profits to the state authorities. They were also 
granted autonomy in decision-making at the margin (in other words autonomy 
after fulfilling state planning targets). This represented a first step of departure 
from the central planning system where enterprises operated under state 
mandatory planning and were in nature just like divisions of the state 
administrative apparatus. 
The second phase was the tax-for-profit reform from 1983 to 1986. Its 
objective was to gradually substitute a uniform system of income taxes for the 
case-by-case bargaining regime of profit remittance, thereby leaving all 
enterprises to be responsible for their own profits and losses and to engage on an 
equal footing with each other in market competition. This reform was in pursuit 
of the separation of the government and enterprises, and was clearly inspired by 
the standard Walrasian-type notion of the 'pure' market. The problem, however, 
was that the state was not only the government (which collected taxes) but also 
the owner (which collected 'dividends' that were bound to vary across 
enterprises). Theoretically, it is seldom possible for the state to have an arm's-
length relationship with SOEs. In practice, the state thus had to introduce an 
adjustment tax, the rate of which was negotiable for individual enterprises, in 
order to even out differences in profit-making across enterprises due to factors 
that were outside their control. The case-by-case bargaining regime was thus 
resumed. 
The third phase of reform was dominated by the adoption of the contract 
management system. This system abandoned the pursuit of a standardized, 
generally applicable rate of state-enterprise division over enterprise profits. 
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Instead, its aim was to fix the base of tax-and-profit remittance and to allow 
enterprises to keep all the above-base profits - that is, it required enterprises to 
ensure steady increases in tax-and-profit remittance over the pre-contract 
amount which was taken as the base. In essence, this reform was in pursuit of 
the separation of ownership and control. While recognizing that the state as the 
owner needs to be involved in case-by-case bargaining over enterprise 
remittance ('dividends'), the reform sought to make the bargaining formal rather 
than ad hoe. And the bargaining was mainly to be done between the state and 
other outside interested parties through a unified contract-issuing committee, on 
the one hand, and the enterprise management which represented all the inside 
members, on the other. In practice, though, the inevitable asymmetry in 
information between the management and the owner tended to result in soft-
budgeted behaviour. There was serious asymmetry between responsibility for 
profits and responsibility for losses. As a result, enterprises tended to over-
expand in good times, and to ask for re-negotiation over profit remittance in bad 
times. The state had serious difficulties in checking such behaviour, because, 
ultimately, it had almost unlimited responsibility for the survival of the 
enterprises. This systemic feature distinguished Chinese SOEs under the 
contract management system from capitalist corporations that operate under 
separation of ownership and control. 
The fourth phase of reform was the corporatization of SOEs, which was 
initiated after 1992 with the aim of addressing this problem. It was implemented 
in order to separate socialist ownership, broadly defined to include the state's 
responsibility for the survival of enterprises, from the state-owner's property 
rights in enterprises. By transforming SOEs into different kinds of limited 
liability companies or shareholding companies, the state would have limited 
responsibility (up to the actual capital it invests) for enterprises - and the latter 
would have to be responsible for their own profits and losses, up to the point of 
bankruptcy. In terms of control, the state would reserve the power over the 
selection of the top management of enterprises and over their strategic decision-
making. Enterprises would receive investment from the state (or, more precisely, 
state authorities of different levels and localities) and other legal entities, and the 
state would enjoy proportional returns from enterprise profits. Thus, after almost 
two decades of evolution, the Chinese authorities have a vision for the country's 
enterprise system that appears to be akin to state-owned firms in capitalist 
economies. 
At the heart of the evolution described above is the changing relationship 
between the state and inside members of enterprises (that is workers), along with 
other main stakeholders such as local communities, the banks, and related 
business partners. Clearly the difficult process of negotiation over tax-and-profit 
remittance is no more than a bargaining over the distribution and redistribution 
of enterprise surplus between the two sides. More fundamentally, the unlimited 
responsibility of the state for enterprise survival is a reflection of the implicit 
contract between the state and workers, where the former was obliged to 
guarantee job security and a certain level of welfare provision for the latter. The 
corporatization of SOEs after 1992, by imposing a limit on state-owner 
responsibility for enterprises and enterprise responsibility for their workers, 
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amounts to a breakdown of the contract. In this respect the state-sponsored 
downsizing drive in 1994-97 appears to be a necessary condition for the state to 
carry out the corporatization of SOEs. However, whereas the central 
government's stated policy was to transform most small and medium-scale 
SOEs into shareholding co-operatives, local authorities at different levels simply 
seized the opportunity to sell off the assets of enterprises and lay off workers -
thus passing liabilities onto the centre. 
The corporatization of SOEs is not only about distribution. It has far-reaching 
ramifications for economic development as well. Up until the mid-1990s, the 
process of enterprise reform was characterized by a series of compromises 
among the main stakeholders including the state. As a result, the governance 
structure tended to be characterized by a complex web of checks and balances 
among these stakeholders, each having some degree of long-term commitment 
with the enterprise. This was particularly true for the workers, who had a strong 
collective voice in influencing the decisions of enterprises over surplus 
distribution as well as their bargaining positions vis-a-vis outside interested 
parties. It also appeared to be true for the banks, which, being the main source of 
external financing for industrial enterprises, continued to provide credit to 
enterprises despite the secular decline in industrial profitability. 
On the whole, the governance structure of industrial enterprises up until the 
mid- l 990s could be characterized as comprising a system of rigid institutions -
the employment relationship, the finance-industry relationship, the state-
enterprise relationship, and so on - with a systemic focus on long-term 
orientation. What distinguished this system from the pre-reform system was the 
formation and consolidation of the distinctive interests of enterprises, that is of 
the inside members as a group, through the reform. What distinguished the 
system from that of a typical capitalist corporation was the indicated implicit 
contract between the state-owner and the inside members, and hence the state's 
responsibility for enterprise survival. Finally, what distinguished this Chinese 
system from the canonical East Asian enterprise was that, in the Chinese case, 
egalitarianism tended to be the norm both in intra- and inter-firm income 
distribution: intra-firm because of the strong collective voice of workers, and 
inter-firm because of the implicit contract between the state and virtually the 
entire urban population. 
2.3.3 Comparative efficiency attributes of institutions 
The rigid institutions described above appear in nature antithetical to the 
principle of the market, and hence are prone to cause allocative inefficiency. 
Indeed, it is precisely these systemic features that have been held responsible for 
the alleged economic problems indicated in the beginning of this chapter. 
However, the reformed enterprise system should be assessed against broader 
criteria of economic development, rather than just allocative efficiency alone. In 
the literature on East Asian industrialization, there is a range of arguments which 
suggest that an enterprise system of stakeholder accountability does have its 
distinctive advantages vis-a-vis one of shareholder accountability (see for 
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example Aoki 1986, 1990, 1995, 1996, Amsden 1991, Lo 1999a). This literature 
suggests that the long-term commitment of major stakeholders of enterprises 
offers potential for collective learning and intensive horizontal co-operation, 
leading to incremental and continuous innovations that could form an important 
source of enterprise competitiveness. In other words, the possible sacrifice of 
allocative efficiency under the long-term-oriented system could be compensated 
by gains in productive efficiency that would be less likely to materialize under a 
system of shareholder accountability. 
The contract responsibility system made management in large SOEs 
autonomous from the government. It established a close relationship between 
firm performance and the prosperity of the regional authorities to which hand-
overs were made (Nolan and Wang 1999: 186). As a result, local authorities 
gave managers a high degree of autonomy in return for meeting the contracted 
hand-overs (Nolan and Wang 1999, Nolan 2001). This in turn forged a strong 
link between profits on one hand and retained earnings and capacity expansion 
on the other (Jefferson and Rawski 1994: 52-55). When management is left to 
focus on long-term growth and maintaining workers' earnings, the government 
becomes in effect an external stakeholder. This is exactly what occurred in 
industries such as pharmaceuticals and steel where large-scale SOEs are 
dominant. Writing about Capital Iron and Steel (Shougang) and Sanjiu in the 
early 1990s, Nolan and Yeung (2001: 463) write that senior management 
'worked for growth within their industries, rather than short-term profit 
maximization'. This is similar to the stakeholder arrangements in the stylized 
Japanese firm. In the stylized Japanese firm most of the capital is reserved inside 
the firm to finam,c further expansion; hence, the dividend to profit ratio is much 
lower than in other advanced capitalist economies. Most of the large SOEs and 
enterprise groups in China also plough back a large proportion of retained 
earnings to finance further expansion and modernization. For example, in the 
mid-1990s in Shougang 60 per cent of all retained earnings were devoted to 
technological modernization and improving production capabilities (Steinfeld 
1998: 176). Reflecting this trend, using data on a panel of 22,000 large and 
medium enterprises, Jefferson et al. (2003) found that between 1994 and 1999 
research and development activity in large firms became much more intensive, 
with the number of patents almost doubling. 
This is symbolic of more general similarities between the institutional 
structure of large SOEs and the stylized Japanese firm in terms of promoting 
incremental innovation. One criticism of the main bank system in Japan is that 
the close relationship between the main bank and the Japanese firm is allocative-
inefficient. Because the risk bearing and control functions of the main bank are 
asymmetric, the Japanese firm benefits from some degree of soft budget 
constraint. However, an important offsetting feature of the traditional Japanese 
firm is that the major stakeholders - banks, shareholders and workers - make a 
long-term commitment to the firm. Aoki (1990) argues that this promotes 
productive efficiency through cushioning the firm from the full rigours of 
financial and labour markets. The planning time horizon of the banks also tends 
to be longer in the stylized Japanese firm, which is conducive to collective 
learning or continuous incremental technical change in productivity growth. 
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This is similar to large SOEs, suggesting that a trade-off exists between 
allocative and productive efficiency (Lo 1997, 1999a). Lo (1997: 116) states that 
'the rigidities characteristic of China's reformed enterprises, particularly in 
terms of low labour mobility and close government ties, though detrimental to 
allocative efficiency, might have been conducive for productive efficiency'. 
Similar to Japan, enterprise groups in China have used a high proportion of 
retained profits to import technologies and adapt them to local conditions. 
During the Meiji era in Japan (1868-1912), an important reason for high growth 
was the cultivation of so-called Meiji technologies from existing methods, which 
were better suited to local climatic conditions than their imported western 
counterparts. After the Second World War Japanese enterprises also imported 
technologies from Europe and the United States, making improvements through 
incremental innovation. The practice of importing and reverse engineering 
second-hand foreign technologies to meet local conditions has been well 
documented in a number of large Chinese SO Es. For example, Nolan and Yeung 
(2001: 446--447) and Steinfeld (1998: 201-202) discuss how the giant Shougang 
made large purchases of low-price second-hand equipment from Europe and the 
United States (circa 1950) and then updated it with a four-stage investment 
process. 
These arguments can be generalized to suggest a trade-off between the 
concepts of stakeholder accountability and shareholder accountability. Here we 
provide a brief outline of the conceptual framework (a detailed exposition of the 
conceptual framework is provided in Smyth and Lo 2000 and Lo and Smyth 
2004). The starting point is that there are three basic organizational forms: 
markets, hierarchies and networks. These organizational forms are founded on 
different concepts of the division of labour and have their own efficiency 
attributes. The two principles of the division of labour are the detailed division 
of labour and the social division of labour. The detailed division of labour refers 
to the hierarchical relationship between capital and labour within the firm. The 
social division of labour refers to the relationship between capitalists in 
competition with each other as independent entities (Fine 1982: 41). The two 
concepts can also be considered in terms of their respective cognitive bases. For 
the detailed division of labour, productivity growth is generated by the 
separation of conception and execution within the confinement of a given 
cognitive framework. The concrete manifestation in modern economies is the 
transition from the craft system to the factory system, and this transition has 
often been interpreted as being driven by the expansion of the scale of exchange. 
This is reflected in Adam Smith's (1776 [1976]) often quoted dictum that 'the 
division of labour is limited by the extent of the market'. In contrast, the social 
division of labour, which is characterized by the integration of conception and 
execution and productivity growth, is generated by the process of exploration 
between deepening the given cognitive framework and selecting a new cognitive 
framework (see Piore 1992: 165-167). 
The market and hierarchy organizational forms are based on the principle of 
detailed division of labour because of the central importance that both attach to 
the notion of information. The relevant efficiency attribute is allocative 
efficiency or economies of scale. The network organizational form is based on 
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the principle of the social division of labour because it centres on the notion of 
knowledge which is generated through collective learning. The relevant 
efficiency attribute is productive efficiency or economies of scope. The creation 
of knowledge stems from self-motivated learning by participants in the 
production process and from active co-operation between them. The concepts of 
reciprocity and social norms which underpin networks have been suggested as 
being responsible for re-integrating the social division of labour (Piore 1992). 
Both reciprocity and social norms required for facilitating collective learning are 
outgrowths of long-term relationships and are not reducible to individualistic 
rational choices. 
To sum up the preceding discussion, a corporate governance structure of 
stakeholder accountability, as evident in the stylized Japanese firm, is based on 
networks and exhibits the attribute of economies of scope founded on the 
principle of the social division of labour. Meanwhile, a structure of shareholder 
accountability, reflected in the stylized Anglo-American model of the firm, is 
based on either markets or hierarchies and exhibits the attribute of either 
allocative efficiency or economies of scale, both of which are founded on the 
detailed division of labour. The comparative efficiency of shareholder and 
stakeholder accountability depends, ultimately, on the appropriate match or 
otherwise between the organizational forms and the external, demand-side 
environment. 
Shareholder accountability is consistent with the situation where the degree of 
ex ante planning is zero. In this scenario the market is characterized by perfect 
competition and the external environment is highly unstable from the 
perspective of individual firms. Under such circumstances, the market is the 
appropriate institutional arrangement. Firms in perfect competition have a short-
term orientation and have institutional arrangements that are conducive to 
providing the highest degree of flexibility. This allows the firm to make a series 
of adjustments in response to rapid fluctuations in the external environment. 
When the external environment is unstable, such firms are comparatively 
efficient, and the main source of their competitiveness is allocative efficiency. 
Shareholder accountability is also consistent with the situation at the opposite 
end of the spectrum where the degree of planning is high and flexibility is not an 
important factor in accounting for the comparative efficiency of the firm. In this 
scenario hierarchies are the appropriate institutional mode. The focus of the firm 
is on ex ante and centralized planning, which has the advantage of maximizing 
the comparative efficiency of the detailed division of labour within the firm. The 
main source of competitiveness is economies of scale. 
Stakeholder accountability is consistent with the intermediate case where the 
external environment is continuously changing in a steady but not violent 
fashion. In this situation networks are the appropriate institutional mode. The 
focus of the firm is on decentralized collective learning, which has the advantage 
of generating continuous and incremental innovations both to adapt to and to 
govern the changes in the external environment. In these circumstances, the 
main source of competitiveness is economies of scope. 
From this theoretical reasoning, and based on the observations on 
performance indicated in the previous section, it is thus possible to make an 
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overall assessment of the corporate governance of Chinese industry depicted 
above. In a nutshell, in the context of China's specific pattern of economic 
development and systemic change, the governance structure of large-scale 
enterprises has appeared to be on balance conducive to the creation of 
comparative efficiency vis-a-vis the rest of Chinese industry. We conclude this 
section by stressing three features of the reforms, which are consistent with our 
argument. 
First, against the backdrop of the institutionalization of their distinctive 
interests, LEs have still continued to maintain close and long-term relationships 
with their stakeholders. This is unlike small and medium firms (SOEs or 
otherwise) which have now been mostly marketized. This point can be 
illustrated with reference to the extreme case of firms which have been listed on 
the stock market. While being the most marketized of all LEs, these firms have 
retained close and long-term relationships with their stakeholders (see ZGFB 
2000, chapters 26 and 28). Second, market demand in most Chinese industries 
has been steadily expanding, although at different speeds in different periods, 
despite the widespread existence of excess capacity since the early 1990s, which 
has been caused by the lack of exit options for failed firms. Third, in an 
environment of expanding market demand cum excess capacity and hence acute 
competition, LEs have done better financially than small firms (Cheng and Lo 
2002). The connection between relative performance and the characterized 
institutions rests on two observations. One is that although profitability 
indicators are much better for LEs, loss-making indicators are similar between 
firms of different scales. The other observation is that the profitability gap 
between LEs and other firms was much bigger in the boom periods of 1986-
1988 and 1993-1997 than in the demand-stagnant period of 1998-2000. Both of 
these observations are consistent with LEs having more rigid institutional 
arrangements and, unlike small firms, not having an exit option. 
2.4 Future prospects and conclusions 
The exposition in the preceding section, while delineating the strength of the 
process of industrial restructuring and the evolution of corporate governance in 
Chinese SOEs, also clarifies their weakness. The comparative efficiency of the 
reformed enterprise system, as indicated, depends on its appropriate match or 
otherwise with the external demand-side environment. The implication is that 
the appropriate match that has been achieved so far over the reform era in China 
is inherently unstable, and the future prospects rest on the capability of 
enterprises in continuously adjusting their institutional arrangements in relation 
to the changing environment. Anything less than that could result in severe 
difficulty for enterprises, as was clearly evident in the developments in the 
second half of the 1990s. 
Prima facie, the outbreak of the East Asian financial and economic crisis was 
the immediate cause of the worsening demand conditions faced by Chinese 
industry, particularly for LEs - a main symptom being the fact that deflation 
began to occur in China from late 1997. However, it is worth noting that demand 
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deficiency had already been very serious in the preceding years. The gradual 
erosion of the egalitarian pattern of income distribution under the market-
oriented reform had undermined mass consumption in the domestic market. The 
enterprise downsizing drive in 1994-97, by causing mass unemployment and 
thereby the slowdown in the expansion of consumption, only exacerbated the 
situation. This resulted in a fundamental re-orientation of state economic policy 
from 1998 to 2000, from pursuing fast marketization to the adoption of a range 
of market-supplanting anti-crisis policies, which stabilized the trend of 
worsening demand deficiency. Central to this change in focus were Keynesian-
type fiscal stimulus policies, welfare-state policies, measures for revitalizing 
SOEs and tighter regulations over external transactions. With these policies 
Chinese industrial enterprises, and LEs in particular, have since been able to 
substantially improve their financial performance. 
Looking forward to the future, one might speculate that the need for Chinese 
industrial enterprises to adjust their institutional arrangements will become even 
more pressing. Now that most small and medium-scale SOEs have been 
liquidated, and that the collectively-owned sector is in a state of stagnation, the 
pattern of income distribution is likely to become increasingly uneven. Mass 
consumption in the domestic market is thus likely to be undermined. Chinese 
industrial enterprises are also facing direct competition from multinational 
corporations following China's accession to the World Trade Organisation in 
late 2001. The transition towards a largely market-based system, in short, 
implies that demand deficiency is likely to be a prevailing feature. In this 
context, a major source of hope for Chinese industrial enterprises is the 
possibility of opening up foreign markets as a supplementary source of demand. 
This is not all wishful thinking. There is ample evidence that, after two and a 
half decades of reform and rapid economic development, Chinese industrial 
enterprises have largely increased their international competitiveness in a wide 
range of industries. How well they will perform into the future will be an even 
more severe test for the comparative efficiency of their corporate governance 
structure. 
3 Regional comparative analysis of 
China's banking system 
Kym Brown and Michael Skully 
3.1 Introduction 
China's banking system is massive, providing some US$2.l trillion of its 
domestic financial sector's US$3.3 trillion at the end of 2002. Faced with the 
massive inefficiencies of the banking system that formally supported state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), and a substantial informal banking sector that grew 
along with economic growth, the Chinese government had few options but to 
agree to more foreign participation by signing the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) agreement on Trade in Services. Like other transitional and developed 
economies, China is in the process of reforming and liberalizing its banking 
sector from full state ownership. Inextricably connected with this banking 
reform are social and economic issues concerning SOEs, which had traditionally 
received funding from state-owned banks (SOBs), regardless of credit risk. 
Quandaries with such moves include the SOBs then employing fewer staff and 
requiring risk assessment of potential outcomes - a change in culture from past 
practices reliant on state direction and full employment for the people.1 
Reform of the Chinese banking and financial system covers several areas. 
First, we review the bank restructuring literature for transitional economies. 
Claessens (1996) recommends that new entrants to the banking sector may help 
to invigorate the prior centrally planned system and that SOBs could be 
privatized. At the same time regulatory, legal and accounting standards need to 
be improved to support market-based systems, and compliance needs to be 
strengthened. Dziobek and Pazarbasioglu (1997) highlight an important policy 
decision that losses need to be suitably shared between the state, the banks and 
the public. A key indicator of progress is that a country publishes statistical data 
(see Jaffee and Levonian 2001). Based on Eastern European and Central Asian 
countries' experiences, Zoli (2001) found that the fiscal cost of restructuring a 
system depended on the size of bad Joans inherited from the centrally planned 
system and weaknesses in the restructuring policies. The usual pathway for 
transitional economies begins with the provision of entrepreneurial finance, 
including self-financing from friends and family, trade credit and micro finance 
from the government. Then, as a firm grows, it will be able to access bank 
finance. Finally capital markets develop, domestically and perhaps 
internationally (see Bonin and Wachtel 2003). 
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Second, the foreign bank entry literature cites a number of advantages for 
their participation within an economy. These advantages include: the cost of 
finance for domestic firms; the fact that foreign banks will be more independent 
of the government; improvement of existing banks through the efficiency, 
technology and management skills of foreign banks; increased competition; and 
further development of bank supervision and the legal system (see Peek and 
Rosengren 2000; Crystal, Dages, and Goldberg 2001). Other possible 
advantages include encouraging the presence of rating agencies and auditors, 
and the fact that foreign banks are not as vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks 
within any one host country (see Montgomery 2003). One disadvantage, 
however, is the reduced ability of regulators to control the banking system (see 
Buch and Golder 2001). Initially foreign entry was thought inappropriate; 
however, with rapid development of banking systems in Hungary, Poland and 
the Czech Republic following such a policy decision, other countries followed 
(see Bonin and Wachtel 2003). 
All Chinese-influenced economies in the East Asian region were net 
providers of international bank funds in 2002. Most banking markets within the 
region have decreased in size since the 1997 financial crisis period; however, 
China and South Korea have both grown with the former by some 50 per cent. 
China and Indonesia are the riskiest markets, with Chinese non-performing loans 
(NPLs) estimated as high as 45 per cent of total loans. While the Chinese people 
do trust Chinese banks, inefficiencies and direct controls have encouraged the 
development of a sizeable informal market. It is suggested that supervision be 
expanded with more bank supervisors per bank. Foreign banks are expected to 
maintain their operations in niche markets even with further reform and 
accession possibilities. 
This chapter seeks to provide a comparative overview of the Chinese 
financial system, with an emphasis on the banking system and its reform 
progress. Initially an overview is provided of current reforms. Second, the 
Chinese banking system is compared with those of other economies in the 
region. Finally a conclusion is provided, with conjectures about the future 
possibilities of Chinese banking reform. 
3.2 Developments in the Chinese Bank reform process 
Before 1978 one mono-bank, the People's Bank of China, served as both the 
central and commercial bank. In 1979 four state banks were established.2 These 
four now dominate Chinese banking, with 90 per cent of banking assets and 70 
per cent of the lending in 2000 (see Bonin and Huang 2001). Further reforms 
included the establishment of three policy banks in 19943 to assume the non-
profitable funding role of SOBs to SOEs. However, the funding of SOEs by 
SOBs continues. By 2001-2002 non-SOEs were receiving approximately 50 per 
cent of funding from SOBs (see Standard and Poors 2003b). A number of joint-
stock owned commercial banks have evolved since 1986. Also there are over 
100 regional, provincial and city commercial banks with joint-stock ownership. 
Ownership generally consists of provincial governments, state enterprises and 
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some foreign banks. International trust and investment corporations were created 
to facilitate foreign trade and investments. Rural areas and some cities are 
serviced by over 42,000 credit cooperatives. Lastly, foreign banks are found in 
the eastern export-oriented cities (see Asiamoney 2002).4 
NPLs need to be removed from bank balance sheets, as has already been done 
to some extent with four asset management companies (AMCs)5 in China for the 
four SOBs. In 1998, the government injected RMB40 billion for them to 
purchase NPLs from SOBs, thus providing some relief, although levels have 
persisted (see Bonin and Huang 2001). Their working out of loans has been 
difficult, with the AMCs finding the NPLs difficult to offload even to foreign 
purchasers (see Ma and Fung 2002). Limited creditor rights within the current 
legal system are part of the problem, as is the cultural preference not to sell 
equity to foreign interests. AMCs also employed debt-equity swaps, whereby 
the SOE debt (outstanding prior to 1996) was swapped for equity. Some 
RMBl,400 billion was provided to some 600 SOEs in this manner by 2001 
(Steinfeld 2001). However, while the balance sheets of the SOEs improved, their 
fundamentals (such as efficiency) did not change (see Steinfeld and Hulme 
2000). 
The AMCs' removal of NPLs in 1999 and 2000 helped state banks' balance 
sheets. The reported NPL levels still remain high, however. This may be because 
of new NPLs and better disclosure of previous problem loans. Past problem 
loans had limited provisioning, as the Ministry of Finance (MoF) imposed a 
limit of 1 per cent for bad loans, given that taxation was tied to bank revenue.6 
This has supposedly now been lifted to 2-3 per cent, but the Central Bank, the 
People's Bank of China, and the new regulator China Banking Regulatory 
Commission are pressing for NPLs now to be reduced to 1-2 per cent per year.7 
One of the latest reforms has been the establishment in March 2003 of a bank 
regulator separate from the central bank, called the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission. Regional offices will be established for the regulator to aid 
supervisory practices. Another development is a national payments system for 
credit cards that prohibits foreign credit cards, and so can be used by the 
government initially to keep domestic customers loyal to domestic banks. 
Foreign banks will be able to compete in the future. Further reforms include a 
trial of portfolio performance-based remuneration for bank managers in 
Wenzhou city, where illegal financiers have previously been the main provider 
offunds.8 
Informal credit markets are common in transitional states, even though they 
charge higher rates (see Chow and Fung 2000). Table 3.1 illustrates the level of 
informal credit under the heading 'other'. If informal financing numbers could 
be included, perhaps China would rival Japan more closely than expected in 
financing efforts simply within its borders. According to Tsai (2002), less than 1 
per cent of the national banking system was funding private enterprise at the end 
of 2000. Therefore entrepreneurs were relying on informal sources including 
interpersonal borrowing, trade credit, credit cooperatives and private 
unsanctioned banks (which are illegal). Furthermore, Tsai challenges the notion 
that reforms in property rights are required for economic prosperity given the 
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successful growth of China based on the current system with high levels of 
informal credit.9 
Arduous restrictions have been placed on foreign bank participants. A non-
operational representative office has to be established for two years before a 
bank may apply for branch approval. Foreign banks must have at least US$20 
billion of assets globally and minimum capital of RMB300 million locally. 
Other requirements include capital levels, and operations were limited first to 
single branches, wholly owned subsidiaries or joint sino-foreign joint ventures in 
specific cities. In addition, foreign banks have only been permitted to service 
foreign clients, joint-venture enterprises or Chinese nationals and enterprises for 
import/export services or approved foreign currency lending (see OECD 2002). 
Capital restrictions also apply in China whereby profits only can be moved 
offshore. 
China signed the WTO agreement in December 2001. The current bank 
reform process is stepped from 2002. Initially foreign banks were allowed to 
manage all foreign currency transactions with foreigners and after one year also 
with residents. Two years later, RMB transactions with Chinese firms are to be 
allowed, whilst by 2006 foreign banks should be able to accept Chinese deposits 
without geographical restrictions. Prior to that they needed to fund loans with 
foreign capital (see: Li and Yau 2001, Bang 2002). Therefore Chinese banks 
need to be reformed and competitive by 2006 when geographical and currency 
restrictions will no longer apply. Stephens (2003) believes, however, that the 
Chinese authorities will slow their reform process owing to concerns over 
growing NPLs. Proposals against the character of the WTO agreement include 
limiting RMB lending by foreign banks based on the size of the bank rather than 
credit, and limiting the number of new branches each year. 
Table 3.1 Financing patterns 
Total Bank Equity% Operations Other% 
External Finance% Finance% 
Finance% 
China 32.62 10.67 2.56 3.95 15.44 
Indonesia 20.47 16.09 0.00 2.19 2.19 
Malaysia 57.61 16.27 10.88 24.57 5.88 
Philippines 36.03 19.27 1.69 10.88 4.19 
Singapore 39.07 24.07 7.13 6.02 1.85 
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002). 
Note 
External finance includes financing from banks, equity, operations and other finance. Bank finance 
includes financing from domestic as well as foreign banks. Operations finance is the sum of leasing 
and supplier credit. Other financing includes financing from development banks, money lenders, 
public sector and other sources. 
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3.3 The Chinese banking sector in comparison to regional East Asia 
A background of historical development within the Chinese banking system was 
provided in the previous section. This section begins with a preliminary 
assessment of China's macroeconomic environment before comparing its 
banking system with regional economies. For the purposes of analysis, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan are treated as separate economies to China as their banking 
markets are different. 
The real GDP growth for China in 2001 was 10.3 per cent, which was by far 
the highest for the region (see Table 3.2). South Korea followed at 6.3 per 
cent(2002) with other countries in the sample falling well behind. Domestic 
credit has outstripped GDP growth progressively since 1998 and by 2002 it was 
some US$860 billion more than GDP (see Figure 3.1). This is of some concern 
as it may reflect over-financing. The ration of quasi money to GDP was 111.1 
per cent at the end of 2002, third only to Hong Kong at 217.8 per cent and 
Taiwan at 153.8 per cent. This ratio represents the degree to which people are 
willing to place their deposits within the banking system. It usually suggests the 
depositors' view of safety and the degree to which the system offers something 
close to a real return. Therefore it can be inferred that Chinese depositors 
currently trust the banking system. The money supply indicator M2 growth for 
China was 16.8 per cent, which was ahead of Australia at 13.2 per cent in 2002. 
Meanwhile, per capita GDP was only US$959, the third lowest in the region, 
with Indonesia at US$785 and the Philippines at US$928 for 2002. By analysing 
outstanding banking, securities and equity market financing to GDP, the size of 
each economy's financial sectors can be compared. China had a ratio of 264 per 
cent in 2002 as compared to 159 per cent in 1997. As of December 2002 China's 
total financing 10 level ranked seventh in the same eleven-economy sample. 
Therefore more finance is becoming available, but its predominant form in 
China is by domestic bank lending. 11 
Initially the banking markets are evaluated with an overall assessment of their 
size. The measurement is based on total domestic credit by the banking sector 
and outstanding international bank liabilities to GDP, including off-balance 
sheet items for each economy. Both Singapore and Hong Kong have had high 
levels of bank finance outstanding, given their importance as international 
financial centres, although it is interesting to note their proportional decline 
since 1997 (see Table 3.3). By December 2002, Singapore had dropped by 36 
per cent to 222.6 per cent of GDP and Hong Kong by some 20 per cent to 295.3 
per cent. For Hong Kong this can be attributed to structural changes after the 
resumption of Chinese rule. The largest growth in domestic banking markets 
since 1997 was in South Korea and China, where both countries borrow 
relatively small amounts internationally. China had the largest levels of domestic 
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Table 3.2 Macroeconomic variables (all expressed as percentages) 
Real GDP Growth Domestic Credit Money Supply Quasi Money /Gross Dom. 
GDP (M2) Growth GDP Savings/GDP 
1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 2002 
Australia 3.7 3.5 85.0 96.9c 7.3 13.2c 45.3 49.lc 22.0" 
China 9.6 10.3c 106.2 161.6 17.3 16.8 76.1 105.8 38.5 
Hong Kong 5.0 2.2 165.4 143.2 8.4 10.4 157.1 217.8 29.2 
Indonesia 4.6 3.3c 44.4 223.3 27.7 4.7 44.4 40.2 21.1 
Japan 1.9 0.1 292.3 119.6 3.0 3.4 71.6 53.1 28.0" 
Malaysia 7.3 -0.7 129.9 117.9 18.5 5.8 68.2 76.5 41.8 
Philippines 5.1 3.3c 78.5 55.4 20.5 9.6 51.0 46.5 17.3' 
Singapore 8.5 -2.0c 73.6 77.8 10.3 -0.3 68.3 92.7 45.8b 
South Korea 5.0 6.3 69.4 108.2 14.7 10.4 37.1 76.4 26.1 
Taiwan 6.8 -2.2 N/a N/a 8.0 4.4c N/a N/a 23.5b 
Thailand -1.3 1,7c 131.9 102.0 16.4 1.4 82.6 86.8 31.4b 
Sources: Statistics are from the IMP IFS, ADB and EIU. 
Notes 
Indonesian GDP in 2002 was only $US47.6, compared with US$93.l in 1997. 
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Figure 3.1 Growth of domestic credit and GDP in China 
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credit in the region in 2002 at 170.3 per cent of GDP. At the same time, China 
was the smallest borrower of international funds in the region, though total 
Chinese bank borrowings are fast approaching those of Singapore (see Figure 
3.2). The domestic Chinese market was therefore the largest in the region by 
2002. Therefore, the sheer size of the Chinese banking system makes the reform 
process a huge task, even without its linkage to SOE reform. 
Table 3.3 Bank financing across Asia(% of GDP) 
Domestic Credit by Banking Sector 
1997 2002 
Australia 85.0 96.9 
China 106.2 170.3 
Hong Kong 165.4 143.2 
Indonesia 58.5 61.5 
Japan 129.5 119.6 
Malaysia 129.9 118.0 
Philippines 78.4 56.0 
Singapore 73.5 77.9 
South Korea 69.3 108.2 
Taiwan Nia 143.6 
Thailand 131.8 102.0 
Totals 1,027.5 1,197.2 
Sources: !MF IFS statistics and Bank for International Settlements. 
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Figure 3.2 Domestic and international bank financing 
Sources: !MF IFS statistics and Bank for International Settlements. 





























34 Kym Brown and Michael Skully 
Since the implementation of the banking laws of 1996, Chinese banks have 
been required to meet certain ratios of assets to liabilities. It is noteworthy that 
China, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan were all net providers of funds to the 
international banking markets as at the end of 2002 with loan to deposit ratios 
below 100 per cent (see Table 3.4). Therefore it is not surprising that these 
economies have high savings rates on a worldwide basis. Only Japan and 
Taiwan were net providers in 1997, although these results do not include off 
balance-sheet obligations. The small ratio of loans to deposits in 2002 for China 
of just 35 per cent supports the correspondingly small 3.5 per cent international 
bank credit figure from Table 3.3. 
Overall, Chinese bank performance data is difficult to obtain; however, based 
on a large sample, some conclusions can be drawn. The Chinese market is 
second only to that of Japan (as noted), with at least US$1.8 billion in assets at 
the end of 2001 (Table 3.5). Although the four SOBs have a huge proportion of 
the market, their concentration ratios, CR3 and CR5, are in accordance with 
other economies. 12 The interest margin is also comparable, although interest rates 
are controlled. 13 The 2001 ROAE and ROAA appear good for China; however, 
the SOBs in particular had reportedly poor profitability levels in the late 1990s. 
The cost-to-income ratio is one measure of bank efficiency by measuring the 
costs incurred by a bank against the income level. China had a rate of 56.7 per 
cent in 2002, ranking sixth. Unfortunately as Chinese NPLs are not provisioned 
at their true levels, this figure may provide a misleading guide. 
Table 3.4 Banking sector, international banking: loans to deposits ratio (all expressed as 
percentages) 
Dec 1997 Dec 2002 
Australia 182 142 
China 110 35 
Hong Kong 194 50 
Indonesia 302 103 
Japan 85 110 
Malaysia 226 150 
New Zealand 400 331 
Philippines 143 108 
Singapore 138 77 
South Korea 178 162 
Taiwan 67 34 
Thailand 857 144 
Source: Bank for International Settlements. 
Note 
External loans are liabilities and external deposits are assets to the salient country. 
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Table 3.5 Commercial bank descriEtive statistics (2001) 
Siz.e Perfonnance (%) 
Total Equity CR3 CR5 Net ROAE ROAA Cost/ 
Assets (bill (%) (%) Interest Income 
(bill USD) Margin 
USD) 
Australia 445.2 31.0 64.0 85.1 1.9 .81 -0.1 69.4 
China 1,811.5 93.9 64.8 86.2 2.2 8.8 0.4 56.7 
Hong 449.1 45.0 71.2 79.5 2.9 9.4 1.4 57.3 
Kong 
Indonesia 82.7 5.38 58.9 74.3 4.2 11.5 1.1 55.4 
Japan 5,088.0 204.3 34.4 48.9 1.9 -9.7 -0.4 69.7 
Korea 477.9 22.4 46.9 64.7 2.4 16.9 0.6 48.4 
Malaysia 131.8 11.2 43.9 57.0 2.9 9.5 1.0 43.6 
Philippines 45.3 5.8 52.8 71.1 3.6 3.4 0.5 74.2 
Singapore 158.1 18.3 80.5 98.2 2.0 12.3 1.0 44.6 
Taiwan 501.0 37.4 28.7 42.3 2.3 1.6 0.2 53.5 
Thailand 134.8 6.7 50.2 51.3 1.6 11.6 2.6 110.6 
Source: Bankscope database. 
Up to this point the empirics have been good for China. On the negative side, 
a large proportion of bank loans are unlikely to be repaid. Table 3.6 clearly 
illustrates that the Chinese banking market is problematic, with NPLs estimated 
as up to 45 per cent with only a 20 per cent recovery rate. China ranks last in this 
regard. The lowest levels of risk and NPLs are found in Australia, Hong Kong 
and Singapore. The economic and industry risk levels for China are rated 'very 
high' because of the risks involved when liberalizing an economy from a 
transitional state. 
The central bank estimated NPLs for the SOBs at just 27 per cent in 2001 (see 
OECD 2002); independent assessments, however, were much higher. The low 
figure reported in 2001 was after the removal of billions of NPLs to the AMCs. 
Figures reported before the AMCs took over bad loans were also in line with the 
25-30 per cent range, but obviously were much higher in reality. The regulator 
would like NPLs to reduce to 15 per cent by 2005. While this is a commendable 
goal, Chinese NPL figures are often reported as what bank officials would like 
rather than the actual position (Standard and Poors 2003c). 
36 Kym Brown and Michael Skully 
Table 3.6 Banking sector risk and non-Qerforming loans 
Economy Economic Industry Gross Estimated Estimated Estimated 
Risk Risk Problematic PeakNPLs NPLend- Recovery 
Assets end 1997- 2003 Rate on 
1998 crisis NPLs 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
Australia Low Moderately 5-15 <1 <1 70 
low 
China Very high Very high 35-70 n.a. 44-45 20 
Hong Moderate Mod. low- 10-20 7 5-6 50 
Kong mod. 
Indonesia Very high Very high 35-70 75-80 15-17 15 
Japan Mod.low Moderately 15-30 9 12-13 30 
high 
Korea Moderate Moderately 15-30 22 6-7 35 
high 
Malaysia Mod. Moderately 25-40 27 13-14 45 
high high 
New Mod. low Mod. low 10--20 <1 <1 70 
2.ealand 
Philippines High High 25-40 30 30 25 
Singapore Mod. low Mod.low- 10-20 11 7-8 75 
mod. 
Taiwan Moderate Moderately 15-30 18 10 40 
high 
Thailand High Mod.High 35-70 50 28-29 30 
-high 
Source: Standard and Poors (2003a, 2003c ). 
Notes 
Gross Problematic Assets represent the potential peak in the ratio of gross problematic assets as a 
percentage of domestic credit to the private sector and non-financial public enterprises during a 
potential cyclical downturn. 
Holz and Zhu (2002) believe that NPLs are due to firms' poor compliance 
with accounting standards and avoidance of debt repayment. For instance 32,140 
firms, including SOEs, managed to avoid paying 18.51 billion RMB to the SOBs 
in 2000 simply by changing their structure. The courts have not upheld 
creditors' rights, thus frustrating recovery efforts. Another example is based on 
the period 1993 to 1995 when 1,520 enterprises were bankrupted with just a 9.2 
per cent recovery rate. 
Local banking supervision practices can further explain country 
differences. Table 3.7 shows that the Chinese banking sector is quite restricted 
in other activities such as securities, insurance and real estate. With further 
reform this will probably change. Barth , Dopico, Nolle and Wilcox (2002) 
performed a large-scale worldwide study on bank supervisory practices. Banks 
were found to be increasingly able to undertake other activities to extend 
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services and profitability. These activities were classified under securities, 
insurance and real estate. 14 Many countries place restrictions on banks' insurance 
and real estate activities to some extent (see Barth, Dopico, Nolle and Wilcox 
2002); China is therefore not unique in that regard, but reportedly imposes 
higher levels of restrictions. 
Following from Table 3.7, which illustrates the tight restrictions of Chinese 
banks, an analysis of a sample of bank balance sheets (from the Bankscope 
database) can clearly indicate how the various banking markets differ in their 
use of debt securities and equities (see Table 3.8). Security investments (assets) 
by Chinese banks have fallen from US$4.1 billion in 1997 to just US$0.9 billion 
in 2001, ranking Chinese bank use of debt securities assets the lowest in the 
region. Nevertheless, Chinese banks have issued an increasing quantity of short-
term money market instruments (liabilities) and reduced amounts of 'other 
funding', which in this case was mainly classified as 'other bonds' (not 
convertible bonds). Since the 1997/98 financial crisis banks in the region have 
increasingly been issuing domestic debt securities. 
Table 3.7 Banking powers across countries 
Securities Insurance Real Estate Index of 
Economy Activities Activities Activities Restrictiveness 
Australia Unrestricted Permitted Restricted 6 
China Prohibited Restricted Prohibited 11 
Indonesia Permitted Prohibited Prohibited 10 
Japan Restricted Prohibited Restricted 10 
South Korea Permitted Permitted Permitted 6 
Malaysia Permitted Permitted Restricted 7 
Philippines Unrestricted Permitted Permitted 5 
Singapore Unrestricted Permitted Restricted 6 
Taiwan Unrestricted Prohibited Prohibited 9 
Thailand Permitted Permitted Permitted 6 
Source: Barth, Dopico, Nolle and Wilcox (2002). 
Notes 
Unrestricted - the full range of activities can be conducted directly in the bank. 
Permitted - the full range of activities can be conducted, but some activities must be housed in 
affiliates of the bank rather than directly in the bank. 
Restricted - less than a full range of activities is permitted. 
Prohibited - banks are not permitted to engage in the activities. 
Securities activities include underwriting, dealing and brokerage services for securities and mutual 
funds. Insurance activities include underwriting and selling for all kinds of insurance, and acting as a 
principal or agent. Real estate services include investment, development and management. 
Index of Restrictiveness: range 0-12 (higher values indicate more restrictions) 
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• Total Money Market Funding includes certificates of deposit, commercial papers, debt securities 
and securities loaned. 
b Total Other Funding includes convertible bonds, mortgage bonds, hybrid capital and 
subordinated debt. 
China has explicit insurance for the SOBs in order to avoid massive bank runs 
and consequent liquidity problems or even bankruptcy for the government. 
Other domestic banks have implicit insurance, meaning that it is expected that 
the government would help repay depositor monies (they are not. however, 
officially obligated). According to Barth, Dopico, Nolle and Wilcox (2002), 
central bank supervisors are more restrictive on regulations. The structure of 
bank supervision has been found to have little effect on the performance of 
banks, however (Barth, Dopico, Nolle and Wilcox 2002). It is worth noting the 
low level of professional bank supervisors per bank in China at just 0.9 
Regional comparative analysis of China's banking system 39 
supervisors per bank in 2000 (see Table 3.9). Only Singapore has a lower level, 
with only 0.7 per bank; that is quite well justified, however, given the 
geographically small country size and its large number of foreign banks. 
China had the highest level of government ownership of banks in 1995 and 
1970 in our sample of countries, based on the study by La Porta, Lopes-De-
Silanes and Shleifer (2002). Interestingly, Taiwan was the only market with 
increasing levels of government ownership (see Table 3.10). Worldwide the 
trend is declining, and China also has experienced declining government 
ownership of banks. 15 When the government has a larger level of bank 
ownership, politically directed loans are more likely to occur and so bank 
efficiency and development are generally lower (see Barth et al. 2002). 
Therefore a decline in government ownership is a signal of reform. Governments 
generally own banks when per capita income is low and property rights are 
poorly protected (see La Porta, Lopes-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002). Control of 
the banking system has enabled China's socialist government to influence large 
industries within the economy. 
Table 3.9 Bank supervision 
Total no. No. of bank 
No. of professional 





China People's Bank of China 105 100 0.9 
Indonesia Bank Indonesia 165 300 1.8 
The Financial Services 
Japan Agency 294 350 1.1 
Ministry of Finance & 
South Korea Economy 21 518 24.6 
Malaysia Ministry of Finance 34 160 4.7 
Philippines Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 51 359 7.0 
Monetary Authority of 
Singapore Singapore 138 <100 0.7 
Bureau of Monetary Affairs, 
Taiwan MOF 34 643 18.9 
Thailand Ministry of Finance 13 503 38.6 
Source: World Bank Database, Bank Regulation and Supervision (2001). 
Note 
These data are not current. The new regulator for China from March 2003 has been the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission. 
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Table3.10 Government ownership of top 10 banks 
Economy 1995 1970 
Australia 12.3 20.8 
China 99.4 100 
Hong Kong 0 0 
Indonesia 42.9 74.8 
Japan 0 6.9 
South Korea 25.4 56.6 
Malaysia 9.9 20 
Philippines 27.2 52.1 
Singapore 13.5 12.8 
Taiwan 76.5 50.4 
Thailand 17.0 24.0 
Source: La Porta, Lopes-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002). 
Notes 
1995: Share of government ownership in top 10 banks in 1995. 













GClO: Sum of assets of all government owned banks divided by total assets of 10 largest banks in 
country in 1995. 
Foreign banks in China are currently primarily involved in foreign exchange 
activities, but also in trade financing, wholesale banking and corporate lending 
(see Table 3.11). As noted earlier foreign banks are quite restricted in China. As 
the reform process continues however, it is not expected that foreign banks will 
dominate (see Stephens 2003; OECD 2002). Foreign banks have managed to 
take over markets to a greater extent in Latin America and Eastern Europe than 
within Asia. Generally foreign banks are expected to have their niche markets 
where they offer services that supplement domestic bank services. Domestic 
banks in China already have a diverse branch network across the country and 
strong customer relations. Given the currently poor ability to recover NPLs, 
foreign banks are unlikely to vie for large-scale domestic lending (see Stephens 
2003).16 
Business executives within China report improvements in financial market 
sophistication, access to credit for their business, soundness of banks and access 
to bank loans (see Figure 3.3).17 The reforms are clearly moving sentiments 
forward regarding the banking and financial system development and reform. 
Chinese banks, along with most regional economies, have improved the 
perceived strength of their balance sheets since 1998 (see Figure 3.4). Given that 
1998 was at the uncertain time of the Asian financial crisis, this improvement is 
not surprising. 
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Table 3.11 Niche business activities of foreign banks in Asia 
Project Trade Foreign Wholesale Investment/ Retail Corporate 
Financing Financing Exchange Banking Offshore Banking Lending 
Bankin 
China ✓ ✓ * ✓ ✓ 
Hong Kong ✓ ✓ * ✓ ✓ 
Indonesia ✓• ✓ ✓ 
Japan ✓ ✓ * ✓ ✓ 
Malaysia ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ * ✓ 
Philippines ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Singapore ✓ ✓ ✓ * ✓ ✓ ✓ 
South Korea ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Taiwan ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Thailand ✓ ✓ * ✓ 
Source: OECD (2002, p. 255). 
Note 
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Figure 3.3 World Economic Forum: financial market indicators for China 
Source: World Economic Forum (1998, 2003). 
Internet banking may also offer possible future cost-effective solutions in China. 
EBucks in South Africa, for instance, part of FirstRand Bank, has implemented a 
new online banking system involving the combination of Gemstone and Sun 
Microsystems products and was able to save one third on costs compared with 
traditional computing online systems. Claessens, Glaessner and Klingebiel 
(2002) note that if internet banking develops in emerging countries, then 
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emphasis on development of bank supervision and guarantee over deposits is not 
so important except for local banks. This is because of the increasing use of 
foreign banks with home country regulators. Table 3.12 illustrates the use of 
online banking; data for China were not, however, available. Online banking is 
limited by online computer access. The uptake of the internet in China by 2003 




]4 - -- - - - - - -
13 ,__ _ - - - - --
r-!-2 - - - - - - - -- - - - -
i 1 - - - - - - - - - -0 - - - - - - -
~'l> 
~~ 
-~'l> ~~ ~'l> 
v~ '(-o ,? 
~<:--
--:,'l>~ 
~'l> ~o 0c; 
#, ~~ if 
~0 0'l> 
~o o'-
flT<:-- l > 
·# -~~ vc; ~~ 00 ~qj' 1,0 -~~ ~ ~ ,,._~ ,,__..;:.~ 'i" -~ iS' ~ o ,<:< ,:r- ~ 
~0 ~ C:," o-S Cj 
[ D1998 ■ 2002 
Figure 3.4 World Economic Forum: soundness of banks 
Source: World Economic Forum (1998, 2003). 
Table 3.12 Internet banking in Asia 
Banks Offering Online Bank Customus Using 
Services - 2000 Online Banking - 2000 
(%) (%) 
Australia 90 4 
China Nia N/a 
Hong Kong 25 <2 
Indonesia 0 0 
Malaysia 10 <1 
Philippines 15 <1 
Singapore 95 5 
South Korea 90 3 
Taiwan 10 0 
Thailand 0 0 
I 
Source: Claessens, Glaessner and Klingebiel (2002), Internet World Statistics. 
Internet Population 
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3.4 Conclusions 
China has the largest domestic banking system to GDP in the East Asian region 
even with its tight prudential restrictions on other activities permissible to banks. 
When combined with international borrowings, it is third only to the 
international financial centres of Hong Kong and Singapore. Nevertheless, 
China faces the massive task of tackling 45 per cent NPLs that are proving 
difficult to recover or sell. The Chinese banking market has the highest level of 
government ownership in the region, although reform may gradually reduce this. 
Unlike in other transitional states such as Russia, people still trust the banking 
system and maintain extremely high savings rates ( over 38 per cent and quasi-
money to GDP of 111 per cent in 2002). The true debt position is not known, as 
the figure when reported excludes many items such as the bad loans of the 
SOBs. 
Provided depositors do not change their views, Chinese banks are likely to 
continue with adequate liquidity because of the high savings rates. While the 
capital adequacy levels fall short of the required 8 per cent, the explicit deposit 
insurance for SOBs provides some security. Even as the formal financial system 
is developed and further regulated there is still the massive informal sector. Until 
the banks can offer lower cost finance to entrepreneurs, these informal financiers 
are likely to continue operating. The number of supervisors per bank needs to be 
increased, especially given the geographical size of the country. Other financing 
options need to be developed in China also, such as the equity and bond markets 
(see OECD 2002). In 2002 the government agreed to work with the IMF to 
improve the statistical reporting situation, which is a good signal of reform. 
Statistical data (such as NPLs) need to be reported regardless of positive or 
negative information content. Publishing negative financial information may 
help to force reform. NPLs should not be further removed from the SOBs by the 
AM Cs, which will then keep bank management under media scrutiny (Woo 
2002). There have been calls for further removal of NPLs from SOBs' balance 
sheets; however, after the massive injection of funds to AMCs in 1998, high 
levels of NPLs persisted with some defaulters obtaining further finance (see 
Steinfeld 2001). Chinese bank managers are best left to deal with NPLs, though 
it is acknowledged that prior state-directed loans were not within their control. 
The consensus seems to be that China will survive the reform process and that 
foreign banks will develop their niche markets. Cynics do not believe that China 
will fully comply with WTO agreements given their massive problems. Yet with 
continued economic growth and NPLs held constant, it would be possible for 
China to outgrow the problem within nine years (see Holz and Zhu 2002). 
Standard and Poors (2003b) provide a less positive assessment, with NPL 
recovery estimated to take some 23 years. 
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Notes 
In fact, analysis and research of China's financial system is stimulating because large 
structural issues need to be addressed, while in the future academics and economists 
can concentrate on micro issues such as the effects of changing interest rates by 1 per 
cent (see Perkins 2002). 
The four SOBs are: Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction 
Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank. In 1978 over 91 per cent of SOBs' loans 
were directed to SOEs, and in 2000 the figure was approximately 80 per cent (see 
Holz and Zhu 2002). 
China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of China and the Agricultural 
Development Bank of China. 
4 According to Leung, Rigby and Young (2003) bank size and international 
diversification have a significant positive impact on the probability of entry into 
China. Banks from Asia have particular cultural and locational advantages and are 
found to be more likely to enter the market. Improved political conditions and 
increasing international trade are also significant determinants of the timing of entry. 
The Asset Management Companies (AMCs) are: Xinda AMC (for China 
Construction Bank), Dongfang (for Bank of China), Changcheng (for the Agricultural 
Bank of China), and Huarong (for the Industrial and Commercial Bank). Collectively 
they took over RMB 1.4 trillion (US$169 billion), which was estimated as being 40 
per cent of outstanding loans for SOBs in NPLs (see Ma and Fung 2002). 
6 If purchasers of NPLs are uncertain about their abilities to collect, owing to factors 
such as inconsistencies in the courts, it becomes difficult for them to price such a 
portfolio; hence the difficulty in selling NPLs in China. Another problem with the 
NPLs was the time it took before recognizing a loan as bad. Loans were classified as 
'doubtful' when they were two years overdue, and as 'bad debts' if the firm was 
bankrupt or in liquidity (see Bonin and Huang 2001). Rolled-over working capital 
loans with non-payment were not classified as bad. The international standard is now 
being implemented with five loan categories: pass (borrower can honour loan); 
special-mention (borrowers are able to service loan although specific factors may 
affect future ability); substandard (borrowers' abilities to service their loans are in 
question); doubtful (borrowers cannot repay principal and interest in full); and loss 
(only a small portion of principal and interest can be recovered) (see Standard and 
Poors 2003b). 
As is often the case for Chinese financial statistics, poor figures are rarely reported. 
Banks with improved NPLs tend to release their data whilst others do not. 
Geographically Wenzhou is located near Taiwan, and historically it has not been well 
funded from the provincial Zheijang government budget. Interest rates are being 
allowed to float with managers' performance based on loan yields and capital 
management. Formerly, private illegal Fis were the main providers of capital to 
private entrepreneurs. NPLs were extremely low for legitimate banks in Wenzhou, at 
just 5 per cent, with private enterprise producing some 96.7 per cent of the city's 
output. The government was forced to try a more capitalist position, given their lack 
of control over the regulation of illegal financing. The trial commenced in February 
2003 (see People's Daily 2003a). 
A problem with informal finance is that the government has no control. When these 
institutions fail, people are angry and may demonstrate in the streets. 
10 Total financing measurement includes domestic credit by the banking sector, 
international bank borrowings, domestic and international debt securities and equity 
market capitalization. 
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11 This is part of another project currently being undertaken by the authors. 
12 These measure the size of the third and fifth largest banks in each country based on 
total assets. 
13 The central bank has previously kept interest rates within the band of a set rate. For 
SOEs the band was 20 per cent, whilst for non-SOEs the band was 30 per cent above 
or 10 per cent below the set interest rate. As part of the reform process it has been 
proposed to lift the interest rate ceiling to allow credit evaluation policies to develop, 
whilst maintaining the minimum rate. 
14 Securities activities included underwriting, dealing and brokerage services for 
securities and mutual funds. Insurance activities included underwriting and selling for 
all kinds of insurance and acting as a principal or agent. Real estate services included 
investment, development and management (see Barth, Dopico, Nolle and Wilcox 
2002). 
15 Worldwide in 1995, government ownership of banks was at 42 per cent, having 
declined from 59 per cent in 1970. 
16 By the end of 2001, 233 foreign bank representative offices existed in China (Bang 
2002). 
17 The World Economic Forum undertakes an annual survey worldwide asking 
executives to rank the business environment and conditions. 
4 Solving agency problems in a cross-
border environment 
Ten years of Chinese company listings in 
Hong Kong 
Alice de Jonge 
4.1 Introduction 
In 1993 a new phenomenon appeared on the Chinese securities scene: the H-
share. H-shares are shares issued by enterprises located in China and 
incorporated under Chinese law, but which are listed and traded on an overseas 
stock exchange. H-shares are denominated in renminbi (RMB), the Chinese 
national currency, but are subscribed for and traded in the foreign currency of 
the market of listing. In New York, H-shares are traded in the form of American 
or Global Depository Receipts, which are receipts for shares in a non-American 
company entitling the holder to all dividends and capital gains in relation to the 
underlying shares. Whatever the jurisdiction of listing, H-shares can only be 
held and traded by foreign (that is non-Chinese) nationals. 
H-shares issued by Tsingtao Brewery Corporation, the first Chinese company 
ever to issue equities outside of the mainland, began trading on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange (HKSX) on 7 July 1993. Since then, another 77 Chinese 
companies have followed suit, and the number is rising rapidly (as at May 
2003). To begin with, H-share issues were approved in 'batches', and separate 
lists of the successful applicants for listing approval were released periodically. 
Thus Tsingtao Brewery was part of the first batch of nine companies approved 
for overseas listing in 1993, followed by a second batch of 22 companies which 
gained the requisite approval in late 1994. By the end of the 1990s, however, 
individual companies had much more control over the timing of their own H-
share IPOs, and applications were being considered and decided upon separately 
rather than in batches. Recent examples of significant H-share listings include 
the HK $2.23-billion IPO and subsequent Hong Kong listing by China Oilfield 
Services (a subsidiary of China Offshore Oil) in November 2002, and China 
Telecom's US$1.43-billion IPO and dual listings in New York and Hong Kong. 
While Hong Kong remains by far the most popular destination for Chinese firms 
issuing shares overseas, twelve such firms also have equities traded in New 
York, while three have chosen London as a second base for their overseas 
listings. The need for improved corporate governance standards in securities 
markets throughout the world has become particularly obvious in recent years. 
Some of the most serious problems that need to be tackled are those presented 
by the separation of ownership from management in the modern corporation. 
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Much has been said about the problems of agency which exist when 
shareholders are forced to rely so much on the honesty of managers and 
directors for the proper management of the company. The particular purpose of 
this chapter is to analyse how these problems are dealt with in the unique cross-
border environment of the Chinese-incorporated firm with shares listed in Hong 
Kong. 
Chinese companies that have listed H-shares in Hong Kong are regulated by 
both Chinese law and Hong Kong law. On the mainland side, these firms are 
regulated, inter alia, by: 
• Company Law of the PRC (1994) 
• Securities Law (1988) 
• Special Regulations of the State Council concerning Floating and Listing of 
Shares Overseas by Companies Limited by Shares (August 1994) 
• Memorandum of Understanding between the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (] 993)1 
• Notice on the Implementation of Essential Clauses in Articles of 
Association of Companies Listed Overseas (August 1994); establishing the 
Essential Clauses in Articles of Association of Companies Listed Overseas 
On the other side of the border, modern-day Hong Kong is generally 
considered to offer a well-established and transparent legal system providing 
efficient protection for individuals and businesses in the conduct of commercial 
activities. The two most important rules governing the issue, listing and trading 
of H-shares in Hong Kong are the recently enacted Securities and Futures 
Ordinance (2003) and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Listing Rules -
especially Chapter 19A. These laws are policed and enforced by the Securities 
and Futures Commission (a statutory body) and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
(itself a company listed on the Exchange). Both regulatory authorities are vested 
with extensive powers of investigation and prosecution. 
Under the framework established by this combination of Chinese and Hong 
Kong laws, there are three tiers for the exercise of decision-making powers 
within every H-share enterprise. The highest level is the shareholders' general 
meeting which, in theory at least, exercises ultimate power to supervise and 
control the company's business activities, as well as the power to appoint and 
dismiss directors and supervisors. The second level consists of the board of 
directors (responsible for managing the company according to the shareholders' 
direction) and the supervisory committee (responsible for supervising the 
decision-making of directors and management). The third level is the general 
manager and other senior executive personnel who are responsible for the day-
to-day operation of the firm This framework, while meant in theory to protect 
shareholders' interests, has rarely achieved this aim in practice. The result is that 
holders of H-shares have always been, and remain, exposed to a number of risks 
not shared by holders of other equities traded in Hong Kong. 
Foreign investors have recognized the risks discussed above, and the H-share 
market has long traded at a significant discount to the Chinese domestic A-share 
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market as a result In order to bolster confidence in the H-share market, and also 
as part of their overall package of reforms to ensure compliance with China's 
protocol of accession to the World Trade Organisation, the Chinese authorities 
have recently implemented various measures to improve protection of 
shareholder rights. Laura Cha-Shih, the recently appointed vice-chairman of the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), has been particularly 
instrumental in maintaining the reform momentum And some of the most 
important recent reforms have been those aimed at establishing a more equitable 
balance of powers within the tripartite structure of the modern H-share firm 
4.2 Changing ownership structure of listed Chinese firms 
Probably the most important risk factor for the rights of all H-shareholders is the 
dominant presence of the state-controlled shareholder in nearly all Chinese 
public corporations. At the end of 1995, state shares made up 54 per cent of the 
total shares of listed Chinese companies. A number of policies have since 
ensured a decline in this figure to 4 7. 7 per cent of total shares by the end of 2001 
(Jiang 2002). It remains true, however, that the dominance of the state-owned 
shareholder in most listed firms remains more than large enough to seriously 
compromise the independence of company management And many of the 
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that hold a controlling interest in listed 
H-share firms are in financial trouble, with heavy debt burdens. As controlling 
shareholder, the parent SOE therefore has a strong incentive to nominate and 
ensure the election of directors and supervisors willing to provide various forms 
of assistance, even at the expense of other shareholders. As many senior officials 
and government members have recognized, the ability of the controlling 
shareholder to divert capital belonging to the listed enterprise into areas such as 
high-risk speculative investments in the hope of making a quick financial gain 
remains a serious problem Funds have been diverted in the interests of the 
controlling SOE through a variety of stratagems. Large loans from the listed 
company to the parent SOE are all too common. In other cases, listed companies 
have purchased mainland-based assets, often of dubious value, from the parent 
SOE. 
Another reason for the extra risks that holders of China-based shares are 
exposed to is the lack of institutional investor-presence in the Chinese securities 
market What this means is that most non-state shareholders in China are 
individual Chinese citizens who have neither the experience nor the motivation 
necessary to attend shareholders' meetings regularly or monitor the performance 
of company management So far as foreign holders of H-shares are concerned, 
geographical distance and lack of familiarity with the on-ground operations of 
Chinese firms also mean that few are able to scrutinize the decisions and actions 
of management with any degree of effectiveness. And this remains the case 
despite the large number of international financial institutions, multinational 
corporations and professional personnel (lawyers, accountants, market 
researchers and investment advisers) in Hong Kong able to make credible 
market intelligence readily available to shareholders. 
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The dominant position of state-owned entities as controlling shareholders is 
certainly not unique to China However, the nature of the Chinese listing process 
has served to compound the risks of conflicts between controlling and minority 
shareholders. Listing and parent companies have often been in the same business 
sector, and may compete with each other. Even where there exists no direct 
business competition between parent and listed subsidiary after the restructuring 
and listing process has been completed, they almost always still have significant 
business and financial links with each other. In some cases, the listed company 
may depend on the rest of the group for distributing products or supplying raw 
materials. Senior managers often work for both the listed and unlisted parts of 
the group. This type of interdependence between listed companies and their 
parent firms creates fertile ground for agency problems. 
Corporate control mechanisms and shareholder activism can do little to 
alleviate such agency problems under the existing ownership structure. The high 
degree of ownership concentration and the non-tradability of such a large 
proportion of the shares issued by a firm imply a low contestability of control. 
One recent reform with the potential to alter the ownership structure problems 
inherent in the typical listed Chinese firm is the recent introduction of the 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme which allows foreign 
institutional investors, for the very first time, to invest in China's A-share 
markets (Provisional Measures on Administration of Domestic Securities 
Investments of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors, December 2002). Since 
1 November 2002, foreign investors have also been legally allowed to own non-
tradable corporate shares and state-owned shares of listed companies, as 
permitted by the Notice on Relevant Issues concerning the Transfer of State-
Owned Shares and Corporate Shares of Listed Companies to Foreign Investors. 
China's domestic funds, such as the 124.1 billion RMB National Social 
Security Fund, are also being allowed into the market, where they will further 
strengthen the presence of an independent, minority shareholder voice in 
corporate decision making (Bei 2003a). 
There are, in addition, two new sets of rules - the Administration of the 
Takeover of Listed Companies Procedures and the Interim Provisions for 
Foreign Investors to Merge Domestic Enterprises - which enable foreign 
investors to become involved in mergers and takeovers of listed Chinese 
companies.2 The Using Foreign Investment to Re-organise State-Owned 
Enterprises Tentative Provisions also establishes a mechanism aimed at ensuring 
greater foreign and institutional presence in the management and operation of 
enterprises now controlled solely by the state. 
There remain, however, a number of significant obstacles in the way of 
foreign investors wishing to take ownership of formerly state or corporate shares 
in a Chinese listed company. These include: 
• the requirement for foreign investors to hold their investments for at least 12 
months; and 
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• the need to ensure that the proposed investment does not violate China's 
'Industrial Catalogue for Foreign Investments', which lists industries closed 
to foreign investment.3 
The changes wrought by the new sets of rules and procedures outlined above 
are, it would seem, likely to be very slow and very incremental in practice - not 
least because of the sheer inertia created by the historically heavy influence of a 
bulky state presence in the market If one looks at each of the nine enterprises in 
the first batch of companies approved for H-share issues in 1993, for example, 
there have been virtually no changes to the dominant presence of the state in the 
ownership structure of these firms over the past ten years. But change is 
beginning to occur, however gradually. Tsingtao Brewery, the first H-share to 
appear in Hong Kong, provides a good example of how this is happening. 
By the end of 1993, after the restructuring of the company and the issuing 
process was completed and Tsingtao had been fully transformed from an entirely 
state-owned enterprise to a partly-privatized public company, the state still 
remained by far the largest holder of equity in the company. The state, in the 
case of Tsingtao, was represented by the Qingdao State-Owned Assets Bureau, 
which held 399,820,000 state shares or 44.42 per cent of the company's total 
authorized share capital of 900,000,000 shares in 1993. Also non-tractable, were 
the 53,330,000 PRC legal person shares issued by Tsingtao, comprising 5.93 per 
cent of total share capital and owned primarily by state-controlled 'legal 
persons' such as the Bank of China Shandong Province Branch (3.25 per cent of 
total share equity from 1993 to 2000), and the People's Construction Bank of 
China, Qingdao Branch (2.12 per cent for 1993-2000). There were 100,000,000 
tradable A-shares of the company listed in Shanghai, and 346,850,000 tractable 
H-shares listed in Hong Kong. 
This ownership structure remained unchanged until 2001, when the total 
authorized share capital of the company was increased to 1,000,000,000 shares. 
An additional 100,000,000 ordinary A-shares were issued and listed in 
Shanghai, bringing the total number of PRC-listed tradable A-shares to 
200,000,000. Most of the listed A-shares by this stage were held by securities 
investment funds and other institutional investors. 
On 21 October 2002, Tsingtao entered into a strategic alliance with 
Anheuser-Busch Companies Inc (A-B), the world's largest brewery, and agreed 
to issue an aggregate of approximately USD182 million convertible bonds to A-
B in three tranches. The conversion of the first tranche of convertible bonds into 
60,000,000 additional new overseas-listed foreign-invested shares was 
completed by mid-2003, bringing the total share capital of the company to 
1,060,000,000 shares. The 2002 strategic investment agreement also laid the 
groundwork for the conversion of the second tranche of convertible bonds into 
134,000,000 additional new overseas-listed shares, and conversion of the third 
tranche of convertible bonds into 114,219,178 foreign-invested shares, both 
within seven years. 
Upon the conversion of all three tranches of convertible bonds into a total of 
308,219,178 additional new overseas-listed shares, the registered capital of the 
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company will rise to RMB 1,308,219,178 and the share structure of Tsingtao 
will be 1,308,219,178 ordinary shares, of which the Qingdao State-Owned 
Assets Administration Office will hold 399,820,000 shares, holders of domestic 
invested shares listed in the PRC will hold 200,000,000, legal-person A-share 
holders will own 53,330,000, and holders of overseas-listed foreign-invested 
shares will hold 655,069,178.4 In other words, state-controlled equity in the 
company will fall to 30.56 per cent, and foreign-controlled equity will rise to 
50.07 per cent If all goes well, Tsingtao Brewery will be transformed from a 
majority state-owned enterprise, to a majority foreign-owned company. And this 
in turn will help to transform the composition of that company's management 
team, as will be discussed further below. 
4.3 Protection for the rights and interests of minority shareholders 
The PRC Company Law is substantially different from Hong Kong Company 
Law, particularly in the area of shareholders' protection and directors' duties 
towards a company and its shareholders. Protection for minority shareholders is 
particularly notable for its absence. The lack of shareholder protection under 
PRC Company Law is compensated only to a limited extent by the introduction 
of Mandatory Provisions in the articles of association of all Chinese companies 
listed on the HKSX These Mandatory Provisions resulted from joint efforts by 
the Hong Kong Securities Commission and the State Restructuring Commission 
of the PRC to facilitate the offer and listing of PRC companies overseas, and to 
regulate the behaviour of companies with shares listed overseas. In Hong Kong, 
the Mandatory Provisions are required under, and supplemented by, the HKSX 
Listing Rules. In the PRC they are enforced through, and supplemented by, the 
Special Regulations. 
4.3.1 The shareholders' meeting 
Chapter VII of the Mandatory Provisions deals with the rights and obligations of 
shareholders and the powers of the shareholders' meeting. Two or more 
shareholders with combined title to 10 per cent or more of shares with voting 
rights at a shareholders' meeting may require the board of directors to convene 
an interim shareholders' meeting or a meeting of a specific category of 
shareholders (Article 72). Shareholders representing 5 per cent or more of the 
company's shareholders with voting rights have the power to raise proposals for 
agenda inclusion and discussion at a shareholders' meeting. 
The shareholders' meeting is the company's most powerful authority, and 
exercises its decision-making powers, including inter alia the power to elect and 
replace directors and supervisors of the company, and determine their 
remuneration. 5 If the company wishes to expand, reduce or otherwise alter its 
share capital and/or share composition, or amend its articles of association, the 
approval of at least two-thirds of the shareholders who are present at an annual 
or interim meeting must first be obtained (Article 71). The board of directors 
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also cannot dispose of major fixed assets of the company without the approval of 
the shareholders' meeting (Article 89). 
Article 47 expressly restricts the rights and powers able to be exercised by a 
controlling shareholder. A controlling shareholder is defined broadly, and 
includes any shareholder who is in a position to: control the election of a 
majority of directors; exercise control over 30 per cent or more of the company's 
voting rights, or over 30 per cent or more of the company's issued shares; or to 
exercise actual control over the company in any other way. 
A controlling shareholder is prohibited from exercising per cent voting rights 
to make decisions on the following matters which harm the interests of all or 
some shareholders: 
• To relieve a director or supervisor from his/her responsibility on the basis 
that this is in the best interests of the company; 
• To approve that a director or supervisor, whether for his/her own interests or 
another's interests, expropriate company property using any means 
including (but not limited to) any opportunity which is beneficial to the 
company; 
• To approve that a director or supervisor, whether for his/ her own interests 
or another's interests, divest other shareholders of individual rights and 
interests including (but not limited to) any distribution rights and voting 
rights, but not including where the matter is submitted to the shareholders' 
meeting for adoption in accordance with the company's articles of 
association that there be a reorganization of the company. 
4.3.2 Individual shareholder rights 
Hong Kong law permits minority shareholders to start a derivative action in the 
name of such shareholders in cases where directors have breached their fiduciary 
duties. The PRC Civil Procedure Law does not provide for any such procedure. 
The closest thing to a derivative action under PRC law is Article 111 of the 
Company Law, which gives shareholders the right to initiate proceedings in the 
People's Court to restrain any resolution adopted by shareholders in the general 
meeting or meeting of the board of directors if the resolution is in breach of any 
law or infringes the lawful rights and interests of the shareholders. There is no 
attempt in the Company Law however to guard against or deal with oppression 
of minority shareholders by the majority shareholders of a listed firm. It was 
therefore left for the Hong Kong authorities, under the HKSX Listing Rules, to 
ensure that all listed H-share enterprises contain in their articles of association 
provisions which allow minority shareholders to commence action against 
defaulting directors, and which also accord minority protection similar to that 
available under Hong Kong law. 
Until recently, however, political hang-ups and the absence of a case-law 
system in China have presented major obstacles to such actions (Lawrence 
2002a). But then in January 2002, the Supreme People's Court in Beijing issued 
a circular effectively allowing stock investors to sue for compensation from 
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fraudulent listed companies (Bei 2002b ). The Questions Concerning the 
Acceptance of Civil Tort Dispute Cases Arising from Misrepresentation in the 
Securities Market Circular effectively lifted a four-month freeze on shareholder 
actions against companies found to have falsified information. More 
importantly, it was followed by the introduction of the necessary detailed trial 
guidelines to allow such actions to proceed. The Trial of Civil Damages Cases 
Arising from Misrepresentation in the Securities Market Several Provisions (the 
Provisions) came into effect on 1 February 2003. Containing 37 Articles, the 
Provisions not only solve important procedural questions, but also operate to 
significantly expand the scope of legal avenues available for aggrieved 
shareholders to pursue. Then in early November 2002, a 60 year-old Shanghai 
housewife became the first mainland stock investor to win a settlement from a 
mainland-listed company for false disclosure (Bei 2002b). 
A new set of 'Guidelines for Corporate Governance of Listing Companies' 
issued by the CSRC in early 2002 also places significance on shareholder rights. 
Chapter One of the Code deals specifically with shareholder rights, while 
Chapter Two deals with the particular position and behaviour of the controlling 
shareholder. Article 2 states that minority shareholders should have equal status 
with other shareholders, while Article 4 gives all shareholders the right to 
protect their interests through civil litigation and other legal action. Article 8 
requires that companies make a genuine effort to use modern technologies in 
shareholders' annual general meetings to improve shareholder participation. 
Also, Article 11 gives institutional investors more weight in the decision-making 
processes, including the nomination of directors. 
4.4 The introduction of independent directors in Chinese listed 
companies 
The board of directors is the critical link between ownership and corporate 
governance. This is the setting where governance takes place and some of the 
solutions to corporate governance problems can be sought Thus, perhaps the 
most important implication of the dominant role of state ownership in China's 
listed companies is the control the government can exercise over directorship 
and managerial appointments and incentives, and thereby over companies' 
behaviour. 
According to the Company Law, a board of directors should consist of five to 
19 directors. The Mandatory Provisions then establish the typical corporate 
structure whereby the board of directors is made directly accountable to the 
shareholders' meeting, and under which directors, supervisors and managers 
owe specific fiduciary duties to the company and its owners. A certain degree of 
independence is required of all directors and supervisors in that they must avoid 
conflict-of-interest situations in the performance of their duties. Directors must 
make full disclosure and must not vote in respect of any board resolution in 
which they have a direct or indirect interest A director, supervisor, manager or 
other member of senior company personnel must not incite or be implicated in 
the doing by any related party of any act which the director, supervisor, manager 
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or other senior management officer may not do. Related parties are defined 
broadly to include any family member, partner, trustee or controlled company of 
the director, supervisor, manager or member of senior personnel concerned. The 
Mandatory Provisions also specifically prohibit the company from giving any 
loan, or providing any guarantee to secure a loan made, to any director, 
supervisor or officer of the company. Share ownership and remuneration levels 
of directors, supervisors and senior management must be disclosed in every 
annual report 
In 2002, the business journal Asiamoney conducted a corporate governance 
poll of companies throughout the Asian region. Of 121 firms a total 197 
companies polled responded to the survey; 12 of the respondents came from 
China Given the care taken in designing the survey methodology and in 
selecting candidates for polling, the survey results can be taken as a fair 
representation of what counts as the 'average' Asian country, at least at a 
superficial level. Responses provided by the 12 Chinese firms that returned 
completed questionnaires indicate that in the average Chinese firm: 
• the board of directors has about 15 directors, of whom perhaps three or four 
are independent non-executives; 
• the full board formally meets for two or four meetings per year; and 
• most Chinese companies take votes at shareholder meetings through a poll 
(proportionate to the number of shares held) rather than through a show of 
hands (Asiamoney 2002: 36). 
By far the greatest majority of directors of H-share companies are nominated 
by the controlling shareholder (the state), but this situation is beginning to 
change, especially for those companies such as Tsingtao Brewery which have 
invited a greater level of foreign involvement, and where nomination 
committees have been established. 
In the case ofTsingtao, when the company began trading on 15 July 1993, its 
board of directors comprised nine directors, of which six were executive 
directors. Of the three non-executive directors, two came from the state-
controlled bank sector and had significant connections and experience in local 
branches of state-controlled banks. 6 
Following the 2003 conversion of the first tranche of convertible bonds issued 
to Anheuser-Busch into 60,000,000 overseas-listed shares, A-B became entitled 
to nominate a non-executive director and one supervisor to the board and 
supervisory committee of Tsingtao respectively. Then, at the Extraordinary 
General Meeting held in August 2003, shareholders were asked to amend the 
company's articles of association to provide for a board of directors of 10 
directors, of whom at least half would be external (that is non-executive) 
directors. At least one third of the board would be comprised of independent 
directors, with at least one of the independent directors to be an accounting 
professional. The supervisory committee would grow to eight supervisors, with 
the chairman of the supervisory committee to be elected by at least two thirds of 
the committee. Five of the supervisors would be shareholder representatives 
Solving agency problems in a cross-border environment 55 
elected by shareholders in general meeting, and three supervisors would be 
elected to represent staff and workers of the company. There is little doubt that 
the role played by the state in the management of Tsingtao will be altered 
significantly as a result of these changes. 
Other companies are also making changes to the composition and operation 
of their boards to ensure compliance with the 'Guideline Regarding Independent 
Directors in Listing Companies' (the 'Independent Director Guidelines') issued 
by the CSRC in August 2001, and the 'Guidelines for Corporate Governance of 
Listing Companies' issued by the CSRC in early 2002. It is worth noting that the 
Independent Director Guidelines are at least as strict as, and in some cases 
stricter than, similar provisions contained in the 'Code of Best Practice' found in 
Appendix 14 of the Hong Kong Main-Board Listing Rules. The rest of this 
chapter outlines the newly reformed system for independent directors in H-share 
firms, and highlights some of the more important shortcomings of that system. 
The Independent Director Guidelines provide that by 30 June 2003 all listed 
companies must ensure that at least one third of the board of directors are 
independent directors (Article 1(3)). Independent directors can be nominated by 
the board of directors, the supervisory board or any shareholder holding more 
than 1 per cent of shares issued by the company. All nominations must first be 
examined and approved by the CSRC. Independent directors serve the same 
length of term as the other directors of the company, but can be re-elected only 
once and cannot serve any consecutive term in excess of six years. 
In principle, an independent director may only concurrently hold the position 
of independent director in a maximum of five listed companies. If an 
independent director fails to attend a board meeting in person for three 
consecutive times, he or she may be removed from his or her position at the next 
shareholders' meeting. The only other reason for which an independent director 
may be removed from office is where the independent director concerned fails to 
meet the 'independence' requirements imposed by the Guidelines, or becomes 
no longer qualified to hold the position of a director as stipulated in the 
Company Law. A person fails to meet the 'independence' requirements of the 
Guidelines if: 
• the person, or any of his or her relatives, holds a position in the listed 
company or its affiliates; 
• the person, or any of his or her relatives, holds more than 1 per cent of the 
shares of the listed company directly or indirectly, or shares in any of the 10 
largest shareholders of the listed company; 
• the person, or any of his or her relatives, holds a position in any unit which 
holds more than 5 per cent of the shares of the listed company directly or 
indirectly, or any unit which ranks amongst the five largest shareholders of 
the listed company; 
• the person met any one of the three conditions mentioned above at any time 
during the 12 months immediately preceding the date of nomination or 
appointment as independent director; or 
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• the person is not qualified to act as independent director for any other 
reason spelt out in the listed company's articles of association or as 
determined by the CSRC (Article III). 
The Guidelines also operate to provide independent directors with the 
protection of guaranteed security of tenure for the entire period of the term for 
which they have been appointed. If an independent director resigns or is 
removed from office, the CSRC in China and the HKSX in Hong Kong must be 
notified (Article IV of the Guidelines; and in Appendix 14 of the Hong Kong 
Listing Rules see Articles 7 and 12). 
The role of the independent director is to safeguard the overall interests of the 
company with particular attention paid to protecting the rights and interests of 
minority shareholders (Article 1(2)). Independent directors are specifically 
vested by the Guidelines with special powers additional to those stipulated in the 
Company and other relevant laws and regulations. In particular, all major related 
party transactions must first be vetted by each independent director before being 
submitted to the board of directors for discussion. 7 
In addition, with the approval of at least half of all the independent directors, 
any independent director may: 
• independently engage the services of an external auditing or consulting 
organization; 
• propose to the board of directors the appointment or removal of an 
accounting firm engaged by the company; 
• propose the holding of an interim shareholders' meeting; or 
• solicit proxies before the holding of a shareholders' meeting. 
The independent directors of a listed company must provide an independent 
opinion on any of the following matters coming before the board of directors or 
the shareholders' meeting: 
• nomination, appointment or replacement of any director or member of 
senior management; 
• remuneration for directors or senior management; 
• any existing or new loan borrowed from the listed company or other funds 
transfer made by the company's shareholders, actual controllers or affiliated 
enterprises that exceeds RMB 3 million or 5 per cent of the company's net 
assets as recently audited (including an opinion as to whether reasonable 
steps have been taken to recover the amount due from the debtor); 
• any proposal or event that the independent director considers to be 
detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders; or 
• any other matter as stipulated by the company's articles of association. 
Finally, and importantly, listed companies must provide all necessary 
assistance and support, including financial assistance, for independent directors 
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to properly and effectively perform all of their functions and duties (Article VII 
of the Guidelines; and in Appendix 14 of the Hong Kong Listing Rules see 
Article 9). 
By 2003, nearly all listed companies in Hong Kong had established 
compliance with the Appendix 14 Code of Best Practice, and most contain a 
statement to that effect in their latest Annual Report (Webb-site 2002). The main 
reason for such a high level of compliance is not only that the Code is relatively 
easy to comply with, but also that non-compliant companies are expressly 
required to justify their non-compliance under paragraph 34 of Appendix 16 of 
the Hong Kong Listing Rules. 
4.4.1 Lack of a committee system on the boards of listed Chinese companies 
All listed companies are required by the Independent Director Guidelines to 
ensure that any subordinate committee established on the board of directors in 
accordance with the recently introduced Code of Good Governance must have 
independent directors making up at least one half of its membership. The Code 
of Good Corporate Governance establishes recommended, but not mandatory, 
guidelines for the establishment of a number of subordinate committees on the 
boards of all listed enterprises, such as a nomination committee, a remuneration 
committee, and/or an auditing committee. 
The Code of Best Practice contained in Appendix 14 of the Hong Kong 
Listing Rules provides, in Article 14, that listed company boards should 
establish audit committees to supervise the company's financial reporting 
processes and internal financial controls. The committee should be appointed 
from amongst the non-executive directors and a majority of the non-executive 
directors should be independent Article 14 then refers its readers to the 'Guide 
for the Formation of an Audit Committee' published by the Hong Kong Society 
of Accountants in December 1997 for further guidance on the establishment of 
audit committees. 
Given the high degree of compliance with the Appendix 14 Code as 
mentioned above, most Hong Kong listed companies, including most H-share 
companies, have now established audit committees. Other committees, such as 
nomination and remuneration committees, have been introduced more slowly, 
but they are appearing. The Tsingtao Brewery board, for example, established 
three special committees in 2001 - a nomination committee, an audit committee 
and a remuneration committee (Tsingtao 2001 Annual Report, at 29). By the end 
of 2002, these committees had been restructured to form a strategy and 
investment committee, an audit and finance committee and a human resource 
and corporate governance committee. As at the end of 2002, independent 
directors representing the majority assumed chairmanship in all but the strategy 
and investment committee (Tsingtao 2001 Annual Report, at 28-29). 
In regards to remuneration committees, Shi and Weisert (2003: 10) have 
pointed out that 'most listed companies in China lack an incentive mechanism 
that ties the management team's performance to its compensation'. While the 
increasing presence of remuneration committees in listed Chinese firms may 
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well help to promote the use of corporate compensation mechanisms that link 
executive remuneration packages to company performance, it will not be enough 
by itself. For example, the local Chinese market needs to develop a broader 
range of readily available financial instruments for companies to choose from in 
designing individual remuneration packages. Stock options, for example, which 
are commonly used in remuneration packages by Hong Kong companies, have 
only recently become legally available as a financial instrument in mainland 
China. 
4.4.2 The role and status of supervisory committees in listed Chinese firms 
Although the new Independent Director Guidelines ensure that independent 
directors now exist on the boards of all listed Chinese companies, no similar 
requirement exists in relation to the supervisory committee, despite the 
important role which that committee plays in the management of the firm. Under 
the Company Law and the Mandatory Provisions, the role of the supervisory 
committee is to supervise the actions and decisions of directors and officers, and 
in particular to: 
• investigate the company's financial affairs and check the financial and 
business reports, profit distribution plans and other financial documents 
submitted to the shareholders' meeting and to commission accountants 
and/or auditors to assist in the verification of documents in respect of which 
doubts are raised; 
• supervise the actions of the company's directors, managers and other senior 
management personnel during the performance of their duties, and to 
respond appropriately in respect of actions which are in violation of the law, 
regulations or the company's articles of association; 
• represent the company in negotiations with directors or in initiating legal 
proceedings against a director; and 
• propose the convening of interim shareholders' meetings as required 
(Article 108). 
Supervisors are required to attend meetings of the board of directors as non-
voting delegates. Article 106 of the Mandatory Provisions attempts to ensure the 
independence of the supervisory committee and its members by prohibiting any 
director, manager or chief financial officer of the company from concurrently 
holding the position of supervisor. But directors or senior personnel of one 
company can, it would appear, hold a position as supervisor on the supervisory 
committee of any other enterprise, including any related enterprise. 
There is also a need to strengthen the role and powers of the supervisory 
committee itself. Under the current system, the supervisory committee in most 
listed companies is considerably weaker than the board of directors, and in 
particular typically has almost no decisive power to stop or correct any actions 
of directors or senior officers. Nearly always, the supervisory committee can 
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only report to the shareholders' general meeting, which may itself, as noted 
above, be controlled by one or two majority shareholders (Cai and Deng 2002). 
4.4.3 Lack of qualified manpower 
Another shortcoming of the independent director system in China is the fact that 
all too many independent directors simply do not fully understand their 
responsibilities or do not have the training or experience required to perform 
their functions effectively. In more developed markets, directors are more likely 
to be brought in on the basis of their professional qualifications and experience. 
Well qualified directors can be active advisors, and can effectively supervise the 
overall health of the company. In China, however 
Most corporate managers still aspire to a civil service rank, and are 
concerned about how their superiors in the political and administrative 
hierarchy assess their performance. This assessment may be quite 
arbitrary or subjective and be based on such indicators as profits, 
political correctness, and the discharge of social obligations. 
Furthermore, local governments may have incentives that are not 
aligned with the plans of companies that operate on a national or 
international scale. (World Bank 1997a) 
Recent corporate scandals in America and other developed markets show that 
even highly qualified and experienced directors do not always fulfil their duties 
or act honestly, but the lack of managerial expertise in China creates equally 
serious problems. A number of Chinese enterprises are solving the lack of local 
qualified personnel by turning elsewhere, and paying high salaries for top talent 
from other markets.8 But the lack of qualified personnel in China remains a 
problem, and it will take many years before China can provide the kind of 
homegrown talent it now needs.9 But steps are being taken to lay the ground for 
newly qualified younger professionals entering the Chinese corporate scene. 
Article 1(3) of the Independent Director Guidelines now provides that at least 
one of the independent directors must be an accounting professional (that is, a 
person with senior professional title or certified public accountant). Article 1(5) 
also ensures that independent directors and nominees for independent director 
positions must take part in the training organized by CSRC and its authorized 
institutions. And Article II provides that as well as having all of the ordinary 
qualifications required for all persons acting as directors of listed companies, 
persons acting in the position of independent director must also have a basic 
knowledge of the operation of listed companies and be familiar with the relevant 
laws and regulations. In addition, all independent directors must have no less 
than five years' work experience in law, economics or some other professional 
area required by his or her performance of the duties of an independent director. 
These provisions reflect similar provisions in the US National Association of 
Securities Dealers requirements, which provide that independent directors 
should be able to understand the company's financial statement and that the 
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issuer should make sure that the auditing committee has at least one member 
with a professional background in financial accounting (Leung et al. 2002). 
4.4.4 The need for an independent company secretary profession in China 
The Hong Kong Institute of Company Secretaries has argued that the 
development of a designated and specified company secretary profession in 
China is vital to ensuring that all Chinese executives are able to fulfil their 
company-related responsibilities effectively. At present, 'board secretaries' in 
mainland China are expected to concern themselves primarily with providing 
secretarial support to and 'serving' the board of directors and its members. In 
contrast, company secretaries in more developed markets have a much broader 
role in the capacity of secretary for the entire company, not just its board. The 
title 'board secretary', rather than 'company secretary' as in Hong Kong, or 
'corporate secretary' as in North America, also serves to imply a lesser status, 
and to downgrade the overall importance of the role they perform (Leung 2003: 
17). Enhancing their status would also encourage secretaries in China to develop 
practices such as performing unpaid, voluntary and non governmental-directed 
jobs in addition to fulfilling their corporate responsibilities - something that is 
now quite common in Hong Kong and elsewhere. 
The Hong Kong Institute of Company Secretaries has provided some 
assistance towards the establishment of a company secretary profession in 
mainland China, including the introduction of professional training courses for 
PRC board secretaries and senior management Most recently, a new 
Association of Board Secretaries of Listed Companies was established in 
Shanghai. But as the Hong Kong Institute of Company Secretaries has pointed 
out, the new Shanghai association was established under the direction and 
supervision of, and remains dependent upon, the securities authorities in 
Shanghai. In sharp contrast, the Institute of Company Secretaries in Hong Kong 
operates as an independent professional organization, and is neither controlled 
by, nor financially dependent on, the SAR government authorities (Leung 
2003:17). 
Notes 
Similar agreements also exist between the CSRC and the stock exchanges of New York, London 
and Singapore. 
See also the Measures for the Administration of Disclosure of Shareholder Equity Changes of 
Listed Companies (CSRC, promulgated 28 September 2002, effective I December 2002). 
The catalogue, which took effect on I April 2002, excludes foreign firms from taking large or 
controlling stakes in strategic industries such as military facilities, airlines and civil airport 
construction and airport operation firms (see Sito 2002, Bei 2002a and Baker 2002). 
Circular (dated 4 July 2003) issued by the company to all holders of H-shares and received by 
the writer as a holder of such shares later the same month. See also Notice of Extraordinary 
General Meeting issued by Tsingtao Brewery Company and dated 26 June 2003. 
See Article 49, Article 50 and Article 70. 
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Zhang Zhenduo was deputy manager of the Shandong Branch of the Bank of China, and Yu 
Fuzhong was General Manager of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Qingdao 
Branch. 
'Major related party transactions' are defined as any transaction that the listed company intends 
to conclude with a related party the total value of which exceeds RMB 3 million or 5 per cent of 
the company's net assets as recently audited. Independent Directors are specifically vested with 
the ability to engage the services of an intermediary agency to produce an independent financial 
advisory report upon which the independent director can base his or her judgement 
According to one executive search firm, Bo Le Associates, the average salaries of senior 
managers in Beijing and Shanghai are still lower than those in Hong Kong, but the gap is 
narrowing rapidly, and China is becoming an increasingly attractive destination for managerial 
talent, causing a brain drain from other Asian business centres (Shih 2003). 
According to the National Bureau of Statistics, there was in the second half of 2003 only one 
Chinese MBA graduate for every 22 foreign-invested companies, and one Chinese master's 
degree holder for every 1.5 foreign-invested firms (Shih 2003). 
5 Foreign banks - market entry and 
foreign investment 
On Kit Tam* 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the key issues affecting foreign market entry into China's 
banking sector with particular references to the Chinese government's aim to 
promote economic development in the country's western region. It argues that a 
more rapid process of liberalization for market entry by foreign banks will 
contribute to developing the region. It examines how entry of foreign banks in 
the country's western region can impact positively on the inflows of foreign 
direct investment into the region while injecting a much needed impetus for 
transforming the financial sector through raising the level of competition and 
transfer of skills and technology. 
A well functioning infrastructure for banking and capital markets is critical to 
a country's economic growth and is pertinent to foreign investment decisions. 
The financial services sector in the western region clearly Jags behind that of the 
more prosperous eastern coastal region, which in turn is yet to develop into a 
mature and globally competitive one. Given China's current economic and 
financial development, the financial sector can play a critical role in creating an 
attractive investment environment, and allowing a high level of foreign 
participation in the banking sector in the western region can be a cost-effective 
means to achieve better outcomes in attracting FDI inflows for the development 
of the region. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 examines the performance of 
China's banking sector in terms of its role in creating an attractive investment 
environment for foreign investors and the impacts that foreign bank entry may 
bring. Section 5.3 identifies and discusses the key barriers to entry and how they 
could be addressed for a more accelerated pace of liberalization. Some 
conclusions are given in Section 5.4. 
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5.2 The banking sector in China and the benefits of foreign market 
entry 
5.2.1 The financial environment 
In China's economic reform environment, where the building of market 
institutions is still a work in progress, the efficacy of financial system 
development is inseparable from progress in other key areas including reforms 
in SOEs, public finance and the legal system, and regulatory regimes governing 
market entry and operation of both domestic and foreign participants. In both 
direct finance and financial intermediation, the effectiveness of the state-
dominated financial system in China is unsatisfactory, and this sector has lagged 
behind others in attaining a free and competitive market environment.1 The pace 
and extent of financial development in the western region are well behind those 
in the coastal region. Redressing this imbalance will be an important factor in 
building a more favourable business environment for attracting FDI inflows to 
the western region. 
Because finance is highly fungible and liquid, reform of the basic structure of 
a country's financial system cannot be differentiated by local geography and 
must be carried out at the national level. It is therefore unproductive to try to 
institute special treatments for financial transactions for any particular region in 
the hope of attracting FDI. Otherwise, the outcome will invariably be more 
market distortions and opportunities for rent-seeking activities amid regional 
protectionism within the country. 
However, to build up a relatively attractive foreign investment environment in 
the western region, there is a case for accelerating the country's timetable for 
liberalization of FDI inflows into the region. Particularly in the important 
banking sector, measures to relax certain regulatory preconditions for setting up 
business or branches in the region could provide a much needed impetus for FDI 
utilization without compromising prudential requirements. Such policy measures 
make no claims on public finance and do not create market distortions. 
As the Chinese government has long recognized during the country's 
economic reform progress, some policy measures incur direct and indirect costs 
to the government and to some sections of society that are affected by the 
resource reallocation and wealth redistribution from various reform measures. 
The more conspicuous costs for the government include subsidies, rebates, loss 
of tax revenue through various concession schemes, and budget expenditures on 
the provision of resources to support a range of activities and projects. 
Another major but less apparent cost is the financing by the Chinese 
government of measures to reduce the state banking system's non-performing 
loans. Unlike the opening up of the manufacturing sector, the opening of the 
banking and financial sector does not need massive government subsidies and 
concessions. On the contrary, it can be expected to produce substantial positive 
externalities for the economy. The expected competitive pressure brought onto 
domestic banks is certainly real but, based on experiences both in China and 
elsewhere, the overall benefits can be significant. 
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First, the presence of foreign-invested financial institutions, especially foreign 
bank branches, can directly catalyze additional foreign direct investment. 
Foreign companies collect market intelligence, conduct research, and perform 
due diligence in making investment decisions. To carry out all those critical 
steps, foreign investors need, and prefer to have, the range and quality of 
services and service providers that they are accustomed to in their home country 
and other top foreign investment destinations (including coastal China). 
Therefore, having foreign banks on the ground that can operate under 
commercial best practice and business scope will clearly make the investment 
environment in western China more attractive to foreign investors. In addition to 
providing banking services that are compatible with the foreign investors' 
international activities, such foreign banks will also be able to provide much 
needed advice and local knowledge of the business environment. 
Second, it is well established that the development of the financial sector 
helps push overall economic development and makes the general business 
environment better (Litan et al. 2001). As the Chinese government has indeed 
acknowledged, the entry of foreign financial institutions (particularly foreign 
banks) provides an important stimulus to raising the technology, management 
skills and quality of services of the domestic banking system. 
The Chinese government's policy of gradual opening of the financial sector 
has clearly been beneficial for the financial and economic development of 
coastal China and there are even more reasons and greater urgency for 
accelerating the process of financial development for the country's western 
region. In addition to the direct catalytic benefits in attracting FDI, foreign bank 
entry will have a further and probably more profound benefit in the competitive 
spur this will provide to China's state-owned and joint stock banks. 
Improvements in practices and service in these banks as a result of 
competitive pressure from foreign banks will benefit all enterprises, including 
local private companies and SOEs. When foreign banks entry is accompanied by 
other financial institutions (such as insurance companies, mortgage banks, car 
finance companies and fund management companies), an enhanced economic 
environment will be created. The usual arguments that have been put forward for 
opening up the banking sector in any country (including China) are certainly 
pertinent and more urgent for this region because of the slower progress in its 
financial development to date. 
The challenge to the Chinese government does not lie in bestowing the 
western region with special concessions and subsidies tied to financial flows 
associated with FDI activities in that region. It is more productive to focus on 
creating more competition in, and raising the sophistication of, the key player in 
the financial services sector - the banking institutions. To achieve that goal, the 
quantity and the scope of banking institutions in the region need to be expanded 
by expediting the liberalization process to allow qualified foreign and private 
investors to establish banks and non-bank financial institutions. Apart from the 
positive competition and demonstration effects, this should also enhance credit 
availability in Chinese currency and improve project bankability for FDI 
activities. 
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5.3 Challenges for China's banking system 
China's predominantly state-owned banking system has been made to serve the 
state industrial sector, resulting in a whole range of attendant problems that are 
well known (Tam 1995, Lardy 1998, Xie 2003). It is not the purpose of this 
study to examine the whole issue of the restructuring and development of 
China's banking system. This chapter aims to investigate why the opening up of 
the banking sector in the western region is important in enhancing the foreign 
investment environment. The reform of the country's banking system has lagged 
behind other sectors of the Chinese economy. The productivity of the state banks 
is low and their efficiency in transforming savings into productive investment 
has been poor. Chinese banks, whether they are state owned or owned by 
shareholders, are heavily taxed and exploited for fiscal revenue by the state 
(Langlois 2001). 
More important from the perspective of foreign investment is the 
acknowledged fact that most Chinese banks' credit management system and 
mode of operation still lack effectiveness and adaptability to meeting the 
changing and expanding needs for international trade and investment (People's 
Daily, 9 July 2002). For instance, credit rating of enterprises is geared for 
industrial manufacturers and does not take into account the characteristics of 
enterprises that engage in foreign trade and investment. As in many other areas 
involving government approval, bank loan approval processes tend to be 
unreasonably long and complicated. 
One of the most conspicuous features of the malaise of China's banking 
system is the huge proportion of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the four major 
state banks. While the official average figure of NPLs for the four state banks 
was about 26 per cent as of 2001, estimates by various observers can range up to 
60 per cent of the banks' total outstanding loans. Regardless of the true extent of 
the NPLs, it is commonly agreed that the problem is serious (Lardy 1998, Ma 
and Fung 2002). The banking sector's preoccupation with serving the state-
owned sector has also meant that it has not provided effective services to the 
fledgling private sector (Tam 2004 ), the healthy development of which is a 
critical condition for building an attractive investment environment for 
sustainable inflow of productive FDI. 
It is interesting to note that the NPL situation may exert indirect influence on 
the financial sector in the western region. The high level of NPLs and the 
recently introduced more stringent and direct personal responsibility for bank 
credit officers has unwittingly led to a certain degree of reluctance by state 
banks to extend credit to avoid managing risks. This situation clearly poses a 
problem for the economic development in the western region, particularly for 
the development of the increasingly important private sector and the creation of 
an attractive investment environment. 
While there is no comprehensive documentation on the catalyst impact of 
foreign banks in attracting FDI to host countries, survey and interview data 
collected by the ADB project team clearly indicate that foreign investors do have 
a strong preference for the presence of foreign banks to provide them with the 
kind and quality of services they require. Because Chinese banks are allowed to 
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engage only in traditional banking services, with 70 per cent of their profit 
coming from interest income (restrictions not unlike the previous Glass-Steagall 
Act in the United States), they are less likely to be capable of servicing the full 
range of needs of foreign investors. 
In contrast, foreign banks are usually universal banks that can provide a more 
comprehensive spectrum of services in a global framework. Their branches in 
China will be part of this international business network and will therefore be 
better able to service existing foreign investors and help attract new ones. There 
is nevertheless ample anecdotal evidence from media reports and from foreign 
banks already in China that foreign banks have played a significant role in 
facilitating and raising the volume ofFDI inflows.2 
5.3.1 Banking services for foreign investors 
Interviews3 with foreign enterprises already operating in Sichuan provide 
information at firm level on the extent and nature of problems encountered by 
foreign companies in obtaining credit finance from the Chinese banking system. 
They show that an overwhelming majority of foreign investors are dissatisfied 
with and highly critical of the banking services they get from the Chinese state 
owned banks. The major complaints are: 
• Inadequate banking services that cannot meet demand; 
• Difficulty in obtaining loans, with complicated, inflexible and time-
consuming procedures in loan applications; 
• Problems with the requirement to obtain a guarantee from an international 
bank in order to borrow from domestic Chinese banks; and 
• Expensive and time consuming process in registering for loan collateral. 
Indeed these problems are similar to those faced by private enterprises in 
China (Tam 2004). Whereas domestic enterprises may resort to various kinds of 
informal credit markets, foreign-invested enterprises do not usually have this 
type of choice. The case for creating effective alternatives through the presence 
of foreign banks is therefore clear and justified. 
On the basis of a recent survey of foreign-invested enterprises by a Chinese 
state bank in Shanghai, a basic set of financial services required by foreign 
investors are identified (Zhonghua Gongshang Shibao (China Business Times), 
30 September 2002): 
• Banking facilities that enable electronic enquiries and payment settlements, 
cross-region money transfers, and domestic letters of credit; 
• Internationally accepted forms of credit transactions, and products such as 
receivables financing and bank overdraft facilities; 
• Products for managing exchange rate risks, and facilities for timely and 
efficient foreign exchange transactions; 
Foreign banks - market entry and foreign investment 67 
• Servicing the global need of the treasury function of transnational 
corporations; and 
• Advisory and consultancy services on financial as well as policy and 
regulatory matters. 
It appears that the state-owned banks themselves have started to take some 
note of the issue of providing better services to foreign companies, but some 
inherent difficulties remain. As noted, Chinese banks are not permitted to 
engage in other non-traditional banking services such as investment banking and 
securities, although state-owned conglomerates such as Everbright and CITIC 
have been given special treatment to cover the whole range of financial services 
through their subsidiaries. 
Thus most Chinese banks will not be able to provide a comprehensive range 
of financial services. However, in the last two years the People's Bank of China 
has appeared to be very selectively opening intermediate areas of services in a 
limited and guarded way (Wu 2003), although there is so far no clear provision 
for foreign banks.4 
5.3.2 Foreign banks' economic and market impacts 
At the general level, foreign ownership of domestic banks in emerging markets 
is found 'to increase overall financial institution strength in both quantitative and 
qualitative terms' by way of: 
• Providing greater access to capital and liquidity and bolstering balance sheet 
strength; 
• The knowledge, skill, and technology transfer that accompany foreign bank 
entry and can be expected to contribute to a stronger control and risk 
management environment; 
• More broadly, foreign bank presence in emerging market financial systems 
is argued to contribute to an improved financial system infrastructure by 
encouraging higher standards in auditing, accounting and disclosure, credit 
risk underwriting and reserving, and supervision (Crystal et al. 2001). 
At the level of bank operation, the beneficial effects of foreign bank 
ownership can be gauged by the expected changes in the key factors that 
constitute a bank's strength. Crystal et al.'s (2001) summary of what is termed 
the CAMEL Framework for assessing domestic bank strength in the event of 
foreign bank acquisition may be relevant here, and is presented in Table 5.1. 
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Components of CAMEL Analysis 
Compliance with regulatory 
standards; 
Adequacy given nature/level of risks, 
and future expansion plans; 
Quality of bank capital. 
Creditworthiness of bank loans and 
investments: 
Adequacy of credit policies and 
procedures; 
Adequacy of loan loss reserve 
policies and levels; 
Level of impaired assets to capital 
and reserves. 
Fitness and experience levels; 
Adequacy of strategic and operating 
plans; 
Risk management and control 
environment; 
Succession planning. 
Quantity and quality; 
Diversification; 
Sensitivity to market risk. 
Adequacy of asset/liability 
management policies and procedures; 
Appropriate level of asset and 
liability liquidity; 
Diversification of funding sources; 
Contingent funding plans. 
Possible Implications of 
Foreign Ownership 
Improved access to and 
increased diversification of 
bank capital, leading to 




administration leading to 
lower non-performing loan 
levels and higher reserve 
coverage of NPLs. 
Secondment of management 
from head office, coupled 
with risk management and 
internal control practices 
closer to international norms, 
leading to better corporate 
governance. 
Wider variety of products 
and services, stronger 
corporate governance, and 
potentially lower funding 
costs, leading to higher and 
more stable bank earnings. 
Foreign bank access to 
parent bank liquidity and 
international funding 
markets, in combination with 
a higher credit standing of 
the parent and more 
sophisticated balance sheet 
management techniques, 
leading to better liquidity 
management. 
CAMEL framework consists of individual assessments of core aspects of a bank's financial 
condition and perfonnance: Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity. 
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Crystal et al.' s (2001) comparative study of foreign and domestic banks in the 
seven largest economies in South America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) finds that foreign banks have consistently stronger 
average credit growth, take more aggressive action to deal with asset quality 
deterioration, and possess the capacity and willingness to sacrifice short-term 
profitability for longer-term soundness. The findings suggest that foreign 
ownership may have quite positive implications for financial sector stability, 
development, and efficiency. The effects given in Table 5.1 primarily refer to a 
complete or partial change in bank ownership. It may be argued that, a priori, 
most of these impacts will be strengthened in the case of the establishment of 
foreign bank branches because the positive effects of full ownership and control 
will be realized. In the context of China's development this is particularly 
relevant as foreign banks have so far opted mainly for the creation of a branch as 
the market entry mode. 
From recent experience in countries where the domestic banking sector is 
under stress, the entry of foreign banks through mergers and acquisition 
activities has clearly worked to produce positive outcomes. There is now clear 
empirical evidence to show that. particularly among emerging economies, 
foreign bank entry has led to improvements in a country's banking system 
efficiency (Roldos 2002). There is also some evidence to suggest that a greater 
foreign bank presence contributes to a more stable banking system and less 
volatility in the availability of credit (Dages et al. 2000; Clarke et al. 2002). 
Given the potential problems posed by the high level of NPLs, any policy 
action and regulatory initiative to encourage such activities in China will have 
similar benefits. Of no less importance and relevance for the development of 
China's western region is the positive contributions that foreign bank presence 
will make to enhancing the attractiveness of the foreign investment environment. 
In a review of empirical evidence on the role of foreign banks in a large sample 
of economies, the following positive impacts are found (Poret 2001): 
• Based on a study of 21 transition economies, a clear correlation is found 
between foreign bank participation in a country and various key indicators 
of banking reform; 
• There is evidence that foreign bank entry at various times in Nordic 
countries, Hungary, Korea, and Mexico has helped countries recover faster 
from banking crises, partly through the broadening of the capital base of the 
country's banking and financial sector; 
• The benefits from the transfer of financial knowhow and increased 
efficiency are extensive. For instance, after acquiring the Midland Bank in 
the United Kingdom, HSBC has successfully brought from Asia a cash-flow 
method of assessing lending to SMEs; and 
• Prudential standards and compliance have been upgraded. Foreign banks are 
already subject to Basel and other internationally accepted requirements and 
practices relating to capital adequacy, risk management and information 
disclosure. Their entry into the domestic market has tended to lift the 
performance of local banks in these important areas. 
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In terms of creating an attractive environment for FDI, the benefits from the 
entry of foreign banks are not limited to the various static gains discussed above. 
There are also important dynamic benefits in the form of the evolution of a more 
efficient, internationally competitive financial sector that provide a basis for the 
country's long-term economic development in a sustainable way. On the other 
hand there are also some commonly held beliefs in the possible negative impacts 
from foreign bank entry: 
• The limited ability of local banks to compete with the larger global banks 
and the consequent adverse impact on their performance; 
• Foreign banks concentrate only on the profitable high value-added end of 
the market, and leave the more risky customers to the less competitive local 
banks;and 
• Foreign bank entry introduces instability to the banking system because of 
the additional avenues for capital flight. 
However, some of these concerns are based on a notion of banks as having 
certain national strategic importance, and from the perspective of local banks 
that are usually bestowed with monopolistic profit opportunities from having a 
bank license as a scarce and administratively allocated resource. In any case, as 
the empirical evidence noted in the preceding paragraphs has demonstrated, 
foreign bank entry does not as a rule result in any of those feared negative 
outcomes. Furthermore, given that foreign banks in China only account for 
about 2 per cent of the market at present, and are not expected to exceed 15 per 
cent within the next fifteen years according to estimates by the Citibank Group, 
the feared market effect on domestic banks is unlikely to be systemically 
devastating for the sector although with foreign entry individual banks may 
suffer a decline in their share of a growing but more competitive market. 
5.3.3 The insurance industry experience 
Indeed, the benefits from the competition of foreign life insurance companies in 
Shanghai in which the life insurance market has seen impressive growth amply 
demonstrate the positive role that market entry of foreign competitors can play 
in transforming and lifting the industry's capacity and performance. The city is 
where most of the foreign insurance companies are initially allowed to start up 
joint ventures to sell insurance policies (except in the special case of the 
American company AIG which has been allowed to operate as a wholly foreign-
owned company up to the present). Shanghai is the base for 8 of the 17 foreign 
life insurance companies in operation or about to set up business as of 2002, and 
7 of the 11 foreign property insurance companies (Caijing 2002). However, on 
all counts the entry of foreign insurers has directly contributed to a growing and 
vibrant insurance market in Shanghai and China. 
Foreign entry did not decimate the Shanghai insurance market and has not 
resulted in any instability. On the contrary, the city's insurance premium income 
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has continued to grow at an average annual rate of over 30 per cent since the 
mid-1990s. The total profits of Shanghai's Chinese and foreign-participated 
insurance companies accounted for 25 per cent of the total profits of the 
insurance industry of the country in 2003. There is no doubt that Chinese 
insurance companies have benefited from the presence of foreign entrants and 
there is much that local companies need to catch up (including business models, 
management, product development, marketing, financial control and claims 
administration, and investment systems). 
The less obvious but equally important contributions that foreign insurance 
companies make are to do with establishing benchmarks of professionalism, 
ethical standards, accountability, and transparency in the conduct of business 
and the behavior of insurance agents in this emerging industry. Insurance 
products, whether life or property insurance policies, are a new and unknown 
commodity for the majority of the Chinese population. The entry of foreign 
companies with their experience and expertise, and the competitive pressure this 
exerts on Chinese companies, have helped create an awareness, acceptance and 
demand for insurance products among an increasing proportion of Chinese 
consumers. There is no doubt that the kinds of contributions that foreign 
insurance companies have made to the development of China's insurance 
industry can similarly be repeated under a more liberal entry environment by 
foreign bank entry in the western region. 
Given the fact that the western region lacks most of the complementary 
economic fundamentals that provide an attractive FDI environment, there is no 
alternative but to create a financial infrastructure that should be one of the most 
market-friendly and efficient in the country in order to better facilitate FDI 
inflows and to gain a competitive advantage position in attracting foreign 
investment. 
5.4 Foreign bank entry 
While the case for a stronger and more extensive presence of foreign banks in 
the western region can be established, it remains the decision of the foreign 
financial institutions themselves whether they are willing and able to conduct 
banking business at locations in the western region. Of the total number of 
foreign bank branches and foreign bank representative offices in China, most are 
located in cities of the coastal region. In the capital of Sichuan, Chengdu, there 
were only one foreign bank branch (compared to 45 in Shanghai and 24 in 
Shenzhen) and seven foreign bank representative offices, and for the whole of 
the western region there were only three foreign bank branches in 2000. 
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At the time of writing, a foreign bank in China could take one of three forms 
permitted by Chinese law: 
• Solely foreign-funded foreign bank with its headquarters located in China; 
• Joint equity bank whereby a foreign financial institution and a Chinese 
financial institution jointly fund and run the operation in China; or 
• Foreign bank branch established in China by a foreign bank. 
5.4.J Entry mode 
In China, establishing a foreign bank branch has been the most common entry 
mode. Because the establishment of bank branches imposes various legal and 
financial obligations on the parent bank in the home country, this may have 
provided a degree of comfort to the Chinese government, particularly in the 
early days of the open-door policy when the system of supervision and 
regulation was being developed from scratch. From the perspective of the 
Chinese monetary authorities, the tradeoff is that a foreign bank branch is part of 
the parent bank which is a foreign legal entity subject to the supervision and 
regulations of the home country's monetary authorities (although China does 
nonetheless impose a range of prudential requirements of its own on foreign 
bank branches). On the other hand, there may be some attraction for foreign 
financial institutions in opting for the bank branch mode because of the high 
level of control and organizational integration with the parent bank. 
While many foreign financial institutions do have strategic ambitions to enter 
and develop the China market, the Chinese government has been very cautious 
in the opening up process. The aim to protect the domestic banking industry 
against foreign competition has clearly played a part in that approach. Under its 
WTO membership commitments, China has undertaken the gradual process of 
phasing in the removal of restrictions in respect of conducting Chinese currency 
business and the geographical location of businesses (see Table 5.2). 
However, even as these types of entry restrictions are being dismantled, there 
remains a range of barriers (some of which may not necessarily be based on 
prudential considerations) that serve to constrain the capacity of foreign banks to 
expand their operations in China, and may even deter foreign bank entry. Of 
course as in the general case of the well understood area of non-tariff barriers to 
international trade in the literature, it is not unthinkable that certain prudential 
requirements can be unintentionally or deliberately used as barriers to foreign 
entry into the market. Table 5.3 summarizes the basic requirements for 
establishing and operating the three forms of foreign banking institutions in 
China. 
On the basis of the initial set of regulations governing the entry of foreign 
banks and finance companies (Regulations on the Administration of Foreign 
Invested Financial Institutions in the People's Republic of China, 25 February 
1994), the Chinese government has updated and provided more details in a 
revised set that came into force in February 2002 (Stipulations on the 
Enforcement of the Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Invested 
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Financial Institutions in the People's Republic of China). Having experienced a 
period of quite chaotic growth of non-bank financial institutions in the early 
1990s and the ever-present systemic threat of the NPL problem with the state-
owned banks, the Chinese monetary authorities have taken a very cautious 
approach to foreign financial institutions entering the Chinese market. The 
capital and asset requirements for a foreign bank to establish business in China 
are set at relatively high levels which will vary according to the extent of the 
foreign bank's business scope in foreign currency and RMB. 
For the most common mode of foreign bank entry, via the establishment of a 
bank branch, the capital requirement to conduct all the permitted scope of 
foreign currency business is for the parent company to allocate to the branch an 
amount of non-recallable freely convertible currencies equivalent to at least 
RMB200 million (US$24 million) (Table 5.3). If the foreign bank branch were 
to conduct the complete permitted business scope of RMB business in addition 
to full foreign currency business, then the amount would rise to RMB600 
million (US$72 million) (People's Bank of China 2002, Article 36). 
Table 5.2 China's WTO commitment to the opening of its banking system, 2002 
Timetable Foreign currency RMB local currency business 
business 
Customers Location 
Upon entry to Chinese enterprises Foreign-invested Shanghai, Shenzhen, 
WTO and individuals (i.e. enterprises, Tianjin, Dalian 
(December all restrictions on foreign residents 
2001) customers removed) 
1 December as above as above Guangzhou,Zhuhai, 
2002 Qingdao, Nanjing, 
Wuhan 
Within 2 years as above Chinese Jinan, Fuzhou, 
ofWTO enterprises Chengdu, Chongqing 
membership 
Within 3 years as above as above Kunming, Beijing, 
ofWTO Xiamen 
membership 
Within 4 years as above as above Shantou, Ningbo, 
ofWTO Shenyang, Xi'an 
membership 
Within 5 years as above All customers in Location restrictions 
ofWTO China terminated 
membershiE 
Notes: 
To conduct Renminbi business, a foreign-funded financial institution must satisfy the following 
requirements: 
• it must have operated in China for at least three years prior to the application; 
• it must have been making profits for the two consecutive years prior to the application; and 
• it must meet other prudential requirements prescribed by the People's Bank of China. 
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Some foreign banks regard this requirement as unnecessarily excessive and 
acting as a deterrent to expanding their operation in China, particularly into 
regions where business needs to be gradually built up before returning a profit. 
Because bank branches are an integral part of the parent organization, a high 
level of capital requirement is therefore considered to be superfluous. Compared 
with domestic Chinese banks, the initial capital cost of funding one foreign bank 
branch operation is therefore not insignificant, even though most major 
international banks will not be unduly affected in their market entry plan. As 
discussed earlier, a foreign bank must also satisfy additional conditions of three 
years of operation and two consecutive years of profitability before being 
allowed to conduct RMB business. Taken together, these constitute in practice 
extra costs and another impediment that deters and slows foreign bank entry. 
Table 5.3 Regulation of foreign banks in China - basic elements 







Minimum registered capital: 
Solely foreign-funded bank & joint-equity bank 
Freely convertible currencies equivalent to RMB300 million 
yuan (for partial services in foreign currency business with 
foreign-invested enterprises and foreign individuals) 
(for complete services in foreign currency business with foreign-
invested enterprises and foreign individuals, the minimum 
moves up to RMB400 million) 
Operating capital: 
Foreign bank branch 
Non-recallable allocation from head office of freely convertible 
currencies equivalent of no less than RMB 100 million yuan 
(for partial services in foreign currency business with foreign-
invested enterprises and foreign individuals) 
(for complete services in foreign currency business with foreign-
invested enterprises and foreign individuals, the minimum 
moves up to RMB200 million) 
Minimum period of maintaining a representative office in China 
Solely foreign-funded bank, joint-equity bank and foreign branch 
At least two years 
Minimum amount of total assets of the foreign financial institution 
applying for license in China 
Solely foreign-funded bank &joint-equity bank 
US$10 billion 
Foreign bank branch 
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Identical for all three types off oreign bank 
Deposit taking, lending, acceptance and discounting of 
negotiable instruments, trading of government and financial 
bonds, trading of foreign currency securities other than stocks, 
letters of credit and guarantee, domestic and foreign settlement, 
trading of foreign exchange and acting as an agent, exchange of 
foreign currencies, inter -bank lending, bank card business, safe 
deposit boxes, credit and financial standing investigation and 
related consultancy, other businesses approved by the People's 
Bank of China (PBC) 












Solely foreign-funded bank, joint-equity bank and foreign branch: 
Interest rates of deposit and loans, and service fees determined 
by banks in accordance with relevant provisions of PBC 
Solely foreign-funded bank, joint-equity bank and foreign branch: 
Must deposit with PBC the required ratio of reserves determined 
by the PBC 
Foreign bank branch: 
30 per cent of the operating capital must be maintained in the 
form of interest-bearing assets as prescribed by PBC, including 
deposits with banks designated by PBC 
Solely foreign-funded bank and joint-equity bank: 
Not less than 8 per cent 
Solely foreign-funded bank, joint-equity bank and foreign branch: 
The maximum of deposits from within China cannot exceed 40 
per cent of total assets 
Source: Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Invested Financial Institutions in the People's 
Republic of China, 25 February 1994; Stipulations on the Enforcement of the Regulations on the 
Administration of Foreign Invested Financial Institutions in the People's Republic of China, 29 
January 2002. 
However, almost without exception, all the foreign banks interviewed by this 
author5 expressed greatest concern over the 40 per cent limit on the amount of a 
foreign bank's RMB liabilities that can be obtained through inter-bank lending 
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from Chinese banks. At the end of 2001, 33 foreign banking institutions (out of 
a total of 158) were permitted to conduct RMB business with foreign-invested 
enterprises and foreign residents. Owing to the absence of a branch network, 
their ability to attract RMB deposits is limited. It is estimated that 50 to 80 per 
cent of their RMB funds were obtained through inter-bank lending from Chinese 
banks (Guoji Jinrongbao, 24 July 2002). This restriction on sources of RMB 
funds represents a serious barrier to foreign banks in their business development 
and is probably construed as a protective measure against foreign competition. 
As Table 5.3 indicates, all three forms of foreign banks are required to have 
reserves with the Chinese central bank. For a foreign bank branch, 30 per cent of 
the operating capital must also be maintained in the form of interest-bearing 
assets as prescribed by PBC, including deposits with banks designated by PBC. 
These requirements, particularly the last, impose some constraints on the ability 
of the foreign bank branch to conduct its business as it sees fit. In this context, 
the more serious concern expressed by foreign banks in China is the onerous 
approval processes imposed on the business of providing foreign currency credit 
to enterprises for which each loan must have given pre-approval and approval by 
the Chinese monetary authorities. The introduction of any financial product is in 
fact subject to government approval. Thus, foreign banks face constraints in the 
pricing, quantity, types of products, and scope of business that they can carry out 
in China. The demand for a more level playing field is very evident among 
foreign banks in China. 
5.4.2 Impediments to expanding foreign bank branch networks 
For those foreign banks already operating in China, the objective of expanding 
their business through additional branches faces some significant obstacles. As 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show, domestic Chinese shareholding banks have much more 
lenient regulatory conditions for gaining approval to create new bank branches 
than foreign banks. Chinese banks can be granted permission to add new 
branches even though their basic financials cannot usually match those of the 
foreign banks in China. More importantly, foreign banks are in effect restricted 
to a maximum of one new branch per year, while Chinese shareholding banks 
can have up to four in the western region and three in the rest of the country. 
This one branch per year barrier is viewed by foreign banks as one of the 
most severe constraints upon their business development in China. It is relevant 
to note that while the parent company of foreign bank branches is required to 
have at least US$20 billion in assets, only 4 of the 11 Chinese shareholding 
banks had reached that size in 2001 (Table 5.6). In fact most foreign banks 
currently in China (such as Bank of America, HSBC and Citibank) are much 
bigger than the minimum size required. 
Foreign banks - market entry and foreign investment 77 
Table 5.4 Conditions for foreign banks to add a new branch 
Foreign bank branch 
(1) Representative office for two years. 
(2) Minimum amount of total assets of the foreign financial institution applying for a 
new branch should be US$20 billion. 
(3) Existing branch in China should have good business performance, and should have 
no record of major activities that are contrary to the law and regulations. 
( 4) Application for an additional branch can only be made one year after the last 
approval by PBC for establishing a branch (i.e. maximum of one new branch per 
year). 
Solely foreign-funded bank and foreign joint-equity bank 
(1) Operation in China over three years; profits in the last two consecutive years. 
(2) Capital adequacy ratio not lower than 8 per cent. 
(3) Application for an additional branch can only be made one year after the last 
approval by PBC for establishing a branch. 
(4) For each additional branch, applicant must pay no less than 100 million RMB 
equivalent fully convertible currency as its operating capital; the total accumulated 
amount of payments for operating capital for a foreign bank's branches (including 
any planned additional one) cannot exceed 60 per cent of the registered capital of the 
bank in China). 
(5) Other prudential requirements prescribed by the PBC. 
Source: Stipulations on the Enforcement of the Regulations on the Administration of Foreign 
Invested Financial Institutions in the People's Republic of China, Article 15. 
Table 5.5 Selected requirements for Chinese shareholding banks to open new branches 
(1) In general the number of new branches per year for each applicant bank should be no 
more than 3; for branches in the western region, the limit could be raised to 4. 
(2) Applicant bank should in general reach the 8 per cent capital adequacy ratio. For those 
banks under 4 per cent, new branches should be restricted. 
(3) Applicant bank should have an NPL ratio of less than 15 per cent. For those with a 
ratio over 15 per cent, if the ratio is declining, considerations along with other factors 
can be taken into account. 
Source: Yinfa [2002] Number 244- Notice by the People's Bank of China on Questions Concerning 
the Adjustment of Investigation Approval Systems for the Establishment of New Branches by 
Shareholding Banks. 
Hence if the same prudential consideration based on bank size being an 
indication of strength is applied, the case for limiting new foreign bank branches 
is weak, particularly when each foreign bank branch will still be subject to the 
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usual capital and prudential conditions before it can be established. And if 
Chinese banks are given the incentive to expand into the western region by 
being allowed one more branch per year, there is no reason why foreign bank 
entry into the western region should not be encouraged by similar measures. For 
instance, the Chinese government could quite easily relax the one new branch 
per year rule for foreign banks by simply excluding the application of this rule to 
any new branch to be established in the western region. 
The requirement that a foreign bank must have made a profit for two 
consecutive years before it can apply to set up a new branch presents a real 
problem for many foreign banks in China. It is common knowledge that new 
bank entrants do not normally generate positive returns during the early years of 
operation in a new market. That is in fact why foreign financial institutions often 
have to justify their business development and entry into China as a long-term 
strategic move. On the basis of interviews with foreign bank representatives in 
China, this is one of the major concerns and is seen as an unnecessary deterrent 
to the development of foreign banking networks in the country. After all, the 
financial parameters of a branch operation are consolidated into the parent 
banks. Ultimately it is the bank which should determine whether it is 
commercially advantageous to expand its branch network if genuine prudential 
requirements are met. The regulator should have no role in deciding what is 
essentially a commercial decision. 
Table 5.6 Chinese shareholding banks, total assets (end of 2000) 
US$ billion 
Bank of Communications 79 
CITIC Industrial Bank 29 
China Merchants Bank 27 
China Everbright Bank 26 
Guangdong Development Bank 19 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 16 
HuaxiaBank 12 
Fujian Industrial Bank 11 
China Minsheng Bank 9 
Shenzhen Development Bank 8 
Y antai Home Savings Bank 2 
Source: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking 2001. 
Foreign banks-market entry and foreign investment 79 
Faced with these obstacles, some foreign banks have started to seek 
alternative routes to participation in China's banking market by taking strategic 
minority equity stakes in non-state Chinese banks. For instance, Canadian Bank 
of Nova Scotia, together with IFC, is buying a 12.4 and 12.5 stake respectively 
in Xi'an City Commercial Bank; HSBC acquired an 8 per cent stake in the Bank 
of Shanghai; and Citibank is buying a 5 per cent stake from a state-owned 
shareholder of the Shanghai Pudong Development Bank. 
There are several reasons for foreign banks to be taking an interest in this 
approach to entering the China market. These may include gaining: experience 
in serving the domestic market; an immediate presence of some kind through a 
national branch network; the potential to better access RMB funds; and the 
opportunities to utilize the strategic link with the Chinese bank to develop 
profitable financial services such as credit cards. For the domestic Chinese 
banks, it provides an opportunity to strengthen their capital base and gain 
knowledge in management, marketing and product development. However, this 
approach is not without problems. 
First, the minority stake may not afford the foreign banks much control or 
influence over the Chinese bank to allow it to utilize fully its firm-specific 
advantages to produce better performance and the desired benefits. More 
important for the foreign investors is the Chinese Central Bank's threshold of 25 
per cent of foreign equity in a Chinese bank. That is, if foreign equity exceeds 
25 per cent, the Chinese bank will become a joint-equity foreign bank which 
must operate under regulations governing foreign financial institutions, and that 
would mean that the privileges and business scope enjoyed by a Chinese bank 
would disappear. As a result, a major aim for investing in the Chinese bank 
would be defeated. 
In order to attract FDI to the banking sector in China's western region, a 
relaxation of this threshold to a higher level (perhaps up to 49 per cent) for 
foreign banks investing in commercial city banks in the region could provide a 
considerable impetus to enhance the investment environment. In this context, it 
is relevant to note the recently reported proposal by the publicly listed Shenzhen 
Development Bank to sell a total of 20 per cent majority stake (held by four 
companies owned by the Shenzhen City Government) to a private US equity 
fund, NewBridge Capital Group. There will be positive implications for the 
opening of China's financial system should Chinese government approval be 
given to the proposal. Approval would mean that it is possible to acquire a 
controlling interest without changing the domestic status of a Chinese bank (a 20 
per cent stake in Shenzhen Development will make NewBridge the largest 
shareholder). Perhaps no less significant is the fact that NewBridge is not even a 
bank. There is therefore no reason why this new direction for Shenzhen cannot 
be employed for the development of the western region. 
In summary, foreign banks clearly continue to face significant barriers in 
expanding their business in the China market for reasons that may be justified 
from the perspective of the government. However, compared with the more 
developed economic and financial system in China's eastern region, foreign 
banks will find (and have indeed found) it difficult to consider expanding into 
the western region on both commercial and regulatory grounds. To make foreign 
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bank entry into the western region a viable and attractive proposition, 1t 1s 
necessary to speed up the gradual process of foreign market entry and to remove 
some of the major obstacles for foreign banks expanding into this economically 
less developed and less open part of China. 
5.5 Conclusion 
China has certainly benefited from special policy measures designed to attract 
foreign investment, particularly in its early stage of development. If the 
government is serious about creating a more vibrant and efficient banking sector 
to bring about a more attractive foreign investment to serve the objective of 
developing the western region, the need to devise a policy package that removes 
entry barriers for foreign banks in the western region is critical. It is relevant to 
note that the conditions governing the creation of new branches by China's 
shareholding banks appear far more lenient (see Table 5.5). At present only 
major foreign banks with a much larger scale of operation than any of China's 
shareholding banks are allowed market entry into China. On the basis of the 
experience of foreign bank entry in other economies discussed earlier, the 
relaxation of restrictions for these foreign banks to expand into the western 
region will not pose a threat to the banking system. 
Because the western region is already less developed, with higher transactions 
costs across most economic activities for foreign investors, all the barriers 
discussed above can be expected to have a pronounced adverse impact on 
foreign bank entry into the region. Policy considerations should therefore aim at 
addressing these issues to attract a substantive inflow of FDI into the region's 
banking sector so as to enhance financial development and to help catalyze FDI 
inflows in all other sectors of the economy. 
Given the current state of economic and financial development in the western 
region, it is realistic to concentrate efforts on developing selected key cities 
(such as Chengdu, Chongqing and Xi'an) as effective financial centers for the 
western region. Simple and effective administrative mechanisms for better 
coordination, support and monitoring for this development among the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission, People's Bank of China, the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange, China Insurance Regulatory Commission, 
China Securities Regulatory Commission, Ministry of Finance, and other 
relevant prudential and supervisory bodies should be set up with a view to 
facilitating institution and capacity building in the financial services sector in the 
western region. 
Specific policy measures may include the immediate granting of a number of 
new banking licenses (valid for offering full RMB business), ahead of China's 
WTO commitments, for foreign investors to establish wholly owned branches or 
joint ventures to conduct both foreign-currency and Chinese-currency business 
in the region's selected cities. Without compromising prudential requirements, 
some of the current barriers and certain preconditions for establishing new 
branches by foreign banks already operating in China should also be relaxed for 
the western region. 
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Foreign banks that are already in China can be encouraged to expand their 
branch network into the western region by dropping the 'one branch per year' 
restriction and the precondition of two consecutive years of profit. The 40 per 
cent inter-bank RMB-currency borrowing limit on foreign banks in the western 
region should be lifted to a higher level (to be determined after consultation with 
foreign banks). Alternatively, foreign banks in the western region should be 
allowed to expand their sources of RMB funds by issuing instruments such as 
certificates of deposit. The threshold for foreign equity investment in a Chinese 
bank located in the western region could be raised from the current 25 per cent 
to a higher level of, say, 49 per cent to encourage more foreign participation. 
As part of the financial development process, eligible domestic Chinese 
individuals and enterprises should also be allowed to invest to establish new 
banks or invest in joint ventures with foreign banks as partners. The aim is to 
provide an impetus to raise the level of competition and quality in banking 
services to enhance the investment environment. The process of foreign bank 
entry into the Chinese market has already begun, and it is important that the 
economic benefits that come with this are well utilized and managed, and that a 
more competitive and attractive foreign investment environment be created for 
foreign banks to help develop China's western region. 
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6 Accounting for intangible assets and 
the relevance of financial statements in 
developed and emerging capital 
markets: Australia and China 
Jayne M. Godfrey and Wei Lu 
6.1 Introduction 
Research indicates that there are differences in the ways that investors in 
developed countries such as Australia, the US and the UK value the intangible 
assets reported in firms' financial statements (Barth and Clinch 1996, Barth 
2000, Lev and Zarowin 1999). Using the Australian institutional setting, 
research has particularly investigated the relevance of capitalized goodwill, and 
capitalized research and development to equity valuation (Abrahams and Sidhu 
1998, Godfrey and Koh 2001). However, research has not yet investigated the 
association between the market value of firms in developing countries and their 
book values of intangible assets. Since the promulgation of China's first 
western-style accounting standard Chinese Accounting Standard for Enterprises 
in 1992, accounting standards and regulations issued by the Chinese government 
have become increasingly internationally compatible. This gives rise to a unique 
research opportunity to examine the economic relevance of accounting in the 
emerging economy of China. Using large samples of. Australian and Chinese 
companies, this chapter investigates the relevance of capitalized intangible assets 
to equity valuation. In particular, it investigates whether variations in the book 
values of individual capitalized intangible assets or the aggregate book values of 
capitalized intangible assets explain variations in the market value of equity for 
Australian and Chinese firms. 
The chapter examines how combinations of accounting practices and different 
institutional settings can affect the relevance of accounting for intangible assets, 
particularly goodwill, to equity valuation. It first documents differences 
between how firms in Australia and China account for intangible assets. It then 
examines the association, for both countries, between the market value of firms' 
equity and the book values of their assets and liabilities, with particular 
emphasis on the association with book values of various types of capitalized 
intangible assets. 
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The study reported in this chapter has two objectives: 
• It examines the differences between the rules for writing off, capitalizing 
and amortizing a variety of intangibles based on Australian and Chinese 
pronouncements (GAAP). 
• It tests the value relevance of the different national practices within their 
jurisdictions. 
While other studies have examined the value relevance of accounting 
measures in the context of Western countries (for example Barth and Clinch 
1996), this chapter brings the issue to the Chinese jurisdiction for two main 
reasons. First, the Chinese economy has grown rapidly since 1991 and has been 
ranked by the International Monetary Fund as the second largest economy in the 
world. It has attracted much foreign investment, and Chinese firms are regarded 
as bringing high levels of growth options to the investment market; hence they 
can be expected to have valuable intangibles, both reported and undisclosed. 
Second, the Chinese stock market has developed dramatically since the early 
1990s when China established stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Indeed, 
listings increased from eight companies to over 1,200 by the end of 2002. This 
capital market growth provides an opportunity to investigate the maturity of the 
Chinese capital market participants' use of accounting numbers. Third, since the 
1980s, China has undertaken a series of reforms to align its accounting system 
with internationally accepted practices (Aiken et al., 1995). The success of these 
reforms has been documented and discussed internationally, but it is also widely 
acknowledged that differences still exist between the existing Chinese 
accounting framework and the accounting framework adopted by the 
International Accounting Standards Board. 
6.2 Accounting for intangible 1mets: a comparison 
Regulating the accounting for intangible assets is arguably the most 
controversial and difficult area faced by accounting standard-setters worldwide 
(Choi and Lee 1991, DeMark 2002). The issue is particularly important because 
of continuing international mergers and acquisitions, and the rapid development 
of international financial markets (Radebaugh and Gray 2002, Hoegh-Krohn and 
Knivsfla 2000). In this environment intangible assets, especially goodwill, 
generally dominate the underlying economic value of assets acquired. 
Furthermore, reported intangible assets are the embodiment of the economic 
growth options that give firms their main value. Table 6.1 summarizes the main 
differences between the current requirements for accounting for intangibles in 
China and Australia. 
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Current AASB Requirement in 
Australia 
Goodwill is amortized to income 
over a period not to exceed 20 
years. 
There is currently no standard 
specifically governing the issue 
since the withdrawal of ED 49 
Accounting for Identifiable 
Intangible Assets. AASB 1021 
Depreciation applies to both 
tangible and intangible assets. 
This standard requires the 
depreciable amounts of assets to 
be depreciated over their useful 
lives in a manner that reflects the 
loss or consumption of future 
economic benefits to the entity. 
Both research and development 
costs may be capitalized if 
certain criteria are met. 
Capitalization of these items is 
permitted. 
Currently the AASB has agreed 
to expose the IASB requirement 
and highlight the implication of 
this requirement in the 
Australian 'wrap-around'. 
Revaluation of intangibles is not 
permitted. 
Current Requirement in China 
Goodwill should be recognized as 
an asset. The cost of goodwill 
should be amortized evenly over 
its expected useful life. 
Impairment review should be 
conducted periodically, but at least 
once at the end of each year. 
Similar to the treatment of 
goodwill. 
Research and development costs 
incurred prior to the legal 
application of obtaining the 
intangible asset should be 
recognized as expenses in the 
period in which they are incurred. 
Only if assets are obtained by 
legal application are they 
permitted to be capitalized. The 
amount is determined in 
accordance with the amount of 
expenditure (such as registration 
fees and legal fees) incurred for 
legal application of obtaining the 
asset. 
Revaluation of intangibles is not 
permitted. 
The current accounting standards in Australia related to intangibles include 
AASB 1011 Accounting for Research and Development Costs and AASB 1013 
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Accounting for Goodwill. Some of the abstracts issued by the Urgent Issues 
Group1 to provide guidance in the absence of a standard also relate to intangible 
assets (e.g. UIG Abstract No. 5: Methods of Amortization of Goodwill 
(withdrawn), UIG Abstract No. 7: Accounting for Non-Current Assets -
Derecognition of Intangible Assets and Change in the Basis of Measurement of 
a Class of Assets, UIG Abstract No. 34: Acquisitions and Goodwill - First Time 
Application of Accounting Standards). 
6.3.1 Goodwill 
In theory, goodwill is the difference between the value of a firm and the sum of 
the value of its individual assets. It reflects the value of synergies derived from 
combining assets. Unlike other assets, goodwill incorporates the value of future 
earnings as they contribute to the valuation of the business as a whole. It is a 
matter of considerable controversy whether goodwill should be treated as a 
separate asset for accounting purposes and whether it should be amortized 
against future earnings since it is not separately identifiable and its value may 
increase over time rather than diminish. Treatments have varied internationally 
(Nobes and Norton 1996). 
Accounting for Goodwill (AASB 1013) classifies unidentifiable intangible 
assets into two categories: internally generated goodwill and purchased 
goodwill. The standard requires purchased goodwill to be capitalized and 
amortized through earnings using a straight-line method over a period of 5 to 20 
years (Australian Accounting Standards Board 1996). If the economic benefits 
of the purchased goodwill are deemed to have fully expired, the goodwill is to 
be completely written off through earnings. Capitalization of internally 
generated goodwill is not permitted. 
Australia is currently preparing to adopt a new approach to accounting for 
goodwill. Under this approach, goodwill will not be amortized systematically. 
Instead, it will be written off as it is deemed to have been impaired. This means 
that goodwill may be carried in the accounts at an unamortized amount for 
several years; alternatively, it may be written off very rapidly, depending upon 
assessments of the economic circumstances that affect goodwill valuation. 
6.3.2 ldenti.fiable intangible assets 
Generally, rules governing the accounting for identifiable intangible assets are 
the subject of standards relating to individual types of intangibles. However, 
there have been some attempts to develop general standards governing the full 
range of these assets, most notably in Australia and in the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) developed by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB). 
In 1989 the Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF) issued an 
exposure draft, Accounting for Identifiable Intangible Assets (ED 49), dealing 
with accounting for identifiable intangible assets such as brand names and other 
related intangibles. ED 49's general proposition was that both purchased and 
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internally developed intangible assets are to be brought to account (Alfredson 
2001). Under ED 49, purchased identifiable intangible assets were recorded at 
the cost of acquisition and internally generated identifiable intangible assets 
were recorded either at cost or at the lowest cost at which they could currently 
be obtained in the normal course of business, as determined by independent 
valuers. ED 49 required amortization of intangible assets but it nominated no 
maximum period. Because of the lack of consensus on a number of issues, such 
as the requirement to amortize all identifiable intangible assets (including brand 
names), the exposure draft was withdrawn in 1992. 
In 1996 the AASB initiated its International Harmonization Project, planning 
to revise more than 20 Australian Accounting Standards to accord with 
International Accounting Standards (Collett et al. 2001). In addition, a new 
accounting standard on intangible assets was to be issued (Parker 1997). The 
intangibles project was delayed significantly as the board dealt with some highly 
contentious issues, such as the treatment of brand names during a period when 
firms were accused of opportunistic overstatement of brand name values, and 
with the issuance ofIAS 38, Intangible Assets in 1998. IAS 38 specifies that the 
deemed useful life of an intangible asset should not exceed 20 years, and an 
intangible asset is to be carried at its cost less any accumulated amortization and 
impairment losses. The standard prohibits the recognition of internally generated 
brands, mastheads, publishing titles and similar intangibles and permits 
revaluation of intangibles only where there is an active market. These 
requirements sparked a highly charged debate on the proper treatment of 
identifiable intangibles. Most lobbyists strongly opposed Australia's 
harmonization with IAS 38. 
The International Accounting Standards Board's December 2002 proposed 
amendments to IAS 36 Impairment of Assets and IAS 38 Intangible Assets 
propose to remove the presumption that the useful life of an intangible asset will 
always be finite and that the useful life cannot exceed twenty years from the date 
the asset is available for use. The draft also proposes that an intangible asset 
with an indefinite useful life should not be amortized and its useful life should 
be reviewed every year. Proposed amendments to International Accounting 
Standards, now known as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
will see some assets no longer recognized (such as internally generated brands, 
mastheads, or publishing lists). This has been extremely controversial in 
Australia, but it does not affect the accounts for the period of this study. 
6.3.3 Research and development 
In an international context, Australia's regulations tend to be relatively flexible. 
In some countries, such as the US, capitalization of research and development 
(R&D) is not permitted except for computer software development costs. 
AASB 1011 Accounting for Research and Development Costs states that R&D 
shall be charged to earnings when incurred. However, capitalization of these 
costs is allowed if they are expected beyond any reasonable doubt to be 
recoverable. Capitalized R&D costs must be amortized over future financial 
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years to match them with related benefits, beginning with the commercial 
production of the product. 
It is expected that when Australia adopts IFRS from 1 January 2005, 
companies will not be permitted to recognize intangible assets arising from 
research ( or from the research phase of an internal project). Development costs 
will be capitalizable only if certain criteria, such as recoverability, are met. 
6.3.4 Brands and other related intangibles 
The treatment of brand names has been particularly contentious since the 
collapse of companies whose financial statements had reported brand name 
assets with high values, but whose capitalized brand values did not withstand 
market forces. In contrast, it has been argued that a motive for some companies 
capitalizing brands has been to ensure that they are not undervalued by the 
capital market, especially in a manner that could lead to possible takeover.2 
Many international mergers and acquisitions involve acquiring famous brand 
names, trademarks, patents, licenses and other such intangibles. As such, the 
treatment of brands and other intangibles is inevitably associated with the 
treatment of goodwill. 
Internationally, there is significant variation in the treatment of purchased 
brand names. In Australia, regulators prefer the assets to be capitalized and 
amortized separately from goodwill, and in the US under the new accounting 
standard FASB 141 Business Combinations identifiable intangible assets with 
indefinite useful lives, including brands, are not to be amortized and measures 
are reviewed for impairment. Intangible assets with limited useful lives continue 
to be amortized. 
Treatment of internally developed brand names is even more diverse. In 
Australia the capitalization of home-grown brands is permitted. The recent IASB 
Exposure Draft amendments to IAS 383, which are likely to be adopted in 
Australia in 2005, stipulate that internally generated brands, mastheads, 
publishing titles, customer lists and items similar in substance should not be 
recognized as intangible assets. As with goodwill, this likely change does not 
affect the period of this study. 
6.3.5 Deferred costs 
Deferred costs include a variety of capitalized expenditures on such things as 
advertising, customer acquisition commissions that are expected to provide 
benefits for several years into the future, and future income tax benefits arising 
because taxes have been paid in advance of their recognition as an expense for 
financial reporting purposes. Generally, deferred costs fall within the definition 
of assets in various countries' conceptual frameworks since they are incurred 
with a view to deriving future economic benefits. With the exception of future 
income tax benefits, their accounting is not particularly contentious since they 
are usually written off against earnings only a short number of years after their 
initial capitalization. 
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6.3.6 licence costs 
Licence costs are the up-front payments for agreements such as software 
licences that allow the use and/or sale of particular software. In Australia it has 
long been accepted practice to value internally generated licences, copyrights, 
and publishing rights. Under the proposed IASB changes internally generated 
brands, mastheads, publishing titles, customer lists and items similar in 
substance are not recognized as intangible assets. The AASB agreed to expose 
this change and highlight its implications in the Australian environment. 
6.4 China 
In December 1992, Chinese Accounting Standard for Enterprises was formally 
promulgated by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in China (MOF 1992). 
Compared with International Accounting Standards and the standards in 
Australia, the US, and the UK, this first Chinese accounting standard is more 
like a conceptual framework than a detailed prescription of how to account for a 
particular issue (Chen et al. 2001). It is a guideline about how to set accounting 
standards. Since the promulgation of that first Chinese accounting standard, the 
Ministry of Finance has endeavoured to set up the new accounting regulation 
system by issuing specific accounting standards. However, this procedure is 
more complicated because of the coexistence of the unified accounting systems 
and accounting standards (Chen et al. 1997). So far, thirty specific accounting 
standards have been drafted and circulated for public comment. The major 
criticism of those drafts of accounting standards is that they are not suitable for 
the Chinese situation because they mainly copy International Accounting 
Standards and GAAP in the United States. 
The Ministry of Finance planned to establish the accounting standards system 
in three years, with 32 specific standards in 1993 (Aiken et al. 1995). However, 
so far only 13 specific standards have been formally promulgated. They are: 
Accounting for Changes of Accounting Policies and Estimations and Mistakes; 
Accounting for Revenues; Accounting for Investments; Accounting for 
Construction Contracts; Accounting for Reorganization of Debt; Accounting for 
Intangibles; Accounting for Contingencies; Accounting for Borrowing Costs; 
Accounting for Leasing; Accounting for Non-cash Transactions; Accounting for 
After-balance Date Events; Cash Flow Statement; and Disclosure of Related-
party Transactions. 
The standard which relates to intangible assets is: Accounting Standard for 
Business Enterprise: Accounting for Intangibles. Similar to the Australian case, 
intangible assets can be classified as either identifiable intangible assets or non-
identifiable intangible assets. Identifiable intangible assets include patents, non-
proprietary technologies, brand names, copyrights, land use rights, franchises 
and suchlike. 'Non-identifiable intangible assets' refers to goodwill. 
In this standard intangibles, including goodwill, are required to be amortized 
using the straight-line method over their useful lives and no more than 10 years 
Accounting for intangible assets and the relevance of financial statements 89 
(MOF 2001). Firms are to value their intangibles each year, and if the book 
value is greater than their recoverable value, they are required to provide for the 
devaluation. Both in China and Australia, internally generated goodwill is not 
allowed to be recognized as an asset. 
In China, R&D costs incurred prior to legally obtaining an intangible asset 
such as a patent are to be expensed in the period when they are incurred. All 
intangible assets that are developed by the enterprise itself and are obtained by 
legal application, including patents, brand names, copyrights and franchises, 
should be measured at cost, including expenditure such as registration fees and 
legal fees incurred for legal application of obtaining the asset (Ministry of 
Finance 2001). 
6.5 Hypothesis development 
This chapter addresses two fundamental accounting research questions: 
• Are accounting treatments of intangible assets associated with the 
investment market's valuation of the firm? 
• Does capitalization of intangible assets have different relevance to the 
market valuation of firms in countries with developed and developing 
capital markets, and with different accounting rules (in particular in 
Australia and China)? 
Although research on intangibles is limited by the availability of data, the extant 
research nonetheless provides insights into the issue. Researchers have found 
that there is a strong association between the capitalization of intangible assets 
and firm valuation. Most of their work focuses on assessing whether investors 
value separate categories of two capitalized identifiable intangibles: goodwill 
andR&D. 
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) investigate the value relevance ofR&D in the US, 
where R&D must be expensed as incurred. By estimating amounts that would be 
capitalized according to the historical success of R&D, they find that notional 
capitalization of R&D is strongly associated with stock prices and returns. Their 
findings indicate that the R&D capitalization process yields value-relevant 
information for investors. Aboody and Lev (1998) further examine the 
relevance to investors of information on the capitalization of software 
development costs. Capitalization of software is the only exception in the US to 
the full expensing rule for R&D. They find that annually capitalized 
development costs are positively associated with share returns, and the 
accumulated software asset reported on the balance sheet is associated with 
share prices. They suggest that there is no evidence to support the view that 
software capitalization decreases the quality of reported earnings. 
Consistent with the US findings, Abrahams and Sidhu (1998) find that R&D 
capitalization by managers of Australian firms is value-relevant and that R&D 
capitalization improves accounting-based measures of firm performance for 
Australian firms in industries where R&D activity is widespread. In contrast, 
90 Jayne M. Godfrey and Wei Lu 
while Godfrey and Koh (2001) find that capitalized intangible assets in 
aggregate and capitalized goodwill and capitalized identifiable intangible assets 
other than R&D are value-relevant, they also find that capitalized R&D is not 
value-relevant.4 Godfrey and Koh (2001) attribute the differences between their 
results and those of Abrahams and Sidhu (1998) mostly to the Abrahams and 
Sidhu (1998) use of a larger sample that includes smaller firms whose equity 
values are likely to be more reliant upon R&D growth options. 
Barth and Clinch (1996) investigate the value relevance of goodwill to US-
listed UK, Australian, and Canadian firms. They find that differences in 
accounting for goodwill provide incremental power in explaining share returns 
or prices. This chapter extends their research by including firms that are not US 
listed, and by investigating accounting practices in relation to other intangibles. 
This is important as US listing is likely to affect a firm's share price, not only in 
the US but also on other stock exchanges such as the London Stock Exchange or 
the Australian Stock Exchange. While investigating goodwill-accounting 
relevance to US share prices is important, the findings do not necessarily apply 
to the many firms that are not US listed, nor to domestic pricing of cross-listed 
firms. 
Research on the value relevance of financial reporting disclosures in general 
in an emerging capital market such as China is very limited.5 Investigation into 
the value relevance of certain areas of financial reporting (such as intangible 
assets) is even more limited. There are probably two reasons for this. First, the 
data for Chinese listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges cannot be obtained easily. However, the situation is improving as 
some databases such as COMPUST AT and Datastream begin to include Chinese 
firms. Although these databases' coverage of Chinese listed firms is not as 
complete as for Australian, US or UK firms, it is nonetheless useful for research. 
Second, the unique institutional environment in China (such as the dominance of 
state ownership) has sometimes been seen as a barrier to conducting this kind of 
research. 
Within the Australian accounting conceptual framework, assets are future 
economic benefits controlled by an entity (AASB 1995). Similar definitions are 
used worldwide, and in China assets are defined as economic resources which 
are measurable by money value and which are owned or controlled by an 
enterprise (MOF 2001). Furthermore, accounting rules internationally tend to be 
conservative in prescribing when assets can be recognized in the accounts. In 
Australia, they may only be recognized when it is probable that the benefits will 
be perceived (probability >50 per cent) and the asset can be measured reliably 
(AASB 1995). Thereafter specific rules apply, as has been explained in the 
context of intangible assets. 
As a general proposition, if managers capitalize only those expenditures that 
give rise to future economic benefits, there should be a positive association 
between capitalized intangible assets and the market value of equity. This gives 
rise to hypothesis 1. 
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Hypothesis 1: 
There is a positive association between the market value of equity and 
the book values of capitalized intangible assets. 
More specifically, investors are likely to value individual classes of 
intangibles differently, according to the probable timing and magnitude of the 
potential benefits to be realized. As such, hypothesis 1 lends itself to 
subdivision as follows: 
There is a positive association between the market value of equity and the 
book values of: 
• capitalized goodwill (hypothesis la) 
• capitalized R&D (hypothesis 1 b) 
• capitalized brand names (hypothesis le) 
• capitalized licence costs (hypothesis ld) 
• capitalized deferred costs (hypothesis le) 
The value of equity is derived from the value of tangible and intangible assets 
less the value of liabilities. As such, if the market value of equity is modelled 
as a function of the value of tangible assets less liabilities, inclusion of 
intangibles should improve the model and explain more of the value of equity. 
Adopting the approach used to expand hypothesis 1 leads to the following 
predictions: 
Hypothesis 2: 
Including the total of capitalized intangible assets significantly 
increases the explanatory power of models of the market value of 
equity as a function of total tangible assets less total liabilities. 
The explanatory power of models of the market value of equity as a function 
of the book values of total tangible assets less total liabilities increases 
significantly when the following classes of assets are included in the model: 
• capitalized goodwill (hypothesis 2a) 
• capitalized R&D (hypothesis 2b) 
• capitalized brand names (hypothesis 2c) 
• capitalized licence costs (hypothesis 2d) 
• capitalized deferred costs (hypothesis 2e) 
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6.6 Research method 
6.6.1 Valuation models 
Tests of the hypotheses use the simple model applied by Abrahams and Sidhu 
(1998) and Godfrey and Koh (2001). Intangible assets are divided into five 
categories: goodwill, R&D, brand names, deferred costs, and licences. 
The base model is as follows: 
MVEit = °<J +cx,TTAit + <X2TLit + Eit 
(1) 
Including intangible assets at different levels of disaggregation leads to the 
following models: 
MVEit = CXcJ +a., TT Ail + CX.2 TLit +CX.3 TIAit + Cit 
(2) 
MVEi1 = a.0 +a.,TTAit + cx.iTLi1 +CX.4GWit +a.sRDi1 +<:Xt;IIAi1 + Ei1 
(3) 
MVEit = <Xo +cx1 IT Ait + a 2 TLit +~GWit +a5RDit +a7BN it + +a8DC it +a.ciLC it + e;.1 
(4) 
Where 
MVE = market value of equity 
TIA = total tangible assets 
TL = total liabilities 
TIA = total intangible assets 
GW = goodwill 
RD = research & development; 
IIA = total identifiable intangible assets other 
than R&D 
BN = brand names & patents 
DC = deferred cost 
LC = licences costs 
Following the Abrahams and Sidhu (1998) approach, all variables are scaled 
by total paid up ordinary capital to reduce heteroskedasticity. Equation (2) tests 
the value-relevance of capitalized total intangible assets. If capitalization of 
intangible assets is value relevant, then a 3 will be significantly greater than zero. 
Equations (3) and ( 4) test the value relevance of individual groups of capitalized 
intangible assets. If il4, a5, a 7, a8 or Cl() is significantly greater than zero, then 
investors deem capitalization of the associated individual type of intangible 
assets to be value-relevant and to be measured with some reliability (Barth 
2000). 
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As well as examining whether capitalized intangible assets are value-relevant, 
the study investigates the extent to which capitalized intangible assets add to the 
power of other balance sheet items, such as total liabilities and total tangible 
assets, to explain equity value. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
measures the incremental explanatory power of an additional independent 
variable or a block of independent variables. It does this by testing whether 
there is a statistically significant increase in the power of several variables (such 
as tangible assets, liabilities) to explain variation in a dependent variable (such 
as equity market value) as a result of the additional independent variable or 
block of independent variables (Tabachnick and Fidell 1989). 
6.7 Sample selection 
As reported in Table 6.2, the Australian and Chinese samples include all firms 
that (1) are included in the Company Analysis database for 2001 for each 
country;6 and (2) report goodwill or other types of intangible assets7 in their 
2001 annual reports. These two criteria result in 636 Australian and 197 
Chinese firms respectively. 
Table 6.2 Sample selection 
Sample Selection 
Company Analysis database coverage: 
Australia 
China 
Final sample size after omission of firms with negative book value and 





6. 7 Results and discussion 







Table 6.3 summarizes the industry distribution of these firms. It also provides 
information about different types of intangible assets reported by these firms 
according to the industry and country of firm listing. Table 6.3 shows that in 
Australia 419 firms (66 per cent) report goodwill. 
Table 6.3 Industry distributions 
Countries Australia China 
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Aerospace & Defence 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Automobiles & Parts 9 8 6 4 1 2 (I 11 2 1 4 5 6 0 
Beverages 15 15 3 9 1 4 0 5 2 0 4 3 2 0 
Chemicals 11 6 3 8 1 2 0 7 2 0 2 2 3 0 
Construction & Building 
Materials 25 19 4 6 1 4 0 14 4 1 3 9 6 0 
Distributors 25 19 4 7 3 2 0 4 3 0 0 0 2 0 
Diversified Industries 7 7 2 3 1 2 0 8 3 0 3 5 6 0 
Electricity 6 1 1 2 3 1 0 11 4 1 1 4 7 0 
Electronic & Electrical 28 21 7 12 6 9 0 32 11 3 11 13 15 0 
Engineering & Machinery 26 21 6 13 1 10 0 20 7 1 7 6 8 0 
Food Producers & Processors 26 18 2 13 3 7 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 0 
Food & Drug Retailers 7 6 2 3 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Forestry & Paper 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gas Distribution 6 2 1 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
General Retailers 16 15 0 6 4 3 0 7 4 0 1 4 5 0 
Health 26 12 4 10 12 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Household Goods & Textiles 18 11 2 10 0 4 0 17 6 0 3 9 9 0 
IT Hardware 5 4 2 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Leisure & Entertainment & 
Hotels 25 18 5 4 12 7 0 3 2 0 0 1 1 0 
Media & Photography 34 23 4 14 13 6 0 3 0 0 1 2 3 0 
Mining 69 25 16 3 8 32 0 3 2 0 1 3 0 0 
Oil & Gas 12 4 0 0 3 5 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Packaging 4 4 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Personal Care & Household 4 4 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(continued) 
Table 6.3 Industry distributions (Continued) 
Countries Australia China 
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Pharmaceuticals 27 12 8 11 7 5 0 13 1 1 2 6 5 0 
Software & Computer Services 84 55 29 27 20 16 0 7 1 0 2 4 3 0 
Speciality & Other Finance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Steel & Other Metals 5 3 1 3 0 1 0 3 0 0 1 2 1 0 
Support Services 63 49 9 24 13 9 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Telecommunication Services 29 20 7 8 13 7 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Tobacco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Transport 19 15 1 6 5 9 0 16 6 0 1 4 9 0 
Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Water l 0 0 1 0 0 0 l 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 636 419 129 216 137 159 0 197 61 8 51 86 97 0 
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This contrasts with the Godfrey and Koh (2001) sample where 85 per cent of 
companies report goodwill. The difference is due to the sample of this study 
encompassing smaller firms that have not engaged in business acquisitions.8 In 
contrast, 129 out of 636 firms capitalize R&D (20 per cent of the sample firms). 
The majority of the 216 firms (34 per cent) that capitalize and amortize R&D are 
in the automobiles & parts, banking, electronic & electrical, food & drug retail 
and software & computer service industries. 
Other identifiable intangibles capitalized by the sample firms include brand 
names & patents, licences, and deferred costs. Fifty per cent of firms report at 
least one identifiable intangible asset. Thirty-four per cent of firms report brand 
names and patents, 22 per cent report licences, and 25 per cent report deferred 
costs. Of the 216 firms that capitalize brand names and patents 53 firms (38 per 
cent) do not amortize them. This includes 41 firms with capitalized brands 
exceeding 10 per cent of their total reported assets. 
In contrast to Australian samples, Chinese firms are much less likely to report 
goodwill (n=61; 31 per cent) or R&D (n=8; 4 per cent). There are several 
potential reasons for this. First, most listed firms are directly or indirectly 
controlled by the state. These firms are less likely, compared to Australian firms, 
to engage in complicated business activities such as merger and acquisition. 
Therefore, there are far fewer opportunities for them to report goodwill resulting 
from such activities. Second, China has been attempting to implement 
accounting reforms by issuing its own accounting standards along IFRS lines. 
However, many unique features of China's institutional environment may hinder 
or delay enforcement. 
According to a recent study by Xue and Wang (2002), there is a lack of 
understanding of how R&D should be measured (expense vs capitalization) and 
disclosed. Many firms simply disclose R&D expenses as part of the operating 
expense without a footnote disclosure explaining the actual annual spending on 
R&D. Of the Xue and Wang (2002) sample of209 firms listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange in 1998, no firms disclosed information on R&D. This 
situation is certainly improving, with this chapter's 2001 sample showing that 8 
out of 197 firms ( over 4 per cent) reported capitalized R&D. More improvement 
can be expected in the future because both the investment and accounting 
communities will be more aware of the international practice on R&D 
disclosure, particularly IAS 38 Intangible Assets, and of the important 
association between a firm's R&D spending and its productivity. 
Approximately 25 per cent of the Chinese sample capitalizes brand names 
and almost 50 per cent of the firms capitalize deferred costs and licence costs. 
Table 6.4 shows descriptive statistics for the two countries' dependent and 
independent variables. After allowing for currency exchange rates, it is clear 
that Australian firms are larger than Chinese firms. For all firms the data are 
skewed, and additional transformations normalize the measures and ensure 
reduced heteroskedasticity for hypothesis testing. For Australia, intangible 
assets comprise 20 per cent of reported total assets respectively. For China, 
they comprise only 2 per cent. 
Table6.4 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Australia (in thousands of A$) China (in thousands of RMB) 
N Mean Median Std.dev Min Max N Mean Median Std.dev Min Max 
($000) ($000) ($000) ($000) ($000) ($000) ($000) ($000) 
TA 636 717396.2 38492 42238045 158.1380 84961000 197 6632242 2456970 32943867 57437 4.61E+08 
TIA 636 135679.7 4735 1295146 0.23 31570000 197 143652.6 48311 255923.5 23 1671358 
TIA 636 577974.3 27792 3142339 154.8780 53391000 197 6488590 2413941 32825839 52315 4.59E+08 
TL 636 416689.2 15892 23356329 3.589 42421000 197 2960999 1134212 12203714 11092 l.68E+08 
MVE 636 763555.5 32512 49786348 757 79653000 197 3504221 1979518 5609137 10269 43589570 
GW 419 54546.35 3817.396 189701.8 8 1998000 61 56276.97 16892.50 133504.4 65 786620 
RD 129 21133.05 1238 146688.l 26 1625000 8 16972.4 8766.603 25468.37 26 78209 
BN 216 177587.9 1768.385 2112342 0.82 31051000 51 66647.7 9611 213959.7 27 1305000 
DC 159 21323.89 1282 106390.5 0.23 1196000 97 33641.19 9136 59429.65 23 288640 
LC 137 104630.2 1444 327843.4 5 2789176 86 107211.9 47503 179166.8 259 1144178 
PR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TA= Total assets, TIA = Total intangible assets, TT A = Total tangible assets, TL = Total liabilities, MVE = Market value of equity, GW = 
Goodwill, RD= Research and development cost, BN = Brand name, DC= Deferred costs, LC = Licences costs, PR=Player's registration 
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6.7.2 Value relevance in Australia and China 
Table 6.5 Model 1 reports a very simple model of the market value of equity as a 
function of only reported tangible assets and liabilities. For Australian firms it is 
significant (F=80; p<0.01) and explains 22 per cent of the variation in the 
market value of equity. The significance remains, the coefficient on the total 
intangible assets is significant and positive, as expected (p<0.01), and the 
explanatory power of the model increases to 71 per cent in Model 2 as the 
aggregate of intangible assets is added to the independent variables. Hence, 
hypothesis 1 is supported. Each dollar of aggregated total intangible assets is 
valued at $8.00 in the market value of equity. 
Table 6.5 Model 3 incorporates total tangible assets, total liabilities, and three 
categories of intangible assets: goodwill, R&D and other intangible assets. For 
Australian firms the explanatory power is 89 per cent, a significant increase 
from Model 2, which aggregates intangibles as one measure. Furthermore, the 
coefficients on both goodwill and R&D are positive and significant, supporting 
hypotheses la and lb. Once aggregate intangible assets are segregated into 
goodwill, R&D and other intangibles, the market value of equity reflects far 
greater values for the individual intangibles than the aggregate of all intangibles. 
Each dollar of goodwill is valued at $6.65, and each dollar of R&D is valued at 
$15.49. The aggregate of brand names, deferred costs, licence costs and other 
intangible assets is also significant, with a positive coefficient. The results are 
consistent with investors believing that the growth options inherent in 
unidentifiable intangible assets and in R&D expenditure are of far greater value 
to shareholders than the amount spent on (and still capitalized in) those assets. 
Model 4 has the same explanatory power as Model 3, but demonstrates that 
there is a strong economic association between deferred costs and equity value 
($3.17 equity value for each $1 of deferred costs), and that licence costs are 
valued at approximately twice their cost ($2.24). As such, hypotheses ld and le 
are supported. Goodwill and R&D remain significant (p<0.01). Presumably the 
reflection of these intangibles in the market value of equity arises because the 
market believes that accounting is conservative and that the costs are carried 
forward rather than expensed only when their value is assured and of 
significantly greater value than the amount spent on deferred costs or licences. 
Brand names are also significantly related to the market value of equity 
(p<0.01), and hypothesis le is supported in that the market values each dollar of 
brand names at $1.68. 
Interestingly, in Models 3 and 4, the individual intangible assets each have 
larger coefficients than the coefficient on total tangible assets. This is consistent 
with the view that intangible assets are growth options whose value exceeds that 
of assets in place (Myers 1977). The fact that total intangible assets in Model 2 
has a smaller coefficient than the coefficients for individual classes of intangible 
assets in Models 3 and 4 reveals that the market weights individual intangible 
assets differently when valuing equity, and that while their aggregate is regarded 
as significant, it is the composition of the aggregate that is more important to 
investors. 
Table 6.5 Regression of market value of equity on capitalized intangible assets and other balance sheet items 
MVEu = <Xo +a.1 TI A;t + <½ TL;t + En (I) 
MVE;1 = llt) +CX.1 TI A;t + Cli TL;t +<lJ TIA;1 + £;1 (2) 
MVE;1 = CX.O +CX.1TIA1 + CliTLu +Cl4GW;t +<lsRDu +Clt;IIAu + E;t (3) 
MVE;t = <Xo +a.1 TI Au + a.2 TL;t +~GW;t +a.5RDu +a.7BN it + +a.sDC it +a.gLC it + Eit (4) 
Australia China 
Predicted Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model] Model 2 Model3 Model4 
Variables 
Sign Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
(2-tailed p- (2-tailed p- (2-tailed p- (2-tailed p- (2-tailed p- (2-tailed p- (2-tailed p- (2-tailed p-
value value value value value value value value 
Intercept 1.074889 -2.837753 -0.724539 -0.646978 3.319872 3.212440 3.176059 3.246915 
(0.1041) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0009) 
TIA + 3.240701 3.934713 2.287633 2.221694 0.700895 0.719540 0.690994 0.684057 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0289) (0.0258) (0.0332) (0.0364) 
TL -3.693586 -4.663850 -2.634748 -2.531446 -0.536259 -0.591712 -0.538333 -0.525903 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1851) (0.1540) (0.1989) (0.2109) 
TIA + 8.670392 0.728307 
(0.0000) (0.5318) 
GW + 6.647940 6.522730 -1.068138 -1.136057 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6869) (0.6690) 
RD + 15.49353 15.47435 26.40027 25.97897 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3064) (0.3166) 
BN + 1.675755 -1.050938 
(0.0000) (0.8111) 
(continued) 
Table6.5 Regression of market value of equity on capitalized intangible assets and other balance sheet items (Continued) 
MVEi1 = <Xo +<X1ITAi1 + <X2TLit + 91 (1) 
MVE;, = ~ +a, IT Ail + ai ~1 +CX:3 TIAi1 + Eu (2) 
MVE;1 = ao +a1 IT Ai1 + exi ~, +aiow it +<XsRDit +<X.c;IIAi, + Ei, (3) 
MVEi1 = exo +a1 IT Ai1 + ai TL;1 +a..ow it +asRDi1 +a-1BN i1 + +asoc it +<½LC it + 91 (4) 
Australia China 
Predicted Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Variables 
Sign Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
(2-tailed p- (2-tailed p- (2-tailed p- (2-tailed p- (2-tailed p- (2-tailed p- (2-tailed p- (2-tailed p-
value value value value value value value value 
DC + 3.169001 -0.634%2 
(0.0000) (0.8301) 
LC + 2.238444 l.831018 
(0.0000) (0.8301) 
PR + 
BN +DC+LC 2.163909 0.908653 
+PA+OTHERS (0.0000) (0.4651) 
N 636 636 636 636 636 197 197 197 197 
F-statistic 79.58859 475.8921 962.9526 681.2173 3.621808 2.537393 1.771295 l.295244 
~0.0000) ~0.0000) (O.ooooi { 0. 0000) (0.028658) (0.058ll6) (0.120865) ~0.255030) 
Adjusted R2 0.217ll06 0.713597 0.893980 0.8933% 0.037876 0.039935 0.046648 0.048210 
'IT A = Total tangible assets, TL = Total liabilities, TIA = Total intangible assets, OW = Goodwill, RD = Research and development cost, BN = Brand name, DC = 
Deferred costs, LC = Licences costs, PR = Player's registration. 
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For Chinese firms, only Model 1 is significant (p<0.05). Total tangible assets 
are value-relevant in all models. However, the explanatory power does not 
exceed 5 per cent for any of the models, and none of the capitalized intangible 
assets' book values are significant in their association with the market value of 
equity. 
For Australian firms, hypotheses l(a) - l(e) are all supported and the most 
disaggregated model explains 89 per cent of the market value of equity. In 
contrast, none of the hypotheses are supported for Chinese firms, and the models 
explain no more than 5 per cent of the market value of equity. The extreme 
differences are likely to arise because Australian firms have a tradition of 
capitalizing identifiable intangible assets and amortizing them in a manner that 
is relatively consistent across all intangibles, and also because the Australian 
capital market participants are familiar with the accounting standards that do not 
permit assets to be capitalized or carried at amounts that exceed their fair values. 
In contrast, China is an emerging capital market where the accounting rules are 
not as familiar to participants, and the rules are less consistent across 
intangibles. 
Table 6.6 reports the results of multiple hierarchical regression tests to 
determine the extent to which adding individual or aggregate intangible asset 
independent variables or groups of independent variables increases the power of 
base models to explain variation in the market value of equity. Consistent with 
the results reported in Table 6.5, the explanatory power increases relatively 
significantly for Australian firms when various individual intangible assets or 
groups of intangible assets are added to an equation modelling the market value 
of equity as a function of the book value of tangible assets less liabilities. 
Despite the greater economic significance of deferred costs in modelling equity 
value for Australian firms, adding R&D to any base model including total 
tangible assets, total liabilities, and/or other intangible assets improves the 
explanatory power of the model far more than addi°ng any other individual 
intangible asset independent variable, or adding total intangible assets. For 
Chinese firms, the increase in explanatory power is never significant. 
The value relevance of capitalized intangible assets is different in China and 
Australia. The regressions using Chinese data show little relevance of 
capitalized assets. This finding is probably a consequence of the fact that the 
Chinese economy is an emerging economy where accounting has not served the 
same information role as in Western society, the capital market is in relatively 
early stages, and the rules governing accounting practice are less well-developed 
and less familiar to capital market participants. 
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Table 6.6 Incremental explanatory power of capitalized intangible assets to models of the 
market value of equity 
Countries 
Base Model Independent Additional Independent Australia China 
Variables Variables 
1 Total tangible assets; total Total intangible assets 0.497719*** 
liabilities 0.003222 
2 Total tangible assets; total Goodwill 0.116301 *** 
liabilities 0.004847 
3 Total tangible assets; total R&D 0.60096*** 
liabilities 0.000589 
4 Total tangible assets; total Brand names & patents 0.004101* 
liabilities 0.004956 
5 Total tangible assets; total Deferred costs -0.000819 
liabilities 0.005184 
6 Total tangible assets; total Licences 0.017883** 
liabilities 0.001121 
7 Total tangible assets; total Total of brand names, 0.020CJ92** 
liabilities deferred costs, licence 0.011303 
costs 
8 Total tangible assets; total Goodwill 0.0673309*** -
liabilities; R&D 0.004019 
9 Total tangible assets; total Goodwill 0.07297*** 
liabilities; R&D; BDLP 0.004505 
10 Total tangible assets; total Brand names & patents 0.001178** 
liabilities; goodwill; R&D 0.005073 
11 Total tangible assets; total Brand names, deferred 0.009393*** 
liabilities; goodwill; R&D costs, licence costs 0.015841 
12 Total tangible assets; total R&D 0.55201*** 0.000239 
liabilities; goodwill 
13 Total tangible assets; total R&D 0.533384*** 0.00028 
liabilities; goodwill; BDLP 
14 Total tangible assets; total Brand names & patents 0.004164* 
liabilities; goodwill 0.004989 
15 Total tangible assets; total Goodwill, R&D 0.119965*** 
liabilities 0.004608 
16 Total tangible assets; total Goodwill, R&D, brand 0.669489** 
liabilities names and patents 0.009681 
17 Total tangible assets; total Deferred costs; licence 0.008218*** 
liabilities; goodwill; R&D; costs 0.006749 
BN 
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6.8 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to investigate the value relevance of 
capitalizing brand names, deferred costs, goodwill, research and development, 
and licence costs across two countries: Australia and China. We have 
investigated the value relevance of capitalizing individual classes of intangible 
assets, and we have also assessed the value relevance of a capitalized aggregate 
of intangible assets. Finally, we have examined the incremental value relevance 
of capitalizing individual classes of intangible asset, conditional upon the 
capitalization of other classes. 
The results indicate that intangible asset classification in aggregate is 
generally value-relevant for Australian firms (p<0.01). Including capitalized 
assets in models of the market value of Australian firms' equity increases the 
explanatory power of those models significantly, but capitalization of individual 
classes of intangibles is even more value-relevant. Furthermore, the value 
relevance of research and development (R&D) ($15.50, p<0.01) and capitalized 
deferred costs is greatest, with the market attributing $3.17 of equity value to 
every $1.00 of capitalized deferred costs (p<0.01). Goodwill has the next 
greatest value relevance ($6.52, p<0.01), and licence costs are also value-
relevant ($2.24, p<0.01). 
The R&D findings conflict with those of Godfrey and Koh (2001), 
presumably because this study uses a larger sample that includes more firms 
with greater growth options inherent in their R&D. For the Australian sample, 
capitalizing the individual classes of intangible assets increases the explanatory 
power of models of the market value of equity from 71 per cent when 
intangibles are grouped together to 89 per cent when the five different classes of 
intangibles are included individually. In separate regressions using a base model 
where no other intangible assets are capitalized, contributions to the increase in 
explanatory power of models of the market value of equity for Australian firms 
are greatest from goodwill, then R&D, deferred costs, licences and brand names, 
in that order. 
In contrast, for Chinese firms the book value of intangible assets is a very 
small proportion of the book value of total assets ( only 2 per cent compared with 
20 per cent of Australian firms). Furthermore, none of the capitalized intangible 
asset book values are significantly associated with the market value of equity. 
One limitation of this study is simultaneously its strength. The limitation is 
that because the study uses data from a single period in China's early capital 
market development, it is impossible to determine whether the lack of value 
relevance of intangible asset capitalization is due to poor measurement in the 
accounts, to lack of capital market familiarity with the notion of intangible asset 
capitalization, or to investors buying shares for reasons other than capital gain. 
The strength from using this early data is that the study, as exploratory research, 
indicates that there is definitely a difference in the value relevance of capitalized 
intangible assets for the developed Australian capital market and the developing 
Chinese capital market. It highlights the potential for, and importance of, future 
research to explain reasons for that difference. 
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Notes 
The Urgent Issue Group (UIG) was established in 1994. The UIG is a 16 member committee 
with members from the profession, preparers of financial statements and government agencies. 
It was established to deal with accounting issues confronting practitioners, in particular where 
different interpretations of standards arise. Its pronouncements are in the form of abstracts, 
which guide accounting practice. 
Some claimed that the successful takeover of Rowntree (UK) by Nestle (Switzerland) in 1988 
was the result of a lack of appreciation of brand values by the stock market. 
Proposed amendments to IAS 36 Impairment of Assets and IAS 38 Intangible Assets. 
Using Australian data, Godfrey and Koh (2001) find that capitalization of intangible assets, as a 
whole, provides information that is relevant for investors in valuing firms. When capitalized 
intangible assets are disaggregated into goodwill, R&D and other identifiable intangible assets, 
both goodwill and other identifiable intangible assets provide relevant valuation information 
whereas capitalized R&D costs do not seem to provide information relevant to firms' valuation. 
Chen et al. (2001) find that accounting information is value-relevant to investors in the Chinese 
market despite its immaturity and the perception of inadequate accounting and financial 
reporting in China. 
The Company Analysis database includes firms whose equity traded on the relevant stock 
exchanges for the relevant period (for coverage see Table 6.3). 
Adopting the classifications of Company Analysis all intangible assets have been categorized as 
goodwill, development costs, brands and patents, licences, deferred costs, player registrations, 
and unclassified and other intangibles. 
The Godfrey and Koh (2001) tests use a sample of 172 firms whose 1999 annual reports appear 
on the Connect4 annual report database and which have reported intangible assets identified 
through the 17th edition of Huntleys' Shareholder. 

SECTION TWO 
7 Changing structure of Chinese 
enterprises and human resource 
management practices in China 
Shuming Zhao* 
7 .1 Introduction 
Economic reform and opening up to the outside world have made profound 
changes to the economic and social development of China. The most dramatic 
changes are in two areas. One is the change in the economic system. China has 
transformed its economic system from a highly centralized, planned economy to 
a market economy. Though people hold different views on whether or not China 
has set up a complete market economic system, the transformation has been 
profound and irreversible. Moreover, it has been necessary to speed up the 
reform process, especially since China's entry into the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). The other change has been in the ownership structure of 
enterprises. 
China began its open-door policy and economic reform in 1978. The reform 
started in rural areas (with farmers signing contracts with government for 
production) and was later introduced in industries (with managers signing 
contracts with the government). Deng Xiaoping's famous tour of Southern 
China in 1992 accelerated the pace of economic reform. The continuation of 
economic reform gained support from China's tenth Five-Year Plan (2002-
2005), and was approved at the Ninth National People's Congress (NPC) in 
2001. The sixteenth Party Congress in 2002 introduced a strategic plan to build a 
high-level consumption-oriented society, to deepen the reform of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), to strengthen the operation of the market, to further the 
open-door policy, to accelerate the development of science and technology and 
to reduce corruption over the next few years. All of this indicates that China's 
reforms are entering into a new period. 
Figure 7.1 shows China's economic growth over the past 24 years, indicating 
that China's average annual growth rate in GDP from 1978 to 2002 was 8 per 
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Figure 7.1 China economic growth after 1978 reform (GDP: billion RMB ) 
Other data also indicate that Chinese society has witnessed extensive 
development. Foreign exchange reserves totaled US$280 billion by the end of 
2002. In the same year, the total volume of imports and exports reached 
US$600.79 billion, consisting of US$325.57 billion in exports and US$295.22 
billion in imports, a rise of 22.3 per cent and 21.2 per cent respectively from 
their 2001 levels. Moreover, life expectancy has increased from 35 years, prior 
to the founding of New China in 1949, to 71.4 years in 2003. 
China's economy is expected to continue to grow despite the effect of SARS 
in 2003. The latest data show that in the first quarter of 2003, China's GDP 
reached 2356.16 billion RMB, an increase of 9.9 per cent from the same quarter 
in 2002. And from January to May 2003, investment in China reached 1057.78 
billion RMB, an increase of 31.7 per cent from 2002. It should not be difficult to 
reach the growth targets of investment (16 per cent) and GDP (7.9-8.2 per cent) 
for 2003. 
7 .2 The history of personnel management in China 
Since economic reform began in China in 1978, several changes have taken 
place in human resource management. Before 1978 China had for decades 
operated a highly centralized planned economy. The same is true for the 
personnel management system. College graduates were assigned jobs. 
Companies and other organizations had to apply for personnel quotas from the 
government personnel department. Personnel management practices are 
described in Table 7 .1. 
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The characteristics of personnel management immediately before 1978 were 
based on the ''three irons" policy. The "three irons" practices can be described as 
follows: 
a. "Iron armchair", which refers to the management of executives and 
technicians under a permanent job system. Once a person was recruited, he 
or she would be entitled to hold the position for his or her entire life. 
b. "Iron rice-bowl", which refers to the system of employment that created 
boundaries between "cadres" and "workers". A lifelong guarantee of a 
cadre's position, and the policy that cadres could be promoted but never 
demoted, led to a surplus of unproductive personnel. 
c. "Iron wages", which describes the wage distribution system. In the highly 
centralized planned economic system, the state played an authoritative role 
in the compensation system of enterprises. Evenly distributed pay had little 
to do with profits and individual performance. 
Since the start of economic reform in 1978, China began changing the personnel 
management system, especially after 1994 when the market economic system 
was officially adopted. There are two main reasons for the changes. First, it was 
necessary to change the personnel management system along with the 
establishment of the market system. Second, the open door policy attracted 
many multinational firms to invest in China, and Chinese enterprises faced 
fierce competition from multinational corporations in attracting and keeping 
high quality personnel. Table 7 .2 describes the process of the change since the 
economic reform in 1978. 
Table 7.1 Characteristics of personnel management before 1978 
Year Stage of personnel Characteristics 
management 
1949- Preliminary Stage Fixed employment; state monopoly of 
1952 recruitment and labor allocation 
1952- Beginning Stage Soviet management model with authoritarian 
1957 leadership; piece rate wages; merit-oriented 
payment 
1957- Development Stage Chief leader responsibility system; committees 
1966 with employee delegation; democratic 
management with employee participation 
1966- Stagnation Stage 'Three irons" policy strengthened 
1977 
Source: Zhao (1998). 
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Table 7.2 The development of the personnel system in China since the early 1980s 
Time Stage Characteristics Traits 
and 
eriod 
Early Exploration Reform of recruitment Decentralization of labor 
1980sto Stage methods to enlarge the pool relations and employment 
mid of candidates to include the 
1980s entire population; 
strengthening of skill 
training 
Mid to Break-through Use of contracts Enterprises become main 
late stage agency of employment; 
1980s employers and employees 
can make mutual 
employment decisions; 
labor relations determined 
through contracts 
Early Development Abolishment of "3 irons" Transfer to human resource 
1990sto stage policy; use of employment management system 
present contracts expanded to 
include all employees 
according to "labor law"; 
appropriate macro-level 
reforms 
Source: Zhao (1998). 
The main characteristics of human resource management in China after the 
1978 reforms can be described as follows (Zhao 2001): 
a. The key human resource management transition in China was the shift from 
a political and administrative relationship to an economic relationship 
between government and enterprise. 
b. The highly centralized labor allocation system shifted to "two-way" 
selection. 
c. The fixed wage system shifted to an enterprise-determined compensation 
package. 
d. The centralized control wage system failed to play an effective role within 
enterprises, and led to the existence of "low salary, low price". 
e. The central government relaxed ceilings on executive pay for SOEs. 
f. Competition for talent has increased since China's entry into the WTO in 
December 2001. 
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7.3 Changes in the structure of enterprise ownership 
The Fifteenth Party Congress, which was in session in Beijing in 1997, 
introduced the policy that mixed ownership forms should coexist with SOEs. 
Since that announcement, the forms and ownership structure of Chinese 
enterprises have changed a great deal. We can see from Tables 7.3 and 7.4 the 
changes in the forms and ownership structure of enterprises in China from 1996 
to 2001. 
Table 7.3 Number of corporations and ownership structure of enterprises in China 







Foreign-invested and Hong Kong, 
Macau, Taiwan-invested companies 
Others 
Source: SSB (1998). 


















Table 7.4 Number of corporations, ownership structure, number of employees and 
percentage of employees of each type in firm (December 31, 2001) 
Corporation % Employees 
( JO thousand } (] 0 thousand ) 
Total 302.6 100.0 16502.2 
State-owned companies 36.9 12.2 5056.8 
Collectively owned 85.8 28.3 3763.1 
companies 
Private companies 132.3 43.7 3170.3 
Share companies 30.0 9.9 2746.6 
Foreign-invested companies 5.7 1.9 644.0 
Hong Kong, Macau, and 8.2 2.7 997.4 
Taiwan-invested companies 
Others 3.7 1.3 124.0 
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The present situation of Chinese enterprises can be described as follows: 
a. State-owned enterprises are still the pillar of the Chinese national economy, 
though the number of SOEs has decreased and the ownership structure has 
changed. From January to May 2003, SOEs accounted for 52 per cent of the 
total output value in the whole country (SSB 2003a). State-owned or state-
controlled large enterprises still monopolized some industries, such as 
telecommunications, oil and petroleum. It seems that China's SOEs will 
continue to play a leading role in the national economy in the coming years. 
b. A modem enterprise system is being set up gradually. Before the 
introduction of market reforms, Chinese enterprises were not real 
corporations; rather, they resembled workshops of a large factory. The 
Chinese government had controlled the production decisions of enterprises 
since 1949. What to produce, how many products to produce, to whom 
products were to be sold and the pricing of the products were all decided by 
government. Sometimes the government interfered directly in the daily 
operations of business. With the establishment of the market economic 
system and the deepening of the economic reform, Chinese enterprises 
gradually gained autonomy, and faced market competition directly. 
c. Mixed ownership firms coexist with privately owned enterprises, and both 
ownership forms have developed quickly. From Figure 7.2, we can see 
clearly that the number of private enterprises has increased very fast in 
recent years. Currently, one-third of the employees in urban areas are 
working for private enterprises. And private enterprises make up more than 
30 per cent of the country's gross domestic product. In Zhejiang Province, 
private enterprises have increased to more than 200,000. At present the 
largest source of taxation revenue in Zhejiang comes from private 
businesses (People's Daily 2003b ). 
d. The number of foreign-invested enterprises has been increasing annually. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in China soared by 48.15 per cent (on an 
annualized basis) to US$23.271 billion in the first five months of 2003, 
according to the latest statistics from the Ministry of Commerce (MOC). A 
total of 439,371 foreign and overseas-funded enterprises have been set up 
since China adopted its policy of economic reform and opening up in 1978 
(Xinhua News Agency 2003). 
e. Many manufacturing enterprises have been merged. Notable instances are 
the five mergers of the ten national SOEs under the supervision of the newly 
established state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC). China Coal Construction Group merged with China 
Coal Energy Co.; China Scientific Instruments I&E Co. merged with China 
Biotech Group; China Food-Fermentation Industrial Institute merged with 
China Light Industry Group; China Crude Drugs Group merged with China 
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Medicinal Group; and China Huaqing Co. merged with China Art & Craft 
Co. (CCTV 2 2003). 
There are still some problems that have hindered the development of Chinese 
enterprises during the transition period. 
First, private enterprises have problems in getting loans from banks. Many 
private enterprises have entered the new high-tech sectors, and obtaining loans 
has been particularly problematic for them. Other sources of financing for 
private firms are also limited. There were only 139 private companies listed on 
China's stock markets at the end of 2002, accounting for 11.8 per cent of all 
listed companies (People's Daily 2003b). 
Second, the government still carries out some enterprise functions, though a 
modern enterprise system has been gradually set up. Because of the long 
duration of the highly centralized planned economy, governments cannot 
transfer their responsibilities immediately. And enterprises, especially SOEs, 
cannot get rid of the old habits that follow from the government's 
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Figure 7.2 A comparison of different forms of corporations in China (10 thousand) 
Source: SSB (1998, 2003b). 
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Third, China has recently issued relevant laws and regulations on corporate 
governance, such as the Law for the Promotion of Small & Medium-sized 
Enterprises, which came into operation on January 1, 2003. The legal system is 
still imperfect, however, and the legal system for protecting private property 
remains very weak. A report to China's People's Political Consultative 
Committee from the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce recently 
indicated that the lack of effective legal protection is a major problem in 
protecting both private property and property rights. This hinders the 
development of private enterprises. 
7.4 Recent challenges to human resource management in China 
7.4.1 Recent developments 
Since the start of economic reform, China's personnel system (under the highly 
centralized planned economic system) has been changed into human resource 
management under the market economy. Many changes have been taking place 
in recent years because of the restructuring of SOEs and the changing ownership 
structure. Some of the major recent changes are as follows. 
Residency card 
Generally speaking, from the 1950s until the 1990s Chinese citizens were 
divided into two categories in terms of residency registration (hukou). These two 
categories were agricultural residence (nongye hukou) and non-agricultural 
residence (fei nongye hukou) or urban residence (chengshi hukou). Residents of 
these different constituencies received very different treatment in employment, 
insurance and so on. If someone held an agricultural residency card, he or she 
could not work or live in the city unless he or she received a bachelor's degree 
or above, served in the army or was promoted to cadre status. Under these 
circumstances an individual could change his or her status from agricultural 
resident to urban resident. Restrictions on mobility became a serious problem for 
companies wishing to recruit people from rural areas or to hire talent from other 
cities. 
From 1993, China started to reform the residency registration system. The 
goal of this reform was to implement the same citizen registration in the whole 
country. In late 2001, several provinces (such as Jilin, Hunan, Guangdong, 
Fujian and Liaoning) abolished residential divisions. In 2002, the new residence 
registration reform began. Chinese citizens who have a place to live in the city, 
hold a job and receive a stable income may now apply for their regular 
residential status from the local police office. Early in 2003, Jiangsu Provincial 
Government issued a document stating that all residents in Jiangsu Province 
114 Shuming Zhao 
would have the same equal residential status from 1 May 2003. This will help 
talent to move to the places where the market needs it (Xinhua 2002). 
Personal file or record 
The personal file (dang'an), which a citizen is not allowed to see, records an 
individual's education and work experience, including high-school and 
university transcripts, reviews and comments from former and present 
employers. At present, state-owned companies have the right to keep employees' 
personal records. Employees in other companies (such as overseas-funded firms) 
have to pay authorized human resources agencies, such as personnel exchange 
centers, 20 RMB (about US$2.4) a month per employee for keeping their files. 
This is a system that a growing number of locals say is out of step with China's 
shift to a market economy. 
Companies cannot sign a contract with a new employee without first 
obtaining his or her file. The files are required for people to move from one 
place to another or to move from one organization to another. However, the 
importance of personal files is declining. Some provincial and municipal 
governments have set up new personal files and ignored the old ones in order to 
help local firms and other organizations to attract more talent. 
Social security system 
During the State's ninth Five-Year Plan period (from 1996 to 2000), the State 
Council issued a series of regulations about social insurance. With these 
regulations, a new social security system has been established. At present, 
China's new social security consists of life insurance, unemployment insurance, 
industrial injury insurance, medical insurance and housing subsidies. The latest 
survey shows that the current social security policy has problems, such as not 
enough money for all these different kinds of insurance. One of the important 
tasks of the reform of the Chinese social security system now is to expand the 
coverage rate of social insurance. And to achieve the reform, a greater amount of 
money to pay the conversion cost is needed. The issue of how to raise funds in 
order to pay for this is an extremely important problem. 
Housing 
In the past, under the highly centralized planned economy, the government 
allocated money to all public organizations to build apartments, and enterprises 
distributed housing to their employees nearly for free. As a result, the 
government had a heavy financial burden, the living conditions of the residents 
were poor and an urban real estate market was unable to develop. Reform of the 
housing policy was essential, and the process began in the late 1990s. The 
housing policy has now been reformed in many aspects, including the following: 
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a. Individuals are allowed to purchase their houses. 
b. A second-hand housing market has been introduced. 
c. A multi-tier system of housing has been set up. People with high incomes 
are permitted to buy apartments at market prices and can sell and buy 
housing on the market. People with low and middle incomes can purchase 
economic and functional housing. People with the lowest income can apply 
for low-rent housing that is managed directly by the government's housing 
department. 
7.4.2 The present situation of Chinese huma,n resources ma,nagement 
Recruiting 
Since China's Labor Law became effective on 1 January 1995, the contract 
employment system has been widely used in Chinese enterprises and the former 
system of assigning jobs to each individual has been abolished. Enterprises have 
the right to recruit and select their employees from the labor market or personnel 
exchange centers all over China. In early 2003, the end of "jobs-for-life" for the 
30 million public employees was announced, and the reform of China's public 
institutions was launched. This reform has been one of the biggest restructuring 
efforts in the field of employment in China and as such is a vital part of the 
country's modernization program. Public institutions have begun the practice of 
signing contracts with individuals instead of offering permanent jobs. The 
reform of human resources in public institutions will be completed within five 
years, by 2008, and at that time the contract employment system will be 
extended to other enterprises. 
One feature of human resources in China is that there are abundant laborers, 
but there is a scarcity of skilled labor. China is a large country with a population 
of 1.3 billion people. However, most of the people have not received a high level 
of education. In 2000, the average education of Chinese workers was only 7.42 
years, about five years less than in the United States (Ministry of Education 
2003). Closing this gap is a difficult and important task for developing human 
resources in China. Foreign-invested corporations offer more attractive 
compensation and opportunities for further training than do most Chinese 
enterprises. Young people, especially those who have received a good education, 
often prefer to work in foreign-invested firms. 
Training 
Training is a rather random business in most Chinese SOEs. Most Chinese 
enterprises have been aware of the importance of training, but systematic 
training structures have not been encouraged. Training is not connected with 
corporate strategy or with employees' career development. Some enterprises do 
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not know the real purpose of training, and therefore training becomes simply a 
formality. 
Training plays an important motivational role for top management and senior 
staff. Top managers pay more attention to training opportunities than others do, 
because they want to improve themselves. Some enterprises that have set up 
human resource management systems have introduced training as a special 
benefit for high-level staff in order to attract talented people. 
Technical training is receiving more emphasis as the shortage of technical 
workers is becoming a serious problem in China. In particular, a lack of senior 
technical workers is one of the most urgent needs in Shanghai, China's biggest 
city. 
Performance evaluation 
Performance evaluation is widely used in China nowadays. But it is not effective 
without motivation and supervision. There are no systematic performance 
evaluation systems. As a result, performance evaluation does not work well in 
most Chinese enterprises. Human resource management scholars and 
practitioners have been trying their best to develop performance evaluation 
systems that fit Chinese enterprises. Performance evaluation is highly regarded 
by employees because it is connected to their incomes. 
Compensation system 
Compensation reform in Chinese enterprises has been introduced gradually since 
the 1990s. For example, the Shenzhen Municipal Government set up a 
regulation on compensation for the top management of Shenzhen City SOEs in 
the late 1990s and renewed it in early 2003. Beginning from 2003 compensation 
for managers of SOEs in Shenzhen City has three components: basic salary, 
performance reward, and annual bonus. The basic salaries for managers at three 
different levels of SOEs are: 120,000 RMB for first-level enterprise managers, 
108,000 RMB for second level and 96,000 RMB for the third level. If the firm 
performs well in a year, managers can receive an annual bonus of as much as 
480,000 RMB (China Youth Daily 2003). 
According to a recent survey, compensation for key positions in foreign-
invested firms in Guangzhou is increasing (see Table 7 .5). It is reported that 
65.4 per cent of the foreign-invested firms have a fixed salary increase system, 
averaging about 9.1 per cent more than the previous year. Altogether, 93.6 per 
cent of the foreign-invested firms have an annual increase system. In the 2002-
2003 fiscal year the average salary increase in foreign-invested firms in 
Guangzhou was about 6.1 per cent. For benefits, employees have 18 to 31 days 
of paid leave for visiting parents or family, in addition to legal holidays. Most 
foreign-invested firms provide free meals during their workdays and subsidies 
for housing; 78.8 per cent of the firms have allocated housing funds. Additional 
measures that foreign-invested firms have taken are salary increases, special 
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training and development programs, and promotion opportunities. Annual 
average training expenditure for each employee is about 9000 RMB. Altogether 
93.5 per cent of the foreign-invested firms have an annual budget of about 5 per 
cent from the total sale revenue for annual training expenditure, of which the in-
house training budget is about 7896 RMB per person per year and the out-of-
company training budget is about 1026 RMB per person per year. In addition, 
80.6 per cent of the firms have 13-month salaries; 87.5 per cent have sales 
bonuses; 37.5 per cent of firms give annual sales bonuses; 31.3 per cent give 
sales rewards quarterly; and 62.5 per cent give sales rewards monthly 
(Guangzhou Topper Human Resource Consultants 2003). 
Tables 7.5 to 7 .9 present the results of a survey carried out by Guangzhou 
Topper Human Resource Consultants in 2003 on compensation and stock 
options for senior management and independent directors in the top 20 Chinese 
listed firms. From these tables one can see the extent to which executive 
compensation in large listed companies is determined by market forces. This 
reflects major changes in the compensation structure for management in top 
Chinese firms compared with the past, with stock options (tied to firm 
performance) having only been introduced as one of the components of the 
compensation system in China in recent years. 
Table 7.5 Survey results of salary for key positions in foreign-invested firms in Guangzhou 
(2002-2003, RMB) 
Position Lowest salary Highest salary Average 
General Manager 178,629 1,156,498 476,463 
Deputy General Manager 187,951 1,046,420 413,462 
Marketing Manager 71,080 683,566 312,609 
Human Resources Manager 113,202 620,983 212,582 
Financial Manager 81,069 362,271 238,737 
Manufacturing Manager 36,327 325,095 146,271 
Technology Management 42,192 288,019 179,458 
Source: Guangzhou Topper Human Resource Consultants (2003). 
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Table 7.6 Compensation for top management in top 20 Chinese listed firms 2003 
Annual 
salary 




Guangdong Kelon Electrical Holding Guangdong Manufacturing 
Co.Ltd 
2 127.11 Fuyao Class Co.Ltd Fujian Manufacturing 
3 123.33 Ufsoft Co. Ltd Beijing IT 
4 100.00 
Qindao Doublestar Shoe Manufacturing Shandong Manufacturing 
Co. Ltd 
5 100 .00 Lu Thai Textile Co. Ltd Shandong Manufacturing 
6 100 .00 Dalian Chuangye Co. Ltd Liaoning Manufacturing 
7 93 .00 China World Trade Center Beijing Service 
8 86.00 Jiangsu Little Swan Co. Ltd Jiangsu Manufacturing 
9 75.00 Zhejiang Guangxia Co. Ltd Zhejiang Construction 
10 70.00 
Xinxing Ductile Iron Pipes (Group) Co. Hebei Manufacturing 
Ltd 
11 61.00 
China Youth Travel Co. Ltd Beijing Multiple 
businesses 
12 60.00 
China International Marine Containers Guangdong Manufacturing 
(Group) Co. Ltd 
13 60.00 Powerise Co. Ltd Guangdong IT 
14 58.33 Dajiang Co. Ltd Shanghai Manufacturing 
15 56.16 ZteCo. Ltd Guangdong IT 
16 55.00 Midea Co. Ltd Guangdong Manufacturing 
17 55.00 
Inner Mongolia North Hauler Joint Stock Inner Manufacturing 
Limited Company Mongolia 
18 55.00 Nantian Information Co. Ltd Yunnan IT 
19 52.50 China Vanke Co. Ltd Guangdong Real estate 
20 51.75 Huagong Tech Co. Ltd Hubei Manufacturing 
Source: Guangzhou Topper Human Resource Consultants (2003). 
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Tianjin Capital Environmental Protection Company Tianjin 26.50 
Limited 
2 Baoshan Iron and Steel Co. Ltd Shanghai 20.00 
3 Shenzhen Expressway Company Limited Guangdong 12.27 
4 Shenzhen Neptunus Bioengineering Co. Ltd Guangdong 10.00 
5 Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Company Limited Guangdong 9.52 
6 China International Marine Containers ( Group ) Co. Ltd Guangdong 8.00 
7 Tsinghua Tongfang Co. Ltd Beijing 8.00 
8 Hainan Airlines Co. Ltd Hainan 8.00 
9 Huafang Co. Ltd Shandong 8.00 
10 Yanzhou Coal Mining Co. Ltd Shandong 7.00 
11 Guangzhou Shipyard International Company Limited Guangdong 6.54 
12 China Fangda Group Co. Ltd Guangdong 6.00 
13 Shenzhen Yan Tian Port Holdings Co. Ltd Guangdong 6.00 
14 Hunan Henghong Science And Technology Develop Co. Hunan 6.00 
Ltd 
15 Wuhan Kaidi Electric Power Co. Ltd Hubei 6.00 
16 Henan Lianhua Gourmet Powder Co. Ltd Henan 6.00 
17 Gansu Ronghua Industry Group Co. Ltd Gansu 6.00 
18 Shenzhen Taitai Pharmaceutical Company Limited Guangdong 6.00 
19 Zhejiang Xinan Chemical Industrial Group Co. Ltd Zhejiang 6.00 
20 Hualian Supermarket Co. Ltd Shanghai 6.00 
Source: Guangzhou Topper Human Resource Consultants (2003). 
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Table 7.8 Stock options for the top 20 chairmen of the board in Chinese listed firms 2003 
... 
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Orient Group Heilongjiang Zhang 2,813,899 7.77 21,863,995.23 
Hongwei 
2 Ningbo Yunsheng Zhejiang Zhu 891,000 24.27 21,624,570.00 
Co.Ltd Yunde 
3 Zhejiang Guangsha Zhejiang Lou 1,437,345 9.72 13,970,993.40 
Co. Ltd Zhongfu 
4 Wanxiang Zhejiang Lu 679,031 10.58 7,184,147.98 
Qianchao Co. Ltd Guanqiu 
5 Midea Co. Ltd Guangdong He 559,859 10.12 5,665,773.08 
Hengjian 
6 Dongfang Shandong Shui 739,200 6.04 4,464,768.00 
Electronics Co. Ltd Yuanbo 
7 Zhejiang Eastern Zhejiang Liu 200,448 21.12 4,233,461.76 
Co. Ltd Linsheng 
8 Youngor Co. Ltd Zhejiang Li 373,152 11.14 4,156,913.28 
Rucheng 
9 Shandong Lubei Shandong Feng 309,777 13.15 4,073,567.55 
Chemical Co. Ltd Jiutian 
10 Shenzhen Guangdong Lin 308,283 13.16 4,057,004.28 
Agricultural Jiahong 
Products Ltd 
11 Guangdong Meiyan Guangdong Yang 717,183 4.81 3,449,650.23 
Co. Ltd Qinhuan 
12 Neusoft Co. Ltd. Liaoning Liu Jiren 156,130 21.34 3,331,814.20 
13 Liaoning Cheng Da Liaoning Shang 222,300 14.58 3,241,134.00 
Enterprises Co. Ltd. Shuzi 
14 Jiangsu Etem Co. Jiangsu Gu 200,000 12.62 2,524,000.00 
Ltd Yunkui 
15 Shenzhen Kaifa Guangdong WangZhi 214,207 11.74 2,514,790.18 
Technology Co. Ltd 
16 Fiyta Co. Ltd Guangdong Li 124,416 17.83 2,218,337.28 
Zhizheng 
17 Zhongda Co, Ltd Zhejiang Cheng 190,125 10.00 1,901,250.00 
Jida 
18 China Vanke Co. Guangdong Wang Shi 139,559 13.35 1,863,112.65 
Ltd 




20 YataiCo.Ltd Jilin Song 232,402 7.16 1,663,998.32 
Shanglong 
Source: Guangzhou Topper Human Resource Consultants (2003). 
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Table 7.9 Stock options for the top 20 general managers in Chinese listed firms 2003 
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Orient Group Heilongjiang An Ying 1,707,797 7.77 13,269,582.69 
2 Shenzhen Kaifa Guangdong Tan 714,025 11 .74 8,382,653.50 
Technology Co. Ltd Zhiwen 
3 Zhejiang Eastern Co. Zhejiang Wu 190,426 21.12 4,021,797.12 
Ltd Jianhua 
4 Liaoning Cheng Da Liaoning Zhang 177,840 14.58 2,592,907.20 
Enterprises Co .. Ltd Dezhong 
5 Ling Bo Fuda Co. Zhejiang Xu 211,954 11.64 2,467,144.56 
Ltd Laiying 
6 Tsinghua Tongfang Beijing Lu 103,623 20.17 2,090,075.91 
Co. Ltd Zhicheng 
7 China International Zhejiang Mai 78,078 26.66 2,081,559.48 
Marine Containers Boliang 
(Group) Co. Ltd. 
8 Jiangsu Sanrnu Jiangsu Cheng 164,454 12.60 2,072,120.40 
Group Co. Weihui 
9 Shanghai Haxin Shanghai Yuan 113,514 16.85 1,912,710.90 
Group Co. Ltd Yonglin 
10 ZteCo. Ltd Guangdong Hou 72,000 23.46 1,689,120.00 
Weigui 
11 Shengzhen Guangdong Song 172,800 9.12 1,575,936.00 
International Co. Ltd Shenjun 
12 Xinjiang Tunhe Co. Xinjiang Zhang 639,600 21.71 1,388,571.60 
Ltd Guo 
13 Guangdong Chunhui Guangdong Wu Jun 144,000 9.07 1,306,080.00 
Co. Ltd 




15 Dongfang Shandong Ding 184,019 6.04 1,111,474.76 
Electronics Co. Ltd Zhenghua 
16 Jiangsu Wujiang Jiangsu Yao 68,400 16.02 1,095,768.00 
delicacy Chemical Jianlin 
Co. Ltd 
17 Shanghai Jinling Co. Shanghai XuWeiwu 130,127 7.24 942,119.48 
Ltd 
18 Shandong Heibao Shandong Shun 117,000 7.89 923,130.00 
Co. Ltd Xianyou 
19 Shandong Jiufa Shandong Wang 49,920 17.45 871,104.00 
Edible Fungus Co. Hongqin 
Ltd. 
20 Shenzhen Kangdar Guangdong OuXitao 141,588 6.09 862,270.92 
Co. Ltd 
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7.4.3 Successful cases 
P&Gin China 
In 1988, P&G founded the first joint venture in China, Guangzhou P&G Co. 
Ltd. Today, P&G has achieved great success in the Chinese market, setting a 
good example in human resource management for foreign-invested firms in 
China. 
In order to attract the best college graduates, P&G in China took three 
measures to recruit the best staff: 
a. Establishing P&G scholarships at top Chinese universities. 
b. Lecturing and giving presentations on the campuses. 
c. Designing a competitive recruitment and selection program. 
P&G in China has become the most popular foreign company in Chinese 
universities and has attracted thousands of outstanding graduates. 
The promotion system in P&G is designed to be fair to every employee. It 
includes internal promotion, international promotion, challenging career 
experience and management opportunities for local Chinese staff. 
Training is used to invest in human resources and motivate employees. P&G 
provides all different kinds of training programs for its employees. All 
employees are encouraged to participate in lifelong learning and organization 
building. 
P&G's compensation system is designed in accordance with international 
standards. The market determines the group average level of compensation. The 
modern compensation structure includes salary, various welfare benefits, stock 
options and other methods, for rewarding performance. Profit sharing is also 
used to retain good employees. 
HaierGroup 
The Haier Corporation was established in 1984 manufacturing only refrigerators. 
Over the past 20 years, the Haier Corporation has grown from one small factory 
into a large transnational company widely recognized in the world community. 
The Haier Group now manufactures a broad range of household electrical 
appliances in 86 categories with 13,000 specifications and exports products to 
more than 160 countries. Haier's global sales in 2002 totaled RMB71.1 billion, 
including overseas turnover ofUS$1 billion. 
Haier tries to build a fair, open, and just atmosphere for employees. There are 
four human resource development principles in Haier. First, the Human 
Resource Development Center studies corporate human resource management 
policies to tap employees' potential and motivate people. They have designed 
three kinds of career development program for all employees. One program is 
for people whose career path is in management; another is designed for 
professional personnel, and the third is designed for blue-collar workers. 
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Second, management staff who are already in their positions are supervised and 
evaluated. Promotion is the result of competition. Third, managers should be 
trained at different departments at a lower level before being promoted to a 
higher position. And last, a small percentage of personnel are removed from 
their positions based on poor performance. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Many changes have taken place in Chinese enterprises since China started 
economic reform and opening up to the outside world in 1978, especially in 
recent years. The changing structure of Chinese enterprises has brought attention 
to some critical issues concerning human resource management. The purpose of 
this chapter was to outline some of the changes that have taken place in Chinese 
enterprises since China began its economic reforms and opening up to the 
outside world, and to describe the changing structure of human resource 
management in those enterprises. The chapter analyzes the present situation, 
discussing problems and challenges of Chinese enterprises and the main 
characteristics of human resource management in China, with brief reference to 
recruiting, training and development, performance evaluation, and compensation 
practices in two specific enterprises. 
Notes 
This chapter is part of a research project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation 
of China, Project number: 70372036; Ministry of Education research project, 03JB630014; and 
Business Administration National Key Specialty of Nanjing University. 
8 The management of human resources 
in Shanghai 
A case study of policy responses to 
employment and unemployment in the 
People's Republic of China 
Grace 0. M. Lee and Malcolm Warner* 
8.1 Introduction 
The management of human resources - broadly conceived - in the People's 
Republic of China (henceforth to be referred to as China) was associated with a 
Soviet-style command economy and lifetime employment from 1949 (when 
Mao Zedong took power) until 1978 (when Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms 
were initially launched). 
The Chinese worker in the 1950s saw the implementation of a 'jobs for life' 
and 'cradle to the grave' welfare policy for those working in the urban industrial 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This system was widely known in Chinese 
parlance as the 'iron rice-bowl' (tie fanwan) and the phrase became a widely 
used shorthand term for the management status quo amongst informed outsiders 
interested in what is happening in that country (see Child 1994). The system was 
partly derived from earlier Chinese Communist experience in the so-called 
'liberated zones' during the war with Japan, as well as later, Soviet practice, but 
may in addition have had roots in Japanese precedents in occupied Manchuria -
and it is likely that there was a wide range of earlier influences that shaped the 
evolution of the 'iron rice-bowl'. It had become definitively embedded in 
industrial life and fully institutionalized by the mid-1950s. Labour market 
imbalances were to be addressed at the company level rather than in the open 
market. As with the Japanese labour market policy model, the emphasis was on 
the 'internal' labour market within the enterprise as opposed to the 'external' 
labour market outside the enterprise. It is an enterprise-centred and industry-
driven form of labour market management. In this context, labour market 
policies may be considered as social protection, both in theory and in practice, 
and as intended as a form of employment protection (Abrahart and Verme 
2001:60). Several writers (such as Walder 1986 or Warner 1995) have seen the 
'iron rice-bowl' relationship as 'organizational dependency', and as an important 
theoretical support for their analysis, to which we will return later. The mindsets 
associated with this relationship became deep-rooted and difficult to modify or 
change. Even so, with the beginnings of the economic reforms, the guarantees of 
the 'iron rice-bowl' began to be eroded. 
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But this only came about gradually in the reform period. The policy of jobs 
for life lingered on in the 1980s, and it was not until the 1990s that the 'iron 
rice-bowl' began to be effectively replaced by a market-oriented set of labour 
and personnel reforms. The 'lifetime' employment system was generally 
believed by economics and management scholars to be associated with weak 
people-management and to reinforce factor-immobility and inefficiency (see 
Warner 1995, 1999 and 2000 on the background literature on this). The 
government acknowledged the existence of unemployment as a necessary 
temporary condition to facilitate and maximize the allocation of labour, and the 
government's role has become mainly to support the unemployed with income 
maintenance and training schemes so as to facilitate job seeking and placement. 
Managers were now allowed more autonomy to hire and fire, particularly in 
SOEs; decision-making was to become more decentralized in not only personnel 
but also marketing and purchasing domains. A reform-inspired workplace 
practice adopted from the mid-1980s onwards had been the implementation of 
'labour contracts'. By defining the length of the contract, the period of 
employment became sharply delineated and this displaced the previously 
enshrined practice of permanent 'lifetime employment'. In theory, workers in 
China had since the 1950s been the 'masters of the country' (guojia zhuren), 
with the bad old days of job insecurity a bygone feature; by definition, 
unemployment could not exist. The key question of the day was the 'right to 
work' (gongzuo quan) and 'full employment' (quanminjiuye). 
Unemployment, sanitized in the phrase 'waiting for work' (daiye), 
intertwined in turn with poverty, now poses such a major threat to both social 
stability and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), however, that it 
demands an urgent policy response. This chapter begins with an examination of 
the issue of employment and unemployment in China, then moves on to explain 
the institutional changes that brought about the problem. We then discuss our 
research methodology. Shanghai will be taken as a case study to explore policy 
responses; in the next section a labour market model will be developed to 
discuss both active and passive labour market programmes in Shanghai. Despite 
the apparent success of the Shanghai model, its general applicability to other 
cities remains uncertain, particularly in view of China's entry to the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), the subject of the discussion section that follows. 
The final section presents some conclusions. 
8.2 Employment and unemployment in China 
At the present time, China's billion and a quarter population and vast labour 
force, the largest in the world (see Warner 1995), puts human resources high on 
the agenda as far as the recent WTO entry (in late December 2001) is concerned. 
Many of the labour force of over 700 million are country-dwellers and still live 
in townships and villages. There has been until lately a strict 'one-child policy' 
in most of the People's Republic to restrain population numbers, as new citizens 
as well as existing ones have to be fed, housed and employed - no easy 
challenge. Half of the labour force work on the land, but it is estimated that over 
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200 million of these are surplus to economic requirements. Already over 100 
million are on the move, making their way into the towns as part of the 
'floating' migrant population known as the mingong. Over a third of China's 
population live in urban areas. Those out of work in the towns were officially 
calculated at 3.5 per cent of the urban workforce in the late 1990s, but in reality 
this figure could be much higher, as we shall shortly see. 
Shanghai, China's largest city, was no exception. Unemployment was 
officially unknown throughout the Maoist years. Jobs for life were de rigueur. 
The unemployment rate in Shanghai even by 2001 was officially seen as low as 
4.3 per cent, in spite of the industrial restructuring that had taken place in that 
conurbation (Shanghai Statistical Bureau 2002). It is more than likely to be an 
underestimate. As Solinger has rightly pointed out, 'accurate data are hard to 
come by, since government statistics are murky and often presented in a way 
that suggest that the numbers are not all that large' (Solinger 2002: 304). The 
State Council's Development Research Centre issued a report that contradicts 
official figures for the current unemployment rate. In contrast to the very recent 
official rate of 4.5 per cent in China, the report indicates that the urban 
unemployment rate is already 10 per cent, and will rise to 15 per cent under the 
impact of World Trade Organisation entry. 1 Politics has plagued the use of 
statistics from the beginning of the People's Republic. As long as high GDP 
growth rates and low unemployment are treated as political targets, and are used 
to bolster the careers of provincial officials, these problems will remain. One 
phrase that is commonly heard among Chinese economists is that 'data make 
officials, and officials make up the data' (shuju chengjiu guanyuan, guanyuan 
chengjiu shuju). 
Euphemisms abound in this sphere. Here are a few examples (see Kynge 
2003): 
• daiye, waiting for work; 
• fenliu, attached to one unit but working for another; 
• neitui, retired early but getting a stipend; 
• tingxin liuzhi, keeping a job but without pay; 
• liangbuzhao, similar but with more emphasis; 
• fang changjia, on a long vacation; 
• tiqian tuixiu, early retirement; 
• fuyu renyuan, no work but a token wage. 
Indeed caution has to be paid to differences in definitions. China defines the 
jobless in a highly distinctive way. According to the State Statistical Bureau, 
unemployment refers to the urban registered unemployed who (a) possess non-
agricultural residence; (b) are within a certain age range (16 to 50 for males and 
16 to 45 for females); (c) are able and willing to work; and (d) have registered 
with the local labour bureau for employment (State Statistical Bureau, 2002: 
588). Only the openly unemployed are eligible for what are known in the PRC 
officially as 'unemployment benefits'. In fact, another form of joblessness is 
perhaps more pervasive - 'hidden' unemployment' - referring to workers, often 
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in the state sector, who have been laid off (xiagang). The State Statistical Bureau 
defines 'laid off' workers to be 'workers who have left their posts and are not 
engaged in other types of work in the same unit, but still maintain a relationship 
with the unit that they have worked in' (State Statistical Bureau 2002: 588). 
Workers who have been laid off are only given very basic living subsidies 
(shenghuofei) at subsistence levels, instead of unemployment benefits, and are 
not included in the registered unemployment rate. This convention has led to 
confusion by overseas observers, and accounts for the allegedly low rate of 
joblessness in China. 
A White Paper on Employment and Social Welfare issued by the State 
Council stated that from 1998 to 2001, more than 25.5 million people were laid 
off from state-owned enterprises, of which 16.8 million managed to rearrange 
employment (as cited in O'Neill 2002: A0l). These figures would suggest that 
8.7 million are still laid off. Wang Dongjin, Vice-Minister of Labour and Social 
Security, pointed out that many of the jobless and those laid off from state-
owned enterprises were low-skilled and middle-aged workers who had had a 
poor education and had been employed in traditional sectors such as coal, 
textiles and machinery (as cited in O'Neill 2002: A0l). Wang's observation is 
supported by Maurer-Fazio's (2002) empirical analysis that demonstrates that 
education has become a key determinant of labour market outcomes in China's 
rapidly changing work environment. Educational attainment is now an important 
factor in the 'layoff decision': the more education a worker has, the better 
his/her protection from layoff. Similarly, the more education a worker has, the 
better his/her chances of finding new employment. 
Wang openly acknowledged that China was facing a severe employment 
situation, and the numbers that had newly joined the labour force were at an 
unprecedented peak. In the coming few years, 12 to 13 million will enter the 
labour market every year. Even if China retains its current 7 per cent economic 
growth per year, only 8 million jobs will be created. This means the annual 
newly added unemployed will be 4 to 5 million. By the end of 2005, a new 
unemployed force of 20 million is expected to appear. While the precise total 
aggregates may be in doubt, this description seems plausible. Unemployment, 
intertwined with poverty, now poses a huge threat to both social stability and the 
rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and this demands an urgent policy 
response. Labour market programmes have emerged as an important 
employment policy tool in the reform era. The following section examines the 
institutional changes in the Chinese labour market in the pre- and post-reform 
era. 
8.3 Institutional changes in the Chinese labour market 
In their theoretical analysis of the recent economic reform process, Hussain, 
Stern and Stiglitz (2000: 4) argued most persuasively that the more successful 
aspects of China's transformation have been based on 'a process of institutional 
change that preserved and built on its basic codes and practices of behaviour'. 
128 Grace 0. M. Lee and Malcolm Warner 
Table 8.1 Institutional changes in the Chinese labour market 
Pre-reform era 
Role of the state 
Socialist ideology 
Direct allocation of jobs 




Tool for full employment 
Workers as 'masters' 
Post-reform era 
Market principles 




Layoffs for efficiency 
Workers as 'proletarians' 
Table 8.1 shows a comparison of the institutional changes in the pre- and post-
reform era. 
China's pre-reform labour system was the antithesis of the free market. The 
state claimed ownership of labour services and bureaucratically assigned 
workers to enterprises for life (tongyifenpei). Workers' preferences concerning 
occupation or location mattered little. On the enterprise side, managers for the 
most part had to accept any and all workers allocated to them. Job mobility was 
minimal and would occur mostly as the result of workers' reassignments or 
transfers to satisfy the need of state-run organizations (Walder 1986: 8). Under 
these circumstances, where individuals are discouraged from searching for jobs, 
information about jobs is unimportant and meaningless. 
Around 1992-1993, the policy of state job assignment was largely abolished. 
By the mid-1990s, the tongyi fenpei system remained only residually in large 
cities such as Shanghai (Davis 1999: 22-43). School graduates still have access 
to state-sponsored channels for employment, but they now have the option of 
using market channels such as advertisements, job fairs and employment 
agencies. The number of private enterprises, foreign-funded firms and other non-
state controlled businesses has significantly increased. Seen positively, the 
operation of labour markets made it legitimate for individuals to use all kinds of 
channels to search for jobs. Bian's (2002) study of job mobility in five Chinese 
cities indicated that from the pre-reform period to the 1980-92 and the post-
1992 period, job mobility through hierarchical channels2 declined sharply from 
76 per cent to 52 per cent to 10 per cent respectively. Meanwhile, job mobility 
through market channels increased from 15 per cent to 32 per cent to 60 per cent 
respectively. These changes point to the decline of job assignments and the 
growth oflabour markets in Chinese cities from 1980 to 1999 (Bian 2002: 4-7). 
On the other hand, the abolition of the state allocation system also means that 
concerns about state-sector inefficiency began to override concerns about 
dismissals and layoffs. Enterprise reforms replaced the 'iron rice-bowl' with 
performance-based hiring, firing, and compensation. State-owned enterprises 
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have begun to use labour contracts, adopt wage reform, and decentralize labour 
management. The policy of laying off workers (making them xiagang) was first 
experimented with and then applied nationwide in 1997. The effects were 
profound. The security once enjoyed by urban workers rapidly eroded. Chinese 
urban workers are no longer shielded from market forces. They bear the brunt of 
the adjustment costs as enterprises shed redundant workers in their attempts to 
become more efficient and profitable. Laid-off workers experience substantial 
periods of unemployment with minimal stipends. To address this issue, various 
localities have devised their own 're-employment projects' (zaijiuye 
gongcheng). Shanghai was chosen for our study because it was the pioneer in 
establishing the Re-employment Service Centre. Combining welfare provision, 
employment services and retraining programmes, the Shanghai Re-employment 
Service Centre was recognized by the central government as a 'learning model' 
for other local governments. These changes exemplify the notion that state 
institutions constantly readjust and revise themselves in response to new 
demands and circumstances, an important feature of the transitional economy 
(Solinger 1999 cited in Fan 2002: 107). We now briefly sketch out the research 
approach we used in the case study. 
8.4 Research methodology 
The main research methods we used in the citywide case study presented here 
draw on evidence gleaned mainly from both primary and secondary documents, 
media reports and official statistics. These we consistently approached with 
caution to build up an analysis and evaluation of the Shanghai re-employment 
model. Empirical field research in Shanghai in the form of over fifty open-
ended, qualitative interviews with policymakers, managers, trade union 
representatives, workers and unemployed persons in the late 1990s and, with 
recent further contacts, up to the end of the year 2001, also provided 
supplementary valuable data. Visits were made to government departments such 
as the Labour and Social Security Bureau in Shanghai, as well as the Re-
employment Service Centres. The operation of the placement service, retraining 
services and social security insurance was observed at first hand. 3 The evidence 
we present below, we believe, has therefore robust empirical underpinnings. 
8.5 The Shanghai labour market model 
Figure 8.1 depicts a labour market model that summarizes the operation of the 
system in Shanghai. Over the past 40 years, 'active' labour market programmes 
have emerged as an important employment-policy tool, particularly in developed 
countries. This policy envelope includes a wide range of activities intended to 
increase the quality of labour supply (for example retraining), to increase labour 
demand (for example direct job creation), or to improve the matching of workers 
and jobs (for example job-search assistance). The objective of these measures is 
primarily economic: to increase the probability that the unemployed will find 
jobs or that the underemployed will increase their productivity and earnings. 




• Registered unemployed 
• Laid-off workers 
• Frictionally unemployed 
• New entrants to the labour market 
Active Labour Market Programmes 
• Training / Retraining 
• Job creation 
• Wage subsidy 





• Remain unemployed 




• Minimum living subsidy 
Figure 8.1 Chinese labour market model 
However, more recently the case for active labour market policies has also 
emphasized the potential social benefits in the form of the inclusion and 
The management of human resources in Shanghai 131 
participation that comes from productive employment (Betcherman et al 2000: 
1). Labour supply (school leavers, job changers and laid-off workers) is the 
primary input to the systems model. This supply of labour, it is hoped, will be 
transformed by the active labour market programmes of the government, leading 
to positive output of employment. Shanghai has also established a 'passive' 
labour market policy of unemployment insurance. 
8.5.1 Retraining 
Public support can come in the form of direct provision of training (for example 
through public training institutes), financial support for trainees (for example by 
funding training costs and/or subsidizing trainees) or providing 'infrastructure' 
services (such as labour market information, licensing, monitoring and 
credential services). State and city governments have a range of potential roles: 
direct provision, regulation, providing information and standards, and financing. 
Many governments are moving away from the role of direct provider and 
focusing more on addressing market failures in information and financing, while 
leaving more of the delivery to private providers (Betcherman et al 2000: 5), but 
the role of the state is prominent in Shanghai. The training programmes are 
designed, financed and delivered by the government. The training centres are 
attached to the placement centres, widely known in Shanghai by the description 
qiandian hou gongchang (employment-service provided in the shop, training in 
the backyard). Each class will have about 40 trainees. The length of training 
differs from job to job: domestic helpers will be trained for three weeks, six 
hours a day; cooks and technicians will receive training for half a year, but only 
three days a week. According to the head of the training centre visited, the 
success rate in job placement is often boosted from the normal rate of below 30 
per cent to as high as 70 per cent for domestic helpers (field interviews, June 
1999). In Shanghai, retraining is free of charge for jobseekers certified to be 
xiagang workers and unemployed. Some laid-off workers do benefit from 
various training programmes, ranging from cooking and hairdressing to public 
relations, law and marketing (China Daily, 30 January 2001). If training is for 
self-development purposes, however, each trainee will have to pay 300 RMB to 
take part in the course. 
8.5.2 Creation of employment 
In general, job creation programmes across the world are designed to support the 
creation of new jobs or the maintenance of existing ones. Three broad types of 
programmes fall under this category. First, there are subsidies to encourage 
employers to hire new workers or to keep employees who might otherwise have 
been laid off for business reasons. These can take the form of direct wage 
subsidies (for either the employer or worker) or social security payment offsets. 
These types of subsidies are always targeted to a particular category of worker 
or employer. The second category involves direct job creation in the public or 
non-profit sector through public works or related programmes. Typically, 
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government funds used for these programmes cover compensation costs to hire 
previously unemployed workers, usually on a temporary basis. Third, support is 
sometimes offered to unemployed workers to start their own enterprises 
(Betcherman et al 2000: 6). 
Direct public employment creation policies are set up to lessen 
unemployment by creating jobs and hiring the unemployed directly. Such 
policies target the displaced and the long-term unemployed, with a view to help 
them regain contact with the labour market, thereby minimizing the likelihood 
of stigmatization, skills obsolescence and marginalization. In devising solutions 
to the employment problem, the Shanghai government has created more 
employment opportunities by any reckoning. The Shanghai Labour Bureau has, 
for instance, invested in minor improvement programmes at the district level, 
and has allegedly created over 20,000 vacancies. These vacancies concentrate on 
public hygiene (baojian), public security (bao'an), environmental protection 
(baolu), and the maintenance of public facilities (baoyang).4 Street committees 
also help in providing employment programmes. These committees retrain laid-
off workers to do work such as the maintenance of buildings and 'green' areas, 
sanitation, domestic services and security. Funding for some of these 
programmes comes from individual households, with each paying about 36 cents 
(in Chinese currency denomination) per month for committee services including 
window-cleaning, garbage-disposal, maintaining recreational facilities and 
activities, maid-services and even providing haircuts (Erickson and Hsieh 1998: 
52). These services have clearly become 'affordable' as urban dwellers in China 
become wealthier.5 
Another type of job creation that is important to cite is the Self-Employment 
Creation Measure or Micro-Enterprise Development Assistance. Technical 
assistance, credit and other support can contribute to the creation and promotion 
of small-scale new businesses and self-employment. China has taken some novel 
initiatives which we can mention here. In Shanghai, the Baibang Community 
Service Company and the Baibang Industrial Centre are examples of self-
employment creation (field interviews, June 1999). The former takes care of the 
aged and the less-educated redundant workers, while the latter caters for the 
needs of semi-skilled workers. The Baibang Community Service Company was 
set up in 1994 to match the employment needs of laid-off workers with the need 
for family services in the community. Officials who run the company are 
seconded from the Ministry of Social Welfare. They rely on the District 
Committees to identify xiagang workers and their appropriate skills. 
Government training institutes provide free training and accreditation of the 
worker's skills. Promotion of the service is through street posters, free local 
media such as newspapers, television and radio-broadcasts, and word-of-mouth. 
Services are developed according to the needs of the neighbourhood, such as 
childcare, elderly care, cleaning and preparation of meals. The company charges 
a commission ranging from 20 to 50 RMB from the workers, and 10 per cent or 
50 RMB per job from the family-service recipient. As of June 1999, the 
company claimed it had been successful in finding jobs for over 200,000 
workers (field interviews, June 1999). 
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Private banks are often unable to conduct the comprehensive risk assessments 
required for offering credit to unemployed workers who want to create their own 
businesses. Public programmes to support small business loans can contribute to 
the removal of this distortion arising from credit rationing. An example of a self-
employment creation agency found in Shanghai is the Baibang Industrial Centre, 
established in May 1998 (field interviews, June 1999). A bankrupt state-owned 
coal-products factory was restructured into 18 units leased to redundant worker-
entrepreneurs. The government provides start-off loans each ranging from 
50,000 to 150,000 RMB. Employees working in the industrial centre should be 
workers who are either laid off or retired from state enterprises (the ratio is about 
70 to 30). 
8.5.3 Job referral and counselling 
Market economies are imperfect because of, among other factors, information 
asymmetry. For example, jobseekers have insufficient information about the 
distribution and specification of job openings, and employers have insufficient 
and inaccurate information about the distribution of qualified job candidates 
(Devine and Kiefer 1991 cited in Bian 2002: 3). Employment services fulfil such 
brokerage functions as matching jobs with jobseekers. 
China too has taken up new ways of finding work for the unemployed. In 
Shanghai, however, private agencies are restricted and the public employment 
service operates under near-monopoly conditions. There have been 452 
registered employment agencies in all to provide employment services in 
Shanghai. Of these, 338 were established under the Labour Administration 
Division and 110 are operated by industries and social organizations such as the 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the Association for the 
Handicapped and the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF). Enterprises 
register their vacancies with the placement centres and then select workers 
through open recruitment. Vacancies reported by employers are advertised 
online (since I July 1997, state-operated employment agencies in Shanghai have 
been inter-connected electronically to provide 'real-time' information on the job 
market to jobseekers; all the state-established agencies are linked vertically and 
horizontally, as well as with nine employment agencies set up by the industries). 
As well as displaying job vacancies, information on retraining is also 
available on the Internet, though this is not necessarily of much use to the poor, 
except at official agency centres. Retraining courses are designed, financed and 
delivered by the government. According to the Deputy Head of the Shanghai 
Re-employment Service Centre, the content of these training programmes is 
intended to link to the needs of the market. Out of the ten positions advertised 
every week in the local newspapers which are in greatest demand, training 
programmes will be offered for the first four. Examples of such vacancies 
include positions as cashiers, computer technicians, cooks, domestic helpers and 
electrical technicians. The training centres are attached to the placement centres. 
Upon completion of training, the trainees will be referred to jobs. 
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Many new types of active labour market measures are now in place. 
Placement officers, for example, provide counselling to jobseekers on labour 
market information, and re-educate those who possess the 'iron rice-bowl' 
mentality to change. To establish rapport between the counsellor and his or her 
client, individual counsellors will follow through cases. All counsellors are 
trained and are required to pass a professional examination annually. Overseas 
training in Germany has been arranged for outstanding counsellors. The state 
closely monitors the situation of workers who have been 'disassociated' from 
state enterprises. Hardship cases are entitled to a subsistence allowance ( zuidi 
shenghuo butie) of 297 RMB per month when repeated referrals, counselling, 
and retraining do not work. Unlike the European model (which provides 
generous unemployment support that is intended as adequate income 
maintenance), the Chinese government is extremely careful to seek a balance 
between stringent procedures and social stability. In any case, this subsistence 
allowance is only payable for two years, after which the unemployed person will 
only be entitled to a maximum unemployment insurance of 432 RMB per month 
depending on various factors like age and years of contribution to 
unemployment insurance (see Table 8.2) 
Table 8.2 Monthly rate ofunemployment insurance in Shanghai 2003 
Cumulative Age of the Monthly payment for first Monthly payment for 
contribution in years unemployed 12 months (RMB) next 12 months (RMB) 
1 to less than 10 Less than 35 297 280 
35 and above 
10 to less than 15 Less than 35 324 280 
35 and above 
15 to less than 20 Less than 40 351 281 
40 and above 
20 to less than 25 Less than 45 378 303 
45 and above 
25 to less than 30 Less than 50 405 324 
50 and above 
30 and above All 432 346 
Source: Shanghai Laodong Baozhang Fuwu Wang (Shanghai Labour Protection Services Net) 
http://www.sh.lss.gov.cn/zcwd/detail.jsp?mes_oid=l29276 
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8.6 Discussion and evaluation 
As a 'transitional' mechanism for managing unemployment in industrial China, 
particularly as it is manifested in the phenomenon of laid-off workers, the Re-
employment Service Centre may be seen as a possibly viable institutional bridge 
between work-unit and society relating to the wider societal management of 
human resources, in both theoretical and empirical terms. It is clearly, in our 
view, a compromise between the protection of the work-unit (danwei) system 
and the harsh course of simply pushing the responsibility for the unemployed 
onto the wider society. This mechanism is different from both the past practice 
of the Communist planned economy (where surplus workers were resettled by 
the enterprises) on the one hand and the American liberal, market-driven labour 
market management system practice of just 'dumping' such workers onto 
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However, the relative success of this programme in Shanghai does not 
necessarily mean that it would also succeed if implemented nationwide. It has 
succeeded because the rapid growth of the Shanghai economy has helped to 
create jobs and ease pressure on employment.6 Indeed, Shanghai has been one of 
the fastest growing areas in China, its economy consistently growing faster than 
the national average in the last decade or so (see Figure 8.2). 
Provided that the pace of economic development is different among various 
regions, it is not surprising that the establishment of Re-employment Service 
Centres in some cities does not have the same achievements as that of Shanghai 
or other affluent coastal cities. One indication is that the re-employment rate of 
Shanghai is much higher than that of the whole country (see Figure 8.3). 
A recent survey by the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) indicates 
that over one-fourth of laid-off women who have landed jobs again are working 
in the service sector of their communities, or are privately hired or self-
employed.7 This can only happen in prosperous economies. In the first half of 
2002, a record high of 30,000 private enterprises were registered in Shanghai,8 
which is deemed China's economic 'powerhouse'. The city now has nearly 
210,000 private enterprises, employing 2.3 million people, or one in every three 
Shanghai workers. Local analysts attribute the fast growth to the policy adopted 
by local authorities at the end of 2002 to open more sectors to private investors.9 
There have been many instances of self-employment or starting of small 
enterprises with training of skills and funding in terms of loans from 
government. 10 To give some examples, a xiagang textile worker started a four-
person sweater-knitting workshop with a loan of 4,000 RMB from her local 
women's federation; another worker studied massage and opened a small 
massage clinic in a residential square with two classmates. 
To facilitate entrepreneurship, the Shanghai Re-employment Centres 
successfully recruited around 500 professionals to volunteer in giving advice on 
starting businesses (People's Daily, 26 September 2002). These professionals 
were reported to include university professors, engineers, industrialists, and 
heads of social and public organizations. Consultation sessions were held on 
Saturdays on an appointment basis. It was reported that 15,500 consultation 
sessions were offered in 2002-003; around 2,000 entrepreneurs started their own 
businesses and created thousands of job opportunities; and around 380 
entrepreneurs successfully applied for loans up to 40 million RMB. Another 
new employment scheme set up by the Shanghai government, the 40-50 Project, 
has a different approach to the problem: the government provides tax breaks, 
financial rewards and loan guarantees to new, labour-intensive private 
businesses as long as they hire laid-off workers (BBC News, 19 March 2002). 
8. 7 Concluding remarks 
In relatively well-off Shanghai, re-employment centres do provide a 'safety net' 
for xiagang workers as the minimum living protection for laid-off workers 
provided by the Re-employment Service Centres has been gradually merged 
with the unemployment insurance system. However, the types and quality of 
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services provided by the centres in different localities do vary considerably. In 
some areas there are also cases where the centres fail to provide any assistance. 
For instance, some centres in Wuhan merely provide a form for the jobseekers to 
fill out but have virtually nothing more to offer. It was reported that a desperate 
worker received no money, no training and no placement, and heard nothing 
from his centre for 18 months after he had signed a contract with them (Solinger 
2001: 683). Such problems often provoke protests and demonstrations: for 
example, 30,000 workers from 20 bankrupt factories marched in the streets of 
Liaoyang in the northeastern 'rust-belt' in March 2002 (see Becker 2003). The 
regime gravely fears a cloning of the Polish-style 'Solidarity' movement - a 
reason why Deng Xiaoping earlier tried to increase worker involvement in 
enterprise decision-making at the beginning of the reform process in the early 
1980s. 
Moreover, officials from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security warn 
that the chances for xiagang workers to obtain re-employment might deteriorate 
in the years to come. Statistics from the Ministry indicate that about 23 million 
labourers will be seeking jobs in urban areas in the next three to four years from 
2002, but there are only expected to be about 8 million job opportunities 
available (China Daily, 24 September 2002). In the first half of 2001, among 
those 7 .69 million xiagang state workers, the official statistics concede that only 
11.1 per cent of the total had succeeded in finding new jobs. This proportion was 
4.9 percentage points lower than that for the same period in the previous year 
(China Daily, 28 July 2001; People's Daily, 30 July 2001). This record is not 
very encouraging in the face of the mass redundancy China faces as a result of 
further 'deepening' of the reforms and the consequences of now ongoing trade 
liberalization. 
China's entry to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in late 2001 and the 
speeding up of the structural readjustment of industries will put an even more 
serious strain on the management of human resources broadly envisaged and 
will increase employment pressures in the coming years as globalization 
advances (see Warner 2002). The Green Paper Report on 'China's Population 
and Labour Problems' published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
pointed out the impact of China's accession to the WTO on China's employment 
situation: in the short term, urban unemployment is likely to increase by 3 to 4 
million, and the unemployment rate to rise by 2 per cent. The impact on 
agriculture may be most severe, and it is estimated that agricultural employment 
could decrease by 10 million. The impact of the WTO on agriculture has 
important implications for workers laid off from state-owned enterprises. 
Increased rural-urban migration may not only raise urban unemployment but 
also place downward pressure on wages, especially in labour-intensive 
industries. Even though China aims to contain the 'official' unemployment rate 
within 5 per cent during the tenth Five-year Plan (2001-2005) (China Daily, 7 
August 2001), it is clear that the problem of unemployment will still be vexing 
the Chinese government in the foreseeable future (see Becker 2003) and may 
likely still constitute a potential threat to social stability. 
The system can probably only maintain its status quo if there are more 
'winners' than 'losers' (see Warner 2003a). The rate of economic growth must 
138 Grace 0. M. Lee and Malcolm Warner 
keep increasing at above 8 per cent per annum just to absorb the redundant old 
and job-seeking youth. If China can continue its almost unprecedented rapid 
economic expansion, it might just keep matters under control. Otherwise the 
system will prove to be unstable and the future unpredictable. 
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either state or any organization is involved. This includes self-employment, direct application, 
use of employment services, and use of any ads and media methods. 
Our earlier research in this area has appeared as Lee and Warner (2001a, 2001b and 2002). 
4 Interview, CEO, Shanghai Baibang Services Limited, Shanghai, May 1999. 
China's first survey of assets of urban families revealed that urban dwellers are becoming 
wealthier, with an average of 228,300 RMB (US$27,600) in total assets for every family. See 
China Daily, 28 September 2002. 
6 Interview, Economist and Vice Director, Shanghai Changning District Labour Bureau, 
Shanghai, June 1999. 
China Daily, 25 September 2002. In the survey conducted by the All-China Women's 
Federation covering 3,633 women from across the country, working for private enterprises 
providing community services and self-employment follow working for state-owned enterprises 
on the list of 'most favoured places to look for work'. 
China Daily, 8 October 2002. In the first half of 2003, the output of private industrial enterprises 
and the business turnover of private retail enterprises totalled 157 billion RMB (US$18.92 
billion), with 7.3 billion RMB (US$880 million) in taxes paid. In the domain of foreign trade, 
more than 140 private enterprises were granted foreign trade rights and exported commodities 
worth US$54 million in the first half of 2003, a significant year-on-year increase of 200 per 
cent. At the time of writing, the registered capital of private enterprises in Shanghai had reached 
210 billion RMB (US$25.3 billion), with 121 corporations contributing more than 100 million 
RMB (US$12 million) each in registered capital. 
Urban construction, education and hospital operations, once 'forbidden areas' for private 
investment, have now been opened to private entrepreneurs. To assist private companies, mainly 
small and medium-sized enterprises, to find sources of funding, Shanghai has set up a credit 
guarantee system and has allocated special loans for private enterprises. According to a Xinhua 
news report, local banks provided 5.2 billion RMB (US$627 million) in loans for 3,177 projects 
from 1995 to 2001, taking the leading position in China in this area. 




9 Employee perceptions of social 
protection reform in Shanghai: 
diversity across ownership forms and 
occupations 
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9.1 Introduction 
As China has expanded the scope and role of the market within its economy and 
society, the job security of its citizens and workers has been undermined by the 
associated dismantling of the old system of social insurance (the 'iron ricebowl') 
that prevailed through the period of command socialism. Consequently the 
government has begun the construction of a social protection regime that is 
suited to a market economy. This is a process which the state recognizes needs 
to be managed with care and sophistication if social stability and a high growth 
rate are to be sustained. It is also recognized by the government that it is 
important to have a clear understanding of how the reforms are perceived by the 
population. Recognition of this need and a genuine concern for the plight of the 
dispossessed has induced both Chinese and international scholars to monitor 
closely how the broad population and strategic elements within the community 
are perceiving the reforms. Underpinning this sensitivity is also an awareness 
that perceptions affect how individuals and groups cope when confronted with 
fundamental changes to practices and institutions central to their needs. 
Shanghai has been an important focus for those undertaking research related to 
perceptions because the city's administrators have played a pioneering role in 
the development of the emergent social protection regime. 
In this chapter, we extend the perception research by detailing the diversity of 
employee views on social protection reform that prevail across firms with 
differing ownership forms and occupations. The research on perception has so 
far tended to concentrate on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at a time when 
China's government is committed to policies that are bound to further decrease 
the number and relative significance of state enterprises. The chapter has five 
sections. First, we highlight changes in the ownership structures of enterprises 
and the social protection system. Second, we review the results of previous 
studies that have sought to determine how the reform of the social protection 
regime is perceived in China. We then explain the research method employed 
including the background of the survey that was conducted in 2002 to determine 
whether and how employees' views of social protection reform vary across 
ownership types and occupations, and detail the measures used in the survey 
questionnaire. In part four, we proceed to recount the results of the survey. 
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Based on a sample of 299 employees, variations in attitudes towards social 
protection reform across several dimensions are reported. These include the 
changing business environment, enterprise competitiveness, personal risk 
management, labour mobility between public and non-public sectors, motivation 
due to the sense of security provided by the new protection system, and labour 
relations. We then apply multivariate analysis to the survey data to examine 
determinants of employee satisfaction with social protection policies. We 
conclude by discussing the survey results and their implications for employees, 
managers and policymakers. 
9.2 Changes in the ownership structure and social protection system 
Among the firms surveyed in this study, there were four major ownership forms: 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), privately owned enterprises (POEs), foreign-
invested enterprises (FIEs) and shareholding enterprises (SHEs). These 
organizations were generally classified as state (SOEs) and non-state (POEs, 
FIEs and SHEs) sectors. While POEs and FIEs started their development in the 
early 1980s, shareholding or joint-stock structure has been used widely to 
reform and restructure the massive state-owned sector only since the mid 1990s. 
For example, the number of SHEs increased from 72,000 in 1997 to over 
300,000 in 2001 (an increase of 320 per cent), and the number of people 
employed also increased more than threefold from 6.44 million to 27.47 million 
(Census Centre of the China Statistical Bureau 2003). According to the second 
nationwide organization census in 2002, the shareholding structure has become a 
major ownership form for companies and enterprises in China. It usually has 
mixed ownership because the majority of SHEs are not publicly listed 
companies and have mixed investors from both public (for example state and 
collectively owned organizations) and private sectors (for example POEs, FIEs 
or individuals) (Census Centre of the China Statistical Bureau 2003). In the 
Third Plenary Session of the 16th Communist Party Congress held in October 
2003, the CCP leaders outlined the need for more diversified forms of public 
ownership and stated that the ideal approach was a 'shareholding system that 
absorbs investment from various channels' (AFR 16 October 2003: 10). 
In the last 25 years, China has witnessed a rapid growth in the number of non-
state enterprises as a result of economic transition and reform in the public 
sector. For example, the percentage of the total number of POEs, FIEs and SHEs 
in relation to the total number of enterprises in China increased from 29 .1 per 
cent in 1996 to 58.2 per cent in 2001 (Zhao 2003). Furthermore, in 2001 the 
total industrial output from POEs increased by 69.2 per cent compared with 
2000, and FIEs produced an increase of 30.7 per cent in contrast to a 14.9 per 
cent decrease in output from SOEs (Wang 2003). In 2002 Shanghai had 210,000 
private enterprises employing 2.3 million people, or one in every three Shanghai 
workers ( China Daily October 8 2002). In the planning communique issued by 
the 2003 Communist Party Congress, the Party identified 'the need for greater 
promotion of the economy's private sector' and proposed that 'private firms be 
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given equal rights in investment, lending, tax, land use and foreign trade' (AFR 
16 October 2003: 10). 
While the transition has increased diversity in the workforce in China in 
terms of different types of enterprises and a diverse range of employees, it has 
challenged the traditional 'iron rice-bowl' form of social protection that had 
previously characterized China's work units or organizations (danwei) in the 
public sector. Before the social protection reforms started in the 1990s, the 
Chinese social insurance system had two major features: the separation of urban 
and rural areas and segmentation of urban enterprises based on their ownership 
status (Hussain 2000). Private industry was negligible during Mao's regime and 
no social protection programs existed in that sector (Chen 1990; Lee 1993; 
World Bank 1990). In the public sector, social protection was tied to the 'work 
unit', not to society, and work units generally provided urban workers with 
permanent employment and a range of social insurance benefits that were non-
contributory and included food and housing subsidies, pensions, health services, 
maternity assistance, and insurance against injury, disability, and death (Li 2000; 
Guan 2000; Wang 2001). The highly decentralized administration lacked an 
established mechanism for portability of eligibility and benefits, which 
discouraged employees from moving across organizations, industries or sectors 
(Dai 1999; Song and Chu 1997); consequently, employees in China were called 
'unit people' (danwei ren) rather than 'social people' (shehui ren). Urban 
employees in the state sector enjoyed cradle-to-grave benefits, and work units 
were responsible for their welfare even after retirement (Whiteley et al 2000). 
By the end of 1994, about 90 per cent of workers in SOEs and about 70 per cent 
in collectively owned enterprises were covered by the social protection system 
(Ge 1996). 
By contrast, the new regime currently being developed links job security to 
the market, provides a less encompassing range of benefits, and greatly increases 
the share of the cost borne by individuals. Guan (2000) has accurately described 
the emerging regime as 'societalization' (shehuihua): that is, a society wide 
system in which everyone receives the same level of social protection 
irrespective of where they are employed. Shanghai, for example, has introduced 
a three-tiered pension and medical insurance system to every type of enterprise 
from the late 1990s, and the traditional 'direct-planned welfare provision' has 
been replaced by a 'redistributive process' in welfare provision (Guan 2000: 
119). As a result, employees in different sectors are theoretically treated equally 
in terms of their social protection. 
While many researchers have focused on the decreased social security 
accorded to employees in SOEs through the breaking of the iron rice-bowl (see 
for example Warner 2000), little attention had been paid to the fact that the 
establishment of a comprehensive national social security system would in fact 
heighten the security enjoyed by the majority of city workers. This is because an 
increasing number of people are employed outside the state owned sector, and 
these people (especially employees working in the private sector) would not 
enjoy any substantial protection from the vagaries of the market but for the 
reforms. The new social security system is expected to assist employees from 
either state or non-state enterprises to handle risks including those induced by 
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the new market economy (such as retrenchment or unemployment). 
Furthermore, as the new social security system maintains employees' coverage 
from job to job, it will facilitate labour mobility across enterprises with different 
ownership structures. As a consequence, under the new system, it is more likely 
employees will select their jobs based on their skill rather than the ownership 
type of the enterprise. Precisely how employees respond to these changes, 
however, will be dependent to a significant degree on how they perceive the 
changes to the regime. It is to this issue that we now turn. 
9.3 Monitioring perceptions and coping strategies 
Researchers who have examined the marketization of China's social protection 
regime have concentrated on analysing the way the reforms are financed and 
governed (Chen 2001; He 2003; Meng 2003; Tian 2003; Yin et al 2000), the 
social and political implications of associated regulations and programs (Guan 
2000, 2001b; Leckie 2003; Saunders and Shang, 2001; Wang 2001; Whiteford 
2003), and the costs to employees induced by breaking the iron rice bowl (Cook 
2002; Mok et al. 2002; Price and Fang 2002; Smyth 1999; Zhu et al 2004). This 
research is of great value but does not necessarily clarify how the populace 
views the market-oriented universal social protection regime that is being 
introduced across China. Understanding how workers perceive the reform of 
social protection is important because there is a spectre haunting China, the 
spectre of organized resistance on the part of those whom the market has 
dispossesseJ. To contain this danger, governments and others with a stake in 
policy management need to be aware of how the reforms are being perceived by 
the populace. A clear understanding of these perceptions can also assist the 
attainment of a number of more limited goals. For example, such knowledge can 
play an important part in the development and maintenance of active labour 
market policies and human resource management strategies. 
That there is a need to incorporate the social security dimension into the 
analysis of labour market and industrial reform often goes unappreciated. Price 
and Fang (2002), for example, surveyed unemployed workers across seven cities 
to assess their coping strategies, but failed to include access to welfare 
provisions amongst the explanatory variables they considered. This was despite 
the fact that welfare provisions for the unemployed vary markedly across the 
cities of China. The need to include the social insurance variable in analyses of 
both the labour market and individuals' coping strategies is also evidenced by 
the fact that though marketization has made alternative forms of employment 
available, the non-state sector remains an unattractive employment locale for 
many workers. This is especially so for those retrenched and unable to gain jobs 
that provide adequate social insurance provisions (Maurer-Fazio 1995; Smyth 
1999). As Gu has observed: 
The majority of workers laid off from the state sector prefer to be re-
employed by their original work units or by other work units in that 
sector (or the collective sector) rather than in the private sector. This is 
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a rational preference because within the institutional configuration of 
the private sector, no systematic welfare provisions have been 
established. Workers are afraid that if they join the private sector and 
then lose their jobs, they will lose unemployment benefits, lay-off aid, 
medical care, and (most important) pensions. Even if they have job 
opportunities in the private sector, many decline them and maintain 
their status as laid-off workers unless new offers have some specific 
attractions (Gu 2001b: 106). 
That there is a need to have a clear understanding of the way social protection 
reform is perceived by the population is appreciated by China's government. 
This is evidenced by the fact that social security was explored in a State 
Statistical Bureau survey of 40,000 urban families undertaken in 2000 in 
preparation for the White Paper on labour and social security that was issued in 
April 2002. In undertaking this survey the researchers took particular care to 
determine how interviewees perceived the increasing social inequality that has 
become a characteristic of China's marketization process, and discovered that 
this was an issue of deep concern to many (Lee et al 2002). 
Determining the importance that individuals place on social protection and 
whether social protection reform is an area of concern has also become a tool 
and a product of private market researchers. These firms have explored this topic 
primarily in order to provide for the needs of the emerging private insurance 
industry. China Mainland Marketing Research Co. (CMMR), for example, 
conducted random sample questionnaire investigations in 31 cities across China 
in October and November 2002 to determine citizens' views on 'social life 
issues and household life status' (China Daily 21 December 2002). The 
researchers surveyed over 12,500 urban citizens aged between 18 and 69. It was 
found that a large majority of citizens believed their living standard had 
improved markedly over the previous five years and most interviewees were 
optimistic about the future. When asked to rank the social issues of most 
concern, employment and medical system reform rated highly as worries but 
social security 'topped the list' (see Table 9.1). 
Not unexpectedly, views regarding social security and unemployment 
differed across the social spectrum (see Table 9.2). Table 9.2 indicates that while 
over half of the people ranked in the 'bottom stratum' (54.3 per cent) showed 
deep concern about the issue of 'social security', there was less concern amongst 
the more affluent. Nevertheless, over 40 per cent of people at all but the 'upper 
layer of the top stratum' shared the same concern. In summarizing their results, 
CMMR concluded that 'people in lower social strata care more about their daily 
life while people in higher strata care more about national affairs and tend to 
have more political orientation' (CMMR 2003, see Table 9.2). 
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Table 9.1 The ranking of 'Hotspot' social topics among urban citizens (multiple choice) 
Type of social topics Ranking % Type of social topics Ranking % 
Social security 1 45.5 Environmental control 9 12.3 
Unemployment and employment 2 33.8 Motherland unification 10 7.4 
Medical system reform 3 31.3 Western China Development 11 7.2 
Public order 4 28.6 Salary increase of ci vii servants 12 6.2 
Anti-corruption 5 27 .2 Increase of overall national 13 6.2 
strength 
Education system reform 6 17 .5 Reform of state-owned 14 6.2 
enterprises 
Impacts of WTO entry 7 13.7 Teenager education 15 6.1 
Medicine price 8 14.3 Others 16 5.0 
Source: CMMR (2003) 
Table 9.2 Hotspot social topics most concerned among different social strata in cities in 2002 
(%, multiple choice) 
Upper layer of top stratum 
Lower layer of the top stratum 
Upper layer of the middle stratum 
Middle stratum 




Source: CMMR (2003) 
36.1 15.5 36.1 33.0 35.1 18.3 14.4 12.4 18.6 6.2 
40.2 19.4 31.6 25.3 33.1 19.9 18.2 12.0 13.3 14.5 
45.2 29.4 29.7 28.5 28.2 19.2 16.7 12.2 13.1 9.5 
46.9 37.6 25.9 32.1 28.4 17.2 14.3 12.2 11.5 3.3 
47.7 46.0 29.7 31.6 23.115.3 12.3 12.9 11.7 3.5 
49.4 45.5 34.9 22.9 24.3 14.3 8.4 15.0 9.3 2.5 
54.3 57.3 28.5 23.5 25.2 14.0 7.2 13.2 8.0 2.2 
46.1 35.7 29.6 28.5 27.6 17.5 14.4 12.6 12.0 7.0 
The social protection perception literature generated by state and market 
researchers has also been enriched by academics. Notable amongst the latter is a 
report by the Institute of Development Studies undertaken in collaboration with 
the China Women's College. Prepared by Cook and Jolly (2000), this study 
explored the perceptions of workers who had been made redundant by 
restructured SOEs. Interviews were undertaken with people laid off in three 
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cities, with the explicit intention of informing policy interventions. It was found 
that not all laid off workers were poor but many suffered from a perceived loss 
of status, feelings of worthlessness and vulnerability to discrimination, 
exploitation or exclusion. Most believed unemployment and the inadequacy of 
social security benefits had compelled them to take up livelihoods formerly 
despised, restrict their diet, spend less on educating their children and elderly 
parents and curtail their social interactions. Cook and Jolly also report that male 
worker resentment is compounded by the fact that many unemployed men suffer 
guilt because without a job or adequate social security they are compelled to rely 
on their wives for support. Conversely, women tend to find it easier to accept 
new forms of work but they deeply resent losing the esteem they enjoyed when 
depicted as model socialist workers, and feel bitter about the loss of the social 
insurance benefits that were associated with this high-status position. 
Generational differences in perceptions were also apparent. Despair and 
resentment was especially acute amongst the young with individuals in their 
thirties perceiving themselves as old, unemployable and unable to compete for 
jobs. 
Similar perception research has subsequently been reported by Mok et al. 
(2002). Again it was found that the vast majority of the retrenched had limited 
access to social security benefits, and few welfare entitlements with the 
exception of medical insurance. And again it was found that the combination of 
unemployment and the lack of adequate social insurance benefits has generated 
a 'strong sense of destitution and betrayal' amongst those who once were 
'labour aristocrats'. The breadth and intensity of these perceptions, Mok et al. 
(2002) conclude, need to be appreciated by China's government which, they also 
insist, needs to do much more than is presently being done in the areas of 
unemployment, medical insurance and pensions. 
While the researchers discussed above have focused on how citizens and 
workers perceive the current social protection situation, Wong et al (2000) have 
explored popular perceptions regarding responsibility for the provision of social 
protection. Focusing on Shanghai, because this is arguably the city in China 
most advanced on the path of marketization, they sought to determine where 
citizens tend to locate responsibility for social security and who they blame for 
the prevalence of insecurity and immiseration. Wong et al. (2000) collected their 
data by random sampling across 16 districts of Shanghai. They found that the 
overwhelming majority of respondents accepted that they had experienced 
substantial improvement in their lives and that there were many new 
opportunities available to further improve living standards. However, when the 
researchers turned their attention to individual life satisfaction, they found that 
barely half the respondents were satisfied with many practical areas of life and 
that it was widely believed inequality was unacceptably high. It was also found 
that most interviewees blamed poverty on institutionalized social injustice rather 
than on government policy failure, adhered to a clear and strong pro-welfarist 
orientation, and strongly believed that the state has the primary responsibility for 
providing for the social protection needs of the community. The respondents 
were overwhelmingly clear about the four traditionally welfarist functions of the 
state: nine-tenths were in favour of guaranteed jobs; nearly all favoured equal 
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education for children; nearly seven-eighths endorsed the narrowing of the 
income gap; and nine-tenths endorsed a guaranteed basic income (Wong and 
Lee 2000: 113). 
Similarly, Beijing Social Psychology Research Institute conducted surveys on 
the social protection provided to the people in Beijing in 2001 and 2002 among 
over 1000 residents living in the eight districts of the city 
(http://www.chinaminyi.org.cn). Three major findings of the research are related 
to the social protection enjoyed by people from different types of organization, 
the responsibility for individuals' future social protection, and the purchasing 
power of commercial insurance. It was found that compared with people 
working in other types of organization, those from POEs had the lowest 
coverage of social protection; 25 per cent of the respondents from PO Es reported 
there was no social insurance paid for them, while another 14 per cent said they 
had no idea whether or not the enterprises paid insurance for them. Consistent 
with the findings from Shanghai in terms of who is responsible for the 
individual's security and future life, Beijing people ranked the government first, 
the organisation second and the individual last to assume such a responsibility; 
this indicates a legacy from the command economy and the iron rice-bowl 
mentality. The Beijing study also found that more people purchased commercial 
insurances in 2002 than they did in 2001 (56 per cent compared to 38 per cent of 
people surveyed), especially medical insurance (35 per cent in 2002 compared to 
14 per cent in 2001). 
In closing this discussion of the literature, we suggest that the research on 
perception has shown that social protection is a major source of concern within 
China. What the literature also suggests is that there is diversity of perspective 
across gender, age and social stratum. What we shall do in the next section is 
determine if diversity of perspective can also be discerned from employees 
across firms characterized by different types of ownership and occupations. 
As observed above, ownership is an issue that is very significant given that 
the development policies being furthered by the government are dramatically 
changing the ownership form of business enterprises within China. 
9.4 Research method 
This section is focused on the background of the survey conducted in 2002 in 
Shanghai, and the measures used in the survey questionnaire. 
9.4.1 Sample 
Our survey, based on a convenience sample, was conducted mainly in industrial 
enterprises in Shanghai in early 2002. Anonymous questionnaires were 
distributed to 650 respondents, from enterprises with different types of 
ownership. The response rate was 46 per cent with a total of 299 usable 
questionnaires received. Of the respondents, 32 per cent were from SO Es, 36 per 
cent from foreign invested enterprises (FIEs), 19 per cent from shareholding 
enterprises (SHEs), and 13 per cent from privately owned enterprises (POEs). 
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Selected demographic characteristics of the respondents are shown in Table 
9.3. Of the respondents, 60 per cent were male and 40 per cent female. The 
majority of respondents (60 per cent) were aged 30-50. Most were qualified, 
with 40 per cent having a tertiary diploma (equivalent to a TAFE diploma in 
Australia), and 28 per cent possessing a university graduate degree or higher. 
Over half (56 per cent) of the respondents were non-managerial staff (workers, 
technical, and clerical staff) and 44 per cent managerial employees (supervisors 
and managers at different levels). 







60 and over 
Gender (N = 266) 
Female 
Male 
Occupation (N = 268) 
Non-managerial (workers, technical and clerical staff) 
Managerial (supervisors and managers at different levels) 
Level of education (N = 267) 
High school certificate or less 
Tertiary diploma (2-year university certificate, dazhuan) 
Tertiary degree (4-year university Bachelor's degree, benke) 
Post-graduate degree (Master degree or above) 
Ownership (N = 290) 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
Privately owned enterprises (POEs) 
Foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) 
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9.4.2 Measures 
The survey requested data on the respondent's demographic characteristics, 
perceived changes in China's business environment, and his/her perception of 
the current social insurance policies. As recommended for international research 
(Cavusgil & Das 1997), after the survey questionnaire was designed by the 
authors, it was translated and back-translated to check that the meaning of the 
original questions was intact. 
Based on literature and the qualitative research conducted by Zhu et al. (Zhu 
and Nyland 2004; Zhu, Nyland & Yang 2004), we developed scales measuring 
the perception of the changing business environment in China, enterprise 
competitiveness and attitudes towards social protection reform across 
dimensions of personal risk management/labour mobility, motivation/sense of 
security, role of trade unions and employee satisfaction. Respondents were asked 
to rate each item on a 5-point scale from '1 = strongly disagree' to '5 = strongly 
agree,' with a neutral midpoint. We averaged the items on each dimension 
(possible score range is thus from 1 to 5) to form composite scales. A higher 
score on each scale indicates a greater amount of the variable being measured. 
Items related to these attitudinal dimensions are detailed below. 
The changing business environment in China was measured by five items: (1) 
marketplace competition has increased dramatically from domestic competitors; 
(2) marketplace competition has increased dramatically from foreign 
competitors, (3) conditions in our business environment are rapidly changing; 
and (4) government intervention is rapidly declining and (5) the technology in 
our product/service is becoming more complicated. Scores on this scale had 
acceptable internal consistency with a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .71. 
Enterprise competitiveness was measured by four items: (1) social protection 
reform can help a company to focus on its economic activities and improve its 
competitiveness; (2) social protection reform will enable social insurance funds 
to be managed in a more efficient way; (3) current social protection system has 
speeded up the abolition of the iron rice-bowl system, and (4) social insurance 
policies have made welfare items transparent, which helps remove hidden costs 
paid by the enterprise. Cronbach's alpha for scores on this scale was .74. 
Personal risk management/labour mobility was measured by three items: (1) 
as a 'social person', I can easily quit and look for better opportunities elsewhere; 
(2) now I can change my job more freely across different sectors based on my 
skills rather than the welfare offered by the firm; and (3) with new social 
insurance policies, I can better handle retrenchment as I may start my own 
business or get a job somewhere else. Cronbach' s alpha coefficient for scores on 
this scale was .75. 
Motivation/sense of security was measured by two items: (1) I feel more 
motivated to work under the current social protection system than the previous 
welfare system, as I can rely less on the enterprise; and (2) my current personal 
insurance policy has increased my sense of security for my future retirement. 
Cronbach's alpha coefficient for scores on this scale was .72. 
The role of trade unions was measured by three items: (1) it is necessary to 
have trade unions to facilitate social protection reform, as they will protect 
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worker's rights; (2) trade unions have played an important role in the 
implementation of new social insurance policies; and (3) the supplementary 
medical insurance supplied by the Shanghai Workers' Mutual Association 
(SWMA, an organization of the trade unions) has reduced resistance to the 
implementation of new policy. Cronbach's alpha coefficient for scores on this 
scale was .68. 
Finally, employee satisfaction with social protection policies was measured 
by eight items: satisfaction with the compulsory and supplementary pension 
policies, unemployment benefits, medical insurance policies for outpatients and 
inpatients, supplementary medical insurance, maternity insurance, and work 
injury compensation. Cronbach's alpha coefficient for scores on this scale was 
.90. 
9.4.3 Control variables 
Organizational ownership was measured by four types of ownership (SOEs, 
POEs, FIEs, and SHEs). For multiple regression, ownership was coded as 
dummy variables; the omitted category was the modal category (FIEs). We 
controlled for age, gender, occupation (coded l=manager, 0=non-manager), and 
education level (l=high school or less, 4=postgraduate degree). 
9.5 Survey results 
The findings of this study are reported in two parts. First, we describe 
differences by ownership type and occupation on the measures of social 
protection reform. Second, multiple regression is used to examine determinants 
of employee satisfaction with social protection policies. 
9.5.1 Attitudes towards social protection 
Table 9.4 presents the mean scores for the attitude towards social protection 
measures across different ownership types. A series of one-way analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to detect statistically significant 
differences by ownership type. It found differences in employee attitudes across 
the four types of ownership with respect to (1) the changing business 
environment, (2) personal risk management/labour mobility, (3) the role of trade 
unions, (4) motivation/sense of security, and (5) satisfaction with social 
protection policies (see Table 9.4). 
It can be seen that mean scores on each of the measures tended to be greater 
than the midpoint (neutral position) of the 5-point rating scale, indicating 
relatively positive attitudes towards social protection reform irrespective of 
ownership form. Nevertheless, Table 9.4 shows that employees in FIEs reported 
the highest ratings on the changing business environment (mean= 4.4). Post-hoe 
tests (Tukey) showed that employees in FIEs were more likely to report a 
changing business environment compared with employees in state, private or 
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shareholding enterprises. Furthermore, post-hoe tests showed that respondents 
from FIEs were less likely to report the role of trade unions as a significant 
factor in social protection compared with state enterprises, which scored highest 
on the importance of the role of trade unions (mean= 3.1 for FIEs and 3.7 for 
SOEs). Employees in private sector enterprises were significantly more likely to 
score higher on personal risk management/labour mobility compared with those 
in FIEs and SOEs (mean= 3.7 for POEs, compared with 3.1 for FIEs and 3.3 for 
SOEs), indicating that employees in private firms were more likely to perceive 
themselves as 'social people'. Respondents from FIEs scored significantly lower 
on motivation/sense of security compared with respondents from POEs and 
SHEs (mean = 3.2 for FIEs, compared with 3.7 for POEs and 3.6 for SHEs). 
Finally, post-hoe tests showed that employees from FIEs were the least satisfied 
with social protection policies compared with POEs and SHEs (mean = 2.8 for 
FIEs, compared with 3.4 for POEs and 3.2 for SHEs). 
The only scale in Table 9.4 which did not show statistically significant 
differences across the four types of ownership was 'enterprise competitiveness'. 
The total mean score of this scale was relatively high (mean = 3.6 out of 5), 
indicating that social protection reform is perceived to have a positive impact on 
enterprise economic performance by survey respondents from different types of 
enterprises. 
Table 9.4 Social protection measures by ownership 
SOEs POEs F/Es SHEs Total 
Variable M M M M M ANOVA results 
(SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) 
Changing business 3.8 3.7 4.4 3.9 4.0 F (3, 277) = 30.3*** 
environment 
(0.6) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) 
Enterprise 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.6 F (3,281) = 1.2 
competitiveness (0.7) (0.6) (0.6) (0.5) (0.6) 
Role of trade unions 3.7 3.5 3.1 3.6 3.6 F (3, 279) = 14.4*** 
(0.7) (0.6) (0.5) (0.4) (0.7) 
Personal risk 3.3 3.7 3.1 3.5 3.3 F(3,282) = 7.2*** 
management/labour (0.9) (0.7) (0.8) (0.6) (0.8) 
mobility 
Motivation/sense of 3.5 3.7 3.2 3.6 3.5 F(3,277) = 5.4*** 
security (0.8) (0.7) (0.9) (0.5) (0.8) 
Satisfaction 3.1 3.4 2.8 3.2 3.1 F (3,279) = 10.1 *** 
(0.7) (0.6) (0.6) (0.4) (0.6) 
Notes 
*p< .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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Table 9.5 Social protection measures by occupation 
Variable 
Non-Managerial Managerial 
M M t-value 
(SD) (SD) 
Changing business 3.9 3.8 t (254) = 1.9 
environment (0.5) (0.5) 
Enterprise competitiveness 
3.7 3.6 
t (263) = 0.6 
(0.6) (0.6) 
Role of trade unions 
3.5 3.4 
t (263) = 0.2 
(0.8) (0.7) 
Personal risk 3.3 3.4 
management/labour (0.8) (0.7) 
t (263) = -1.4 
mobility 
Motivation/sense of 3.5 3.5 t (263) = 0.6 security (0.7) (0.8) 
Satisfaction 3.0 3.1 
t (259) = -1.2 
(0.6) (0.7) 
Notes 
*p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
Table 9.5 presents mean scores for the perception of social protection 
measures by occupation. A series of independent samples t-tests were conducted 
to detect any statistically significant differences between managerial and non-
managerial employees. There were no statistically significant differences 
according to occupation. 
9.5.2 Determinants of employee satisfaction with social protection policies 
We then conducted a multiple regression analysis using employee satisfaction 
with social protection policies as the dependent variable. Satisfaction was 
regressed onto the variables of changing business environment, the attitudinal 
measures outlined above, ownership type, age, gender, occupation, and 
educational level. The relationships were tested using multiple regression to 
control for variables simultaneously and to take into account the 
interrelationships among the independent variables. Regression allows us to 
estimate the 'unique' contribution of each independent variable to the model 
after controlling for all other independent variables in the model. Colinearity 
diagnostics using the Tolerance Test indicated that the regression coefficients 
were not degraded by multicolinearity. Pairwise deletion was used for missing 
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data. There were no consequential departures from normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity. 
Table 9.6 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis. Overall, the 
regression model accounted for a modest 26 per cent of the variation in 
employee satisfaction. Four variables were significant in the prediction of 
satisfaction. There was a positive relationship between motivation/sense of 
security and satisfaction (Beta= .29, p < .001). Respondents who felt increased 
motivation/sense of security under the current social protection were more likely 
to be satisfied. Compared with respondents from FIEs, private sector (Beta = 
.22, p < .01) and shareholding (Beta= .14, p < .05) employees were also more 
likely to be satisfied. There was a positive relationship between attitudes 
towards the role of trade unions in social protection reform and satisfaction 
(Beta=.21, p < 01); that is, respondents who reported positive attitudes to the 
role of trade unions were more satisfied with social protection policies. These 
effects control for age, gender, education level, and occupation, noting that their 
unique effects were not, however, statistically significant. 
Table 9.6 Multiple regression analysis of independent variables on satisfaction with social 
protection policies 
Standardized (Beta) regression coefficient 
Age -0.C)0 (0.04) 
Gender 0.00 (0.07) 
Occupation 0.04 (0.70) 
Education level -0.07 (-1.10) 
Changing business environment 0.10 (1.45) 
State 0.07 (0.10) 
Private 0.22 (3.03)** 
Shareholding 0.14 (1.97)* 
Competitiveness -0.07 (-0.94) 
Role of trade unions 0.21 (2.72)** 
Personal risk management/labour mobility 0.07 (1.11) 
Motivation/security 0.29 (4.00)*** 
R2 (explained variance) 0.26 
Notes 
t-values in parentheses. 
*p< .05. 
** p < .01 
***p < .001 
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9.6 Discussion and conclusion 
Based on the survey results, it is evident that ownership form has a significant 
impact on employee perception of social protection reform. Despite the fact that 
the mean ratings indicated relatively positive attitudes towards social protection 
reform across ownership form, the results revealed that employees from FIEs 
displayed the least positive attitude towards personal risk management/labour 
mobility, the role of trade unions, motivation/sense of security and satisfaction 
with social insurance policies. By contrast, those from POEs tended to have a 
more positive attitude in response to these issues. Employees from POEs 
perceived their ability to deal with personal risk and job changes under the new 
security system in a more positive way than those from FIEs and SOEs. This not 
only demonstrates that employees of POEs were more likely to perceive 
themselves as 'social people', but also indicates that social insurance might be 
the only welfare they can enjoy and thus becomes a major concern when they 
relocate across enterprises. 
By contrast, employees from SOEs used to enjoy more welfare benefits such 
as housing and other free or subsidized services (for example child care, 
education and public health) in addition to social insurance. This might explain 
why SOE people often regarded themselves as 'unit people', as they rely heavily 
on their work unit for most welfare needs. The written comments made by three 
respondents on the survey questionnaire all pointed out that the current social 
security system did not provide adequate security for SOE employees to enable 
'social people' to face the challenges of a free market. There are mixed reasons 
why FIE respondents scored lowest on personal risk management/labour 
mobility. Some FIEs (which were joint ventures formed with SOEs and 
influenced/controlled by the Chinese partner) offered welfare benefits to their 
employees that were similar to those in SOEs, which made their employees rely 
more on the 'work unit'. Some FIEs, especially those established by 
multinationals from advanced market economies, might transfer their home 
country's 'best practices' in workforce management (Chan 2001) and offer their 
employees more benefits (both tangible and intangible, such as better salary and 
learning environment) than merely social insurance. In this case, employees 
would not consider social security alone as an important factor for them to 
change jobs. In contrast, employees from POEs previously had little social 
protection and are therefore most satisfied and motivated by the new social 
security system. These results support our claim that the establishment of a 
social protection system could heighten the security enjoyed by the increasing 
number of employees working in the non-state sector. 
Why were respondents from FIEs less motivated by and satisfied with the 
new social protection system than those from POEs? There could be several 
reasons. First, FIEs in Shanghai, whether joint venture or wholly foreign owned, 
all have to supply basic social insurance provisions to their employees as 
required by law. The only matter of choice for FIEs is whether or not to supply 
supplementary insurance. Although POEs are supposed to have the same 
requirement, the tendency for them to act as free rider (that is to evade social 
insurance payment) seems more apparent (see Zhu and Nyland 2004). One 
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respondent commented at the end of the survey that one of the problems with the 
system was that many POEs simply ignored the new social security policies. 
This might explain why employees of POEs appreciate any social protection 
they do receive. Furthermore, FIE employees were normally better paid than 
their counterparts in POEs. It was officially reported that the average salary level 
for employees in Shanghai in 2001 was 17,820 RMB for SOEs, 20,865 RMB for 
POEs, and 24,352 RMB for FIEs (Shanghai Statistical Almanac 2002). In 
addition to a much higher income, FIE employees may also receive other types 
of incentive such as housing allotments and stock options (see Hickey 2003; 
Zhao 2003; and case study 3 in Zhu and Nyland 2004). With all these attractive 
benefits that employees can receive, social insurance pales in significance to FIE 
employees. Another reason behind the differences between FIEs and POEs 
could be a more formal human resources management system practised in FIEs. 
As researchers have pointed out, 'joint venture firms in general adopted more 
market-oriented approaches in managing human resources and in designing 
social security schemes' (Ding et al 2000: 224 ). More formal HR practices to 
attract, develop and retain employees would tend to reduce employees' anxiety 
about retrenchment or welfare post retirement. 
In terms of the role of trade unions in social protection, it was not surprising 
that respondents from SOEs scored the highest. Traditionally only permanent 
employees could join unions in China (Warner 1995). SOEs had more 
permanent employees than other types of enterprises, and these employees were 
automatically accepted and looked after by the unions. Trade unions are not 
mandatory in the private sector, although the Labour Law has legitimized 
labourers' right to form and participate in trade unions. The survey results have 
also supported our claim in another paper (see Zhu et al 2004) that trade unions 
in SOEs were still playing the role of a caretaker that helped the government and 
enterprise management to implement the new social insurance policies which 
have greatly increased individual's contribution to the new system. This has 
especially been the case in Shanghai, where most SOEs have joined the 
supplementary medical insurance schemes established and managed by 
Shanghai Workers Mutual Association (SWMA, an agency of the trade unions) 
as SOEs generally had a lower salary level with an ageing workforce. Compared 
with SOEs, FIE employees were much better paid (the average salary of FIEs 
was nearly 37 per cent higher than that of SOEs, Shanghai Statistical Almanac 
2002), and therefore more capable of paying the social insurance fees. FIEs also 
had a much younger workforce with less medical expenses (see cases 3 and 4 in 
Zhu and Nyland 2004). Instead of using SWMA's additional insurance package 
(which must be purchased for every employee of the firm), FIEs prefer to have 
commercial insurance. In such circumstances, FIEs relied much less on trade 
unions to help their employees cope with social insurance reform. This may 
explain why FIEs scored the lowest for the role of trade unions. 
With regard to the changing business environment, FIEs experienced a series 
of changes in the late 1990s and early 2000 when the government waived some 
preferential treatments that had previously been offered to encourage the 
development of private businesses, such as tax holidays enjoyed by FIEs and the 
acceptance of POEs' paying less or no social security benefits to their 
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employees. Furthermore, with accession to the WTO, FIEs are faced with more 
competition from both international and domestic markets than other types of 
enterprises because of their export activities. This could explain why FIE 
respondents were more likely to report a rapidly changing business environment. 
Interestingly, the scale measuring enterprise competitiveness received 
positive feedback (overall sample mean = 3.6 out of 5) with no statistically 
significant differences across ownership types; this indicates that the new social 
protection system was perceived positively by respondents in its ability to 
facilitate the firm's business operation in a market-driven economy and to 
manage the system in a more efficient way. 
The statistically significant survey results were translated into determinants of 
employee satisfaction with the new social protection system. These included 
sense of security, ownership type and the role of trade unions. Respondents who 
felt that they could rely less on their enterprises and more on the social 
protection system to achieve a sense of security about their future retirement 
were more likely to be satisfied with the new system. Compared with 
respondents from FIEs, those from POEs and SHEs were more satisfied with the 
social protection system. In other words, the newly established social protection 
system could encourage people to move into or stay in POEs or SHEs. 
Furthermore, respondents who perceived that trade unions could play an 
important role in the implementation of social protection policies tended to be 
more satisfied with the system. 
In this chapter we have focused on the perceptions of both managerial and 
non-managerial employees from different types of enterprises towards the social 
protection reform in Shanghai. There are limitations to the study, particularly in 
the use of convenience sampling (which limits the generalizability of the survey 
findings) and our reliance on self-report rating scales (which can be subject to 
error and response bias). Nevertheless, we have found that occupation did not 
have a statistically significant impact on employees' attitudes towards reform, 
although ownership type did have an impact. Some useful implications can be 
drawn from the findings for further discussion. The first and unavoidable 
implication is that the government has to take steps to ensure that all enterprises 
meet insurance obligations, as the sense of security offered by each enterprise is 
an important determinant of employee satisfaction with the social security 
system. Moreover, the government needs to ensure that the implementation of 
the policies of 'Two Guarantees' and 'Three Security Lines' needs to cater not 
only for the workers' basic needs when they exit the labour market, but also to 
encourage them to resist exploitation and risk a greater level of entrepreneurship, 
that is to be real 'social people'. 1 Furthermore, the trade unions should be 
encouraged to take a leading role in the implementation of social security 
policies, as this may have a significant long-term impact on the viability of the 
union movement, on the nature of labour market relations, and on the 
willingness of workers to embrace the reforms. While the new social security 
system does have a positive impact on work incentives and labour mobility, its 
negative effect on job security and labour market equality should not be 
dismissed. The establishment of the social security system has enhanced the 
capacity of employers to retrench workers, and the new regulations are often 
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under-enforced. Therefore, the transition from a 'unit person' or 'labour 
aristocrat' to a 'social person' or 'labourer in a free market' needs to be 
facilitated by the government, management and trade unions in ways that will 
help employees deal with the challenges associated with such a transition while 
maintaining their sense of security in the system. 
Notes 
The 'Two Guarantees' policy guarantees the basic living standard of retrenched workers from 
SOEs and the timely and full payment of basic pension benefits to retirees from enterprises, 
while the 'Three Security Lines' refers to (I) the basic living standard guarantee system for 
people laid off from SOEs; (2) the unemployment insurance system targeted at the unemployed, 
and (3) the minimum living standard guarantee system of urban residents whose family income 
per capita is lower than the prescribed level. 
10 Pension reform in China: imperatives, 
constraints and outcomes 
Peter Saunders and Lujun Sun • 
10.1 Introduction 
China is in the midst of a major transition from a centrally planned to a more 
market-oriented economy, and from a predominantly rural to a more urbanized 
society. This is occurring as its national income is growing strongly and as its 
population is ageing very rapidly (Whiteford 2003). There is great interest in the 
impact of these changes on the living standards of the population and on the 
extent and nature of poverty and inequality. In addition, the sheer size of China's 
economy and population guarantees that these changes will have a major impact 
on how the global economy is affected by changes in trade liberalization, market 
competition and other factors. 
The combination of the 'one-child family' policy and increased longevity is 
seeing a very rapid ageing of the Chinese population. As the World Bank has 
noted: 
By 2030 the absolute size of the labour force in China will begin to 
decline, and by 2050 the ratio of workers to pensioners (aged sixty-five 
and above) is projected to decline to about 3 to 1 from the 10 to 1 ratio 
in 1995. The number of elderly will rise from about 76 million in 1995 
to 300 million by 2050. 
(World Bank 1997c: 1) 
The demographic transition is expected to accelerate rapidly after 2010, as the 
dependency ratio rises, placing enormous pressure on the authorities to introduce 
pension reforms capable of supporting the growing number .of aged people at a 
level that is consistent with the increase in material prosperity that is taking 
place generally. 
At the same time, China is undergoing a series of other transitions, including 
the shift from a centrally planned to a 'socialized market economy', from a low-
income to a middle-income country, and from a rural and agricultural to an 
urbanized and industrialized society. These changes are affecting the traditional 
structure of Chinese society and the role of its institutions. Much emphasis has 
been placed on the ability of formal institutional structures to respond to these 
changes and the role of policy in the adjustment process. But the process of 
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reform of formal institutions cannot take place without affecting the role and 
nature of the many informal structures that are also part of the overall 
institutional framework of any society. These changes need to be considered as 
part of the reform process, since the role of informal institutions is also changing 
in ways that will have an important bearing on how well formal structures can 
respond to the challenges they face. For this reason, it is important to focus on 
both formal and informal institutional structures when considering the capacity 
for change and the constraints this imposes on reform and its outcomes. 
As with other developing countries, China's social protection system has 
traditionally relied upon a network of formal and informal structures and 
arrangements that reflect its history and culture. Global economic developments 
pose a challenge to the values and attitudes that underlie these informal 
structures, but their importance cannot simply be ignored. Nowhere is this more 
relevant than in relation to the reform of social policies and the impact of public 
programs on the living conditions of the aged. Western experience has shown 
that one of the crowning achievements of the post-war welfare state (still 
supported by even the most conservative of governments) is the maintenance of 
living standards in old age through a range of pension, health, housing and 
community support programs. The success of social policy in countries like 
China will be judged by how well it protects the living standards of its older 
citizens - as is well understood by those driving the reform agenda. But how 
well this is achieved will depend not only on the efficacy of public programs -
important though these are - but also on how well the reforms can be integrated 
with the informal structures of support that currently exist. The values and 
practices of that informal support system are often viewed with envy by Western 
countries where they have been replaced by formal programs, and part of the 
challenge for countries like China is to ensure that reform of the formal 
structures does not weaken the informal structures that economic reforms are 
already placing under stress. 
As a contribution to this task, this chapter reports some early results from a 
project that is examining the living standards of the aged in China in 2000 and 
how they have changed since 1992. The period covered has been characterized 
by rapid and extensive reform of policies affecting the aged, and part of our goal 
is to investigate what effect these have had on the economic status of older 
people, the role played by the family in this context, and how attitudes have 
changed towards these issues. The chapter focuses on the role of pensions in 
providing income support for the aged, how this has changed, and its impact and 
consequences for support provided by family members. It is hoped that the 
results presented will illustrate the importance of looking beyond pensions (and 
by implication, beyond pension reform) in understanding the factors that 
contribute to wellbeing in old age and the opportunities to influence it. 
It is worth emphasizing at the outset that though the chapter may appear to 
have little to do with the general focus of this volume on institutional change 
and its implications for the business sector, this is not in fact the case. One of the 
most important institutions in all societies is the family, and part of the challenge 
facing policymakers in China revolves around how to restructure public policy 
to respond to the transitions underway without at the same time undermining the 
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role the family plays in Chinese society. The results presented demonstrate that 
the family plays an integral role in supporting the aged, and this has implications 
for the nature (and pace) of pension reform. In addition, while business has 
tended to focus on how pension and other reforms will affect its cost structure, 
this too must take account of the costs and benefits associated with the informal 
system of social support. The imposition of additional costs on business will be 
accompanied by reduced demands on workers to provide family support, and the 
effects of this need to be brought into the overall calculus. Although the chapter 
does not explicitly address these issues, the results will draw attention to the 
importance of them and, it is hoped, prompt others to revise their thinking 
accordingly. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 10.2 provides a brief overview of 
recent pension reforms in China and the response to them by analysts. Section 
10.3 provides a similarly brief introduction to the data used and the survey from 
which they were derived. Section 10.4 reviews some of the objective and 
subjective data on the living conditions and circumstances of the aged, including 
how these have changed between 1992 and 2000. Section 10.5 examines the 
changing nature of attitudes to support among the aged and the role of informal 
intra-family transfers. Most of the results cover the urban aged only, although 
we also present some rural results for purposes of comparison. Our main 
conclusions are briefly summarized in Section 10.6. 
10.2 Reviewing recent pension reforms 
It was inevitable that the combination of a rapidly ageing of its population and 
its sheer size would make pension reform in China the focus of intense interest 
from around the world. The World Bank has played a major role in highlighting 
the problems and developing solutions: thus, in its 1997 report on Old Age 
Security. Pension Reform in China, it was argued that 'the problems of the 
current system of pensions in China are deep-seated and widely recognized' but 
that 'the broad directions ofreform are becoming clear' (World Bank 1997c: 4). 
Yet despite major reforms introduced in 1997 and 2001 (see below), there 
remains concern that the reforms to date have not addressed all of the underlying 
problems. Thus Estelle James, a leading contributor to the 'three pillar' model of 
income support in retirement developed by the World Bank (1994), has 
described pension reform in China as being 'characterized by bold 
pronouncements followed by cautious implementation as the new problems 
emerge. On a year-to-year basis it has sometimes been difficult to see any 
change, despite the great changes on paper' (James 2001: 73). 
In a similar vein, Pieter Bottelier who has been heavily involved in the World 
Bank's work on pension reform in China has recently described the current 
system as 'under-funded, fragmented, incomplete in coverage and uneven in 
regard to benefits' (Bottelier, 2003). However, he goes on to argue that 'China is 
essentially on the right track towards creating a modem pension system that is 
compatible with the requirements of an aging population in a market economy. 
It would have been a miracle if there had been no implementation problems. We 
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should not forget that the social security reform challenges facing China are 
unprecedented in scale and complexity.' (Bottelier 2003:32). 
The foundations of the new pension system were set in place by the 1997 
reforms which established a two-tier public pension system consisting of a basic, 
universal social pooling component, supplemented by a contributory pension 
funded from individual accounts (Whiteford 2003; Zhu 2002). The new scheme 
provides a social pooling pension set at 20 per cent of the average regional 
wage, with the individual account component providing an additional pension up 
to a maximum of 38.5 per cent of the average wage after 35 years of 
contribution. The original idea was that the individual account component would 
be fully funded by contributions from employers and employees, although the 
formula used to estimate the benefit was set too generously, creating problems 
from the outset in terms of financial sustainability. 
These design problems were compounded by the fact that in practice, 
contributions into individual accounts have been used to pay for the social 
pooling pensions, making the individual accounts an accounting exercise and 
leaving the entire system running on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis. 
Furthermore, the implied rate of return on contributions to the individual 
accounts has been set very low (by administrative fiat), reducing the incentive 
for firms (and their employees) to join the scheme (James 2001). The 
consequence has been low coverage which, when combined with the rapid 
growth in the number of pensioners, has further undermined the financial 
soundness of the whole system. For example, Whiteford (2003) reports that 
while the number of contributing workers doubled from 52 million to 104 
million between 1990 and 2000 (equivalent to an annual growth rate of 7.2 per 
cent), the number of pensioners rose from 10 million to 32 million, an annual 
increase of 12.3 per cent. Put differently, the ratio of worker/contributors to 
pensioner/beneficiaries declined from 5.2 in 1990 to 3.25 in 2000. 
These problems have been compounded by the fact that the scheme is run on 
a highly fragmented basis at the local/provincial level. This has resulted in 
different contribution rates in different places, creating economic distortions. In 
addition, since the central government has bailed out several local pension pools 
that have become bankrupt, there is little incentive for local scheme managers to 
ensure the financial soundness of local schemes, creating an additional barrier to 
an extension of coverage. In 2001, a pilot scheme was established in Liaoning 
Province in which the management of individual accounts has been segregated 
from the administration of social pooling funds in an attempt to overcome some 
of the current difficulties. While this initiative is being watched with interest, it 
has not resolved the problems associated with the complexity of transferring 
between local schemes, which is seen as an obstacle to labour mobility (Zhao 
and Xu 2002: 399). The fragmentation issue is also being addressed by the 
National Social Security Fund (NSSF), established in 2000, which is attempting 
to unify the system by receiving revenues from government and other sources 
that can be used to cover revenue shortfalls at the local level (James 2001). 
Despite all of the changes so far brought about, it seems clear that yet more 
reforms to China's formal pension system will be required. Much of the 
discussion, however, has taken place in isolation from the broader system of 
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support for the aged, much of which is still provided from within the family. 
Whiteford (2003: 74) comes close to acknowledging this omission by ending his 
analysis with the statement that 'attention needs to be given to the development 
of more balanced social protection policies to address the needs of the majority 
of the Chinese population'. But even here there is inadequate attention to the 
need to address the role of informal support mechanisms for the aged, including 
their response to changes in formal policy structures. 
But welfare state scholars have long argued that, particularly in East Asian 
countries, the inter-relationship between formal and informal provision is central 
to understanding the nature of social policy in the region. Thus, White and 
Goodman (1998: 13-14) identify an East Asian 'welfare orientalism' model in 
which: 
The notion of state-provided or guaranteed welfare as a social right of 
citizens is weakly developed. Rather, non-state agencies - community, 
firm and family - have been expected to play a major role in both 
financing and providing welfare services in an ideological context 
wherein self/mutual help is encouraged and dependence on the state 
discouraged, indeed stigmatized. 
And in his own analysis of social security reform in China, White (1998: 176) 
argues that: 
(W)elfare reforms cannot be seen merely in terms of choices between 
alternative policy options or directions; rather, the range, nature and 
feasibility of these choices are heavily determined by deeper dynamics 
which are propelled not only by broad structural changes in the social, 
political and economic spheres, but also by the particular constellation 
of interests ands perspectives which cluster around welfare issues like 
iron filings round a magnet. 
One example illustrates the importance of adopting this broad approach (and the 
expanded notion of institutions that it implies) in the context of pension reform. 
One of the challenges facing China currently is the so-called 'double burden' 
dilemma, whereby the current generation is required to pay not only for their 
own future pensions, but also to finance the pensions paid to the current 
generation of retirees. All funded pension systems ( of which the principle of 
individual accounts is an example) must face this dilemma, which represents a 
major transition issue. In the pension reform literature, the double burden 
dilemma is seen as imposing constraints on how quickly a defined-contribution, 
fully funded pension scheme can be introduced. 
However, the counterpart to the formal double burden imposed on the current 
generation of workers is a greatly reduced expectation among the current 
generation of retirees regarding how much they can expect to receive by way of 
informal intra-family transfers. A rational (in most cases, enforced) response to 
the introduction of a pension double burden is for workers to reduce their other 
financial commitments - one of which is likely to be transfers to older family 
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members. This suggests that the outcomes of pension reforms of the type being 
implemented in China cannot be analysed without taking account of these 
consequences for private intra-family transfers. At the very least, there is a need 
to examine the extent to which the promise of within-family support (previously 
seen as virtually guaranteed within towns and villages) has been replaced by 
greater uncertainty as the terms of the formal inter-generational contract are 
being rewritten in the policy ministries in Beijing. By focusing on these issues, 
this chapter will hopefully provide same balance to what has to date been a 
rather narrow pension reform debate. 
10.3 Data 
In order to provide basic data needed to evaluate the total ageing situation and to 
better understand the circumstances of the aged population, the Sample Survey of 
the Aged Population in Urban and Rural China was undertaken in December 
2000, sponsored by the All China National Working Commission on Ageing, the 
China National Committee on Ageing (CNCA) and the China Research Centre 
on Ageing (CRCA). The broad structure of the survey instrument replicates an 
earlier survey that was also undertaken in 1992 by CNCA and CRCA that covers 
many similar topics, although the earlier survey was restricted to only twelve 
provinces (CRCA 1994). Both surveys were undertaken in coordination with 
local committees on ageing in the selected provinces, municipalities and 
autonomous regions. 
The latest survey adopted a stratified sampling method which operated at five 
levels. First, 20 provinces were chosen from 30 candidate regions; second, four 
cities and four counties were chosen in each selected province, divided into 
urban and rural areas; third, 16 resident districts (urban) and 16 towns (rural) 
were chosen in each selected city/county; fourth, 50 resident committees (urban) 
and 50 village committees (rural) were chosen from those included at the third 
level; and finally, 10 'elderly households' (each with at least one family member 
aged 60 or above) were chosen from each resident committee or village 
committee at the fourth level. 
The 2000 survey contains 10,249 respondents from urban areas and 10,299 
from rural areas, and involved over 2000 interviewers. A separate community 
questionnaire was also administered in each of the 80 cities and 80 counties 
included in the second level of sampling, although that information is not 
examined here. In overall terms, the demographic coverage of the 2000 survey 
was 935 million, accounting for 72.2 per cent of the total population of the 
country. The survey date (1 December 2000) is close to the date of the Fifth 
National Census (conducted on 1 November), and data from the census have 
been used to derive a set of weights that have been applied to the survey data 
described and analysed below. 
Most of the results refer only to the urban aged population in 2000, although 
some comparisons are made with the rural population in that year and, where the 
data permit, changes between 1992 and 2000 are discussed. However, the 
precise wording of many of the questions has changed or been expanded to 
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reflect new areas of interest, so that there are relatively few areas where a direct 
comparisons of responses is possible. Another important feature of the data is 
that they relate primarily to the respondent only, with relatively little 
information provided about other co-habiting family members (including other 
aged people). This is a limitation since, as will be shown below, the incidence of 
co-habitation is very high. There are, however, a number of attitudinal questions 
that allow the attitudes of the aged in 2000 to be analysed and compared in some 
instances with those prevailing in 1992. As shown in the previous section, the 
intervening period was characterized by major reforms to the pension system, so 
it is of great interest to explore whether this has affected the values, attitudes and 
expectations of the aged. 
Finally, it is important to stress that the results reported below are preliminary 
and subject to revision as the analysis proceeds. The research team (consisting of 
Saunders and Xiaoyuan Shang at SPRC and Zhang Kaiti, Sun Lujun, Guo Ping 
and Chen Gang at CRCA) are still in the early stages of the analysis, and this 
should be kept in mind. 
10.4 The well-being of the aged: objective and subjective indicators 
We begin by presenting results on the living arrangements of the urban aged 
because housing represents an important aspect of the overall living conditions 
of the aged. One of the reasons, for example, why the age pension in Australia is 
so low relative to average community incomes compared with other OECD 
countries is that home ownership is heavily subsidized by government and home 
ownership rates are consequently high. In many developing countries, shared 
housing is a way of spreading costs between generations and is thus part of the 
overall support system. In countries like China, in particular, the state has played 
a direct role in housing provision and many people live in government-owned 
residences and face very low housing costs. 
10.4.1 Living arrangements 
Table 10.1 provides a breakdown by age and gender of the 2000 sample of the 
urban aged, classified according to whether they live alone or with their spouse 
only, with other relatives, or with unrelated people.1 Overall, around 60 per cent 
of the aged live with someone other than their spouse. Of those who do not live 
with others, about 10 per cent live alone, and a further 30 per cent with their 
spouse - with far more women living alone and far more men living with their 
partner (reflecting the increased longevity of women). Very few of the aged live 
with people to whom they are not related, but the fact that so many do live with 
relatives implies that the average household size for households that contain at 
least one aged person is 3.3 - well in excess of the corresponding value in a 
country like Australia. This implies that the economic circumstances of the other 
family members with whom aged people live and the degree to which there is 
resource sharing within the household will both have a critical bearing on the 
economic wellbeing of the aged. 
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The patterns of living arrangements in 1992 for the provinces/cities included 
in that survey are very similar to those shown in Table 10.1 and are therefore not 
shown separately.2 Thus for example the percentages of aged persons in all age 
groups in each of the three identified living-arrangement categories in 1992 was 
40.7 per cent, 58.9 per cent and 0.4 per cent - very close to the 2000 estimates 
shown in Table 10.1. These similarities remain across all age and gender 
classifications. 
Table JO.I Living arrangements among the uman aged in China in 2000 (percentages) 
Age: Total: 
Living Arrangements: Average 




Living alone or with 24.5 17.2 2.5 6295.9 21.4 1.9 
spouse 
Living with relatives 35.9 15.4 3.8 7825.7 26.6 4.4 
Living with unrelated 0.3 0.4 0.0 88.3 0.3 3.0 
people 
Total 60.7 33.0 6.4 14209.9 48.3 3.3 
FEMALES: 
Living alone or with 21.4 12.5 2.9 5589.8 19.0 1.6 
spouse 
Living with relatives 34.9 20.2 6.8 9414.4 32.2 4.2 
Living with unrelated 0.5 0.4 0.3 205.9 0.7 2.5 
people 
Total 56.9 33.1 10.1 15210.1 51.7 3.2 
PERSONS: 
Living alone or with 22.9 14.7 2.7 11873.9 40.4 1.7 
spouse 
Living with relatives 35.4 17.9 5.4 17254.0 58.6 4.3 
Living with unrelated 0.4 0.4 0.2 292.1 1.0 2.6 
people 
Total 58.7 33.0 8.3 29420.0 100.0 3.3 
Note 
Survey estimates have been weighted to the population using data from the 2000 Census. 
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10.4.2 Mean incomes 
Table 10.2 shows the mean reported incomes of the aged, disaggregated by age, 
gender and living arrangements (see Table 10.1).3 Income has been separated 
into market income from earnings, self-employment and investments (including 
dividend and rental income), transfer income in the form of pension and other 
public and private transfers, and other sources of income. The most striking 
feature of these results is the sharp gender differences in mean incomes in both 
years: in 2000, for example, across all age ranges, the mean income of women is 
only just over half (57 .8 per cent) of that of men, and this relativity declines with 
age, as women's incomes decline more rapidly than men's. In 1992, after 
adjusting mean incomes to reflect year 2000 consumer prices,4 the overall ratio 
of female to male incomes was 57 .2 per cent, implying that there has been no 
change in the female to male income differential over the period, despite the 
growing importance of pension income. 
In both years, transfers were the main source of income overall, accounting 
for around 86 per cent of total income in both years. Pensions were the major 
source of income for both men and women in both years, accounting for 78 per 
cent of total male income and 71 per cent of female income in 2000. The 
importance of pension income tends to increase with age for men but declines 
for women; even so, pensions contribute a greater percentage to total income for 
men than for women at all ages. The importance of pension income increased 
substantially for both men and women over the period, this shift being 
accompanied by a decline in the importance of income from other public 
transfers and from private transfers. In 1992, these two forms of non-pension 
transfers accounted together for over 33 per cent of average male income and 53 
per cent of average female income; by 2000, these percentages had declined to 
close to 7 per cent (males) and 16 per cent (females), respectively. 
Table 10.2 also shows that real (CPI-adjusted) incomes grew very 
significantly for aged men and women in all age groups between 1992 and 2000. 
For men in their sixties, seventies and over-80, the real increases in mean 
income were 94 per cent, 104 per cent and 96 per cent respectively, while the 
average increase for men of all ages was 94.7 per cent. The corresponding 
increases for women of different ages are even greater, at 280 per cent, 56 per 
cent and 77 per cent respectively, with an overall increase of 97 per cent. Thus 
real incomes almost more than doubled on average, implying a considerable 
improvement in living standards - albeit accompanied by no change in the 
gender income gap. Similarly dramatic real income increases are apparent for 
'cohorts' of the aged, derived by comparing the mean income of men aged 60-69 
in 1992 with men aged 70-79 in 2000, and so on. 
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Table 10.2 Urban aged: mean incomes by age and gender in 1992 and 2000 (RMB per 
month and percentage) 
Income Age: 
Source 60-69 70-79 80+ Total 
(2000) RMB % RMB % RMB % RMB % 
2000 
MALES: 
Market income 137.1 16.0 41.3 5.7 20.5 3.3 93.7 11.9 
Pension income 634.8 74.0 606.6 84.4 506.1 81.9 614.7 77.9 
Other Public 
Transfers 33.8 3.9 34.5 4.8 45.5 7.4 35.0 4.4 
Private transfers 25.0 2.9 23.8 3.3 34.4 5.6 25.3 3.2 
Other income 27.5 3.2 12.6 1.8 11.6 1.9 20.9 2.7 
Total income 858.3 100.0 718.9 100.0 618.0 100.0 789.6 100.0 
FEMALES: 
Market income 58.0 11.2 22.9 5.7 13.6 4.4 41.5 9.1 
Pension income 367.6 70.9 289.6 72.5 196.2 64.3 323.5 70.9 
Other Public 
Transfers 27.3 5.3 18.1 4.5 32.2 10.6 24.7 5.4 
Private transfers 43.4 8.4 57.8 14.5 62.2 20.4 50.2 11.0 
Other income 22.5 4.3 11.2 2.8 1.2 0.4 16.5 3.6 
Total income 518.9 100.0 399.6 100.0 305.2 100.0 456.4 100.0 
1992 (Mean incomes infla,ted to 2000 using the Consumer Price Index) 
MALES: 
Market income 81.8 18.5 33.7 9.5 20.5 6.5 62.6 15.4 
Pension income 210.3 47.5 168.0 47.7 141.8 45.0 192.4 47.4 
Other Public 
Transfers 105.0 23.7 112.1 31.8 99.5 31.6 106.8 26.3 
Private transfers 27.1 6.1 27.1 7.7 44.0 14.0 28.2 6.9 
Other income 18.4 4.1 11.3 3.2 9.2 2.9 15.6 3.8 
Total income 442.4 100.0 351.9 100.0 315.l 100.0 405.5 100.0 
FEMALES: 
Market income 12.l 8.9 22.8 5.3 5.8 3.4 17.7 7.6 
Pension income 54.5 39.9 102.5 30.7 26.5 15.4 83.7 36.l 
Other Public 
Transfers 43.3 31.7 81.4 31.0 40.6 23.5 72.0 31.0 
Private transfers 22.1 16.2 41.6 30.1 96.7 55.9 51.4 22.l 
Other income 4.5 3.3 8.5 2.9 3.2 1.8 7.1 3.1 
Total income 136.5 100.0 256.8 100.0 172.9 100.0 232.l 100.0 
Note 
Market income includes income from earnings, self-employment and investments; transfer income 
includes income from pensions, and public and private transfers. 
Pension reform in China: imperatives, constraints and outcomes 167 
10.4.3 Expenditures on necessities 
The proportion of the total budget allocated to food and other basic items is 
often used as an indicator of the standard of living, following Engel's Law. The 
food ratio method still forms the basis of the official (government endorsed) US 
poverty line, although it has recently been proposed that the basket of necessities 
be extended to include housing and clothing (Citro and Michaels 1995). 
Table 10.3 Utban aged: mean expenditures on basic necessities by age and gender in 1992 





60-69 70-79 80+ 
RMB % RMB % RMB % RMB % 
2000 
MALES: 
Food 201.1 73.2 188.4 75.7 161.4 76.0 193.5 74.3 
Housing <•J 34.2 12.4 36.7 14.8 34.0 16.0 35.1 13.5 
Clothing 39.4 14.4 23.7 9.5 17.0 8.0 32.0 12.3 
Total 274.7 100.0 248.8 100.0 212.4 100.0 260.6 100.0 
FEMALES: 
Food 179.9 82.8 166.1 75.4 172.7 81.5 174.5 75.6 
Housing (a) 34.4 14.3 36.1 16.4 28.0 13.2 34.3 14.9 
Clothing 26.1 10.9 18.2 8.2 11.2 5.3 21.9 9.5 
Total 240.4 100.0 220.4 100.0 211.9 100.0 230.9 100.0 
1992 (Mean expenditures inflated to 2000 using the Consumer Price lndex) 
MALES: 
Food 185.8 76.5 164.4 81.4 152.9 84.3 177.0 78.3 
Housing<•> 21.8 9.0 19.2 9.5 15.0 8.3 20.7 9.2 
Clothing 35.2 14.5 18.4 9.1 13.4 7.4 28.4 12.6 
Total 242.8 100.0 202.0 100.0 181.3 100.0 226.1 100.0 
FEMALES: 
Food 157.2 78.1 141.1 83.0 123.4 87.2 149.7 80.0 
Housing <•J 18.6 9.2 14.5 8.5 10.3 7.3 16.7 8.9 
Clothing 25.6 12.7 14.5 8.5 7.7 5.4 20.7 11.1 
Total 201.4 100.0 170.1 100.0 141.4 100.0 187.1 100.0 
Note 
<•> Housing includes expenditure on utilities (water and electricity) and maintenance. 
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This broader definition of necessities has been used to estimate a set of Low 
Income Cut-Offs by Statistics Canada (Wolfson and Evans 1989) - the closest 
that country has come to developing an official poverty line. With these 
developments in mind, Table 10.3 shows how expenditure on basic necessities -
food, housing and clothing - changed among the aged in China between 1992 
and 2000. As before, the 1992 expenditures have been inflated up to 2000 in line 
with movements in the consumer prices (see note 4). 
Both aged men and women devoted around three quarters of their basic 
budgets to food in 2000. This represents a slight decline over the figure of 
around 80 per cent in 1992, indicating that living standards have risen over the 
period5• Housing represents a small, though rising, proportion of spending on 
necessities, reflecting the widespread provision of low-cost government housing 
to the aged. The food ratio is higher for women then men and tends to increase 
with age, suggesting that living standards within the urban aged population 
follow a similar pattern to that implied by the mean incomes shown in Table 
10.2. However, the pattern of necessary spending shows less fluctuation across 
age and gender categories, suggesting that the variations in subsistence poverty 
are less than those for total income ( or total expenditure). 
The high average food budget ratios highlight the low living standards of the 
aged in urban China at the tum of the century. It is instructive to compare them 
with the normative budget standard estimates derived for Australian households 
living in Sydney in 1997 by Saunders et al. (1998). The Australian standards 
indicate that spending on basic necessities in the areas included in Table 10.3 
required by the aged to attain a low-cost standard of living (assuming they own 
their home outright) is equal to $105 a week (single person) or $155 (aged 
couple). Of these amounts, the proportion of necessary spending devoted to food 
is equal to 35.6 per cent (single) and 49.0 per cent (couple) - the higher ratio for 
couples reflecting the relative lack of economies of scale in food consumption. 
These comparisons highlight the huge differences that still exist between the 
living standards of the aged in the two countries. 
10.4.4 Subjective wellbeing 
Having examined two objective measures of economic status, Table 10.4 
presents information on two subjective indicators of wellbeing and how they 
changed between 1992 and 2000. The two indicators (and the survey questions 
from which they are derived) are: 
Resource Adequacy: In 2000, based on responses to the following 
question: According to your own assessment, how is your economic 
condition this year? Response categories: More than enough; Just 
enough; Rather difficult; Very difficult. In 1992, based on the following 
question: Do you feel your monthly income is enough? Enough, with 
money left; Just enough; No difficulty; Some difficulty; Much 
difficulty. 
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60-69 70-79 80+ Total 
URBAN MALES: 
Resource Adequacy, 1992 % 'Much difficulty' 2.5 4.0 5.3 3.2 
Resource Adequacy, 2000 % 'Very difficult' 2.5 2.4 5.4 2.7 
Economic Security, 1992 % 'Unsatisfied' 5.5 5.5 6.3 5.6 
Economic Security, 2000 % 'Not economically 16.6 17.4 18.4 16.9 
secure' 
URBAN FEMALES: 
Resource Adequacy, 1992 % 'Much difficulty' 4.6 9.0 14.5 6.7 
Resource Adequacy, 2000 % 'Very difficult' 4.1 7.0 9.8 5.6 
Economic Security, 1992 % 'Unsatisfied' 6.4 7.2 9.5 6.9 
Economic Security, 2000 % 'Not economically 27.9 34.5 38.1 31.1 
secure' 
RURAL MALES: 
Resource Adequacy, 1992 % 'Much difficulty' 8.8 14.2 14.1 10.9 
Resource Adequacy, 2000 % 'Very difficult' 7.8 8.6 10.1 8.2 
Economic Security, 1992 % 'Unsatisfied' 11.9 14.0 12.8 12.6 
Economic Security, 2000 % 'Not economically 45.4 45.2 45.2 45.4 
secure' 
RURAL FEMALES: 
Resource Adequacy, 1992 % 'Much difficulty' 11.6 13.2 13.2 12.3 
Resource Adequacy, 2000 % 'Very difficult' 7.9 9.9 10.4 9.0 
Economic Security, 1992 % 'Unsatisfied' 12.5 12.6 10.6 12.4 
Economic Security, 2000 % 'Not economically 43.5 43.1 43.5 43.4 
secure' 
Economic Security: In 2000, the question was: Do you think you are 
economically secure now? Yes; No. In 1992, the question asked was: 
Are you satisfied with your current economic condition? Response 
categories: Satisfied; Unsatisfied; Unclear. 
The responses to these questions indicate that there are clear signs of 
progress in relation to perceptions of resource adequacy, although only of a 
modest degree - particularly in urban areas. There is also a narrowing of the 
urban/rural gap in perceived adequacy over the period, particularly for 
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females. However, these modest gains in subjective adequacy must 
bebalanced against the substantial increases in the percentages that report 
feeling unsatisfied or insecure about their overall economic situation. The 
extent of the increase in the percentages reporting dissatisfaction or 
economic insecurity - well over threefold in the case of urban males and 
rural males and females, and in excess of fourfold in the case of urban 
females - suggests that China's growing national income and material 
prosperity has come at a price in terms of the perceived economic security 
of its aged population. This may in part be explained by the reality that aged 
incomes have not kept pace with general income growth, reinforced by the 
possibility that the aged are more likely to resist economic change (and thus 
to be less appreciative of its benefits) than younger members of the 
population.6 
10.5 Changes in attitude and informal support 
Community attitudes are important in the overall social support system in two 
respects. First, attitudes help to determine the relative roles of different 
components of the system, including the balance between formal (public) and 
informal (private) provisions. Bu they also reflect existing arrangements in ways 
that can constrain the scope for new initiatives. To bring about change, it is thus 
necessary to understand the nature of existing attitudes in order to devise reform 
strategies that are not counter to what prevailing community attitudes expect. 
This does not mean that attitudes are a binding constraint, but rather that they 
can affect the kinds of reforms that will win public support or at least the time 
frame within which new policies can attract community endorsement. 
We begin by examining the pattern of attitudes among the aged in 2000 in 
relation to alternative forms of provision for support in old age. Respondents 
were asked to rank their first and second preferences among four alternative 
forms of preparation for old -age, and the responses are summarized in Table 
10.5, which shows the first ranked option. The most preferred form of 
preparation for old age among both men and women is to spend money on one's 
children when they are young and rely on them to reciprocate that support later, 
when it is needed. Private saving is the next preferred option, followed by 
participation in a social insurance scheme. There is virtually no support for 
purchasing commercial insurance at least among the aged, for whom this is 
really no longer a viable option. Similar patterns pervade all age groups and are 
more pronounced among the older cohorts. Women tend to have stronger views 
than men, with almost half of all women favouring reliance on children, 
compared with just over a third of men. 
Overall, there is a clear preference for family-based types of support, whether 
this takes the form of inter-generational transfers or individuals providing for 
themselves by saving (possibly through a combination of both options). Support 
for social insurance is less than that for these family mechanisms, but there is 
very little support for relying on the commercial sector to provide a reliable 
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60-69 70-79 80+ 
Participating in a social insurance program: 
Male 25.9 23.0 21.3 24.7 
Female 18.6 15.6 10.6 16.8 
Purchasing commercial insurance: 
Male 2.1 0.9 3.5 1.8 
Female 1.6 1.5 3.0 1.7 






















source of support in old age. Self-provision or family support both rank above 
collective insurance options, with market-based solutions attracting minimal 
levels of support. 
Clearly the aged in China show little support for the general direction of 
reform, although this is not unexpected since the reforms are aimed primarily at 
younger cohorts. But as noted earlier, the key point is that those in these younger 
age cohorts may react to the reforms in ways that run counter to the aspirations 
of the older cohorts. 
Is there any evidence that the attitudes of the aged to the social support 
system have changed as the reform agenda has unfolded over the 1990s? Our 
ability to answer this question is constrained by the nature of the questions asked 
in the two CRCA surveys, although it is possible to explore two aspects of this 
issue. The first relates to whether or not the aged regard their children as filial or 
not - an issue that forms the basis of a question asked in both surveys. The 
responses these questions produced are summarized in Table 10.6.7 
The results show that the vast majority of the aged believe that their children 
are filial, with the extent of belief among females slightly higher than among 
males, although the gender differences are quite small. There is, however, a 
decline of around 10 percentage points between 1992 and 2000 in the proportion 
of both males and females of a given age who believe that their children are 
filial. A similar decline is apparent among 'cohorts' of the aged, based for 
example on comparisons of those aged 60-69 in 1992 with those aged 70-79 in 
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2000, and so on. This is a marked change in attitudes in a relatively short period, 
all the more so given the widespread belief at the beginning of the 1990s that 
children are filial. This shift probably reflects the transitions that China is 
experiencing, and if it continues it is likely to have important consequences for 
the future structure of aged support arrangements. 




60-69 70-79 80+ 
1992 
MALE: 
Living alone or with spouse 85.3 81.2 71.3 82.8 
Living with relatives 87.1 86.8 88.0 87.1 
Living with unrelated people 50.0 50.0 100.0 60.0 
Total 86.4 84.2 80.1 85.3 
FEMALE: 
Living alone or with spouse 83.9 81.7 76.1 82.7 
Living with relatives 88.8 87.4 89.2 88.4 
Living with unrelated people 100.0 75.0 71.4 
Total 86.9 84.9 85.1 86.2 
2000 
MALE: 
Living alone or with spouse 75.5 76.4 71.1 75.7 
Living with relatives 76.4 75.8 74.4 76.1 
Living with unrelated people 80.0 75.0 100.0 81.8 
Total 76.1 76.1 73.4 75.9 
FEMALE: 
Living alone or with spouse 76.5 72.5 75.3 75.1 
Living with relatives 76.5 77.5 83.3 77.6 
Living with unrelated people 84.6 75.0 85.7 79.3 
Total 76.6 75.6 81.3 76.7 
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Table 10.7 The incidence and amount of children's financial support for aged parents in 
urban and rural areas, 1992 and 2000 (percentagesi•J 
Age: Average 




Children providing financial support to their aged parents: 
URBAN 
Males, 1992 30.0 39.1 47.9 34.0 75.0 
Males, 2000 28.0 36.5 44.3 32.4 35.8 
Females, 1992 46.2 64.3 80.5 54.3 91.0 
Females, 2000 43.6 52.5 60.8 48.4 60.5 
RURAL 
Males, 1992 65.2 75.8 84.2 69.6 63.5 
Males, 2000 60.1 68.9 78.7 64.3 37.7 
Females, 1992 81.8 87.1 88.3 84.1 61.5 
Females, 2000 68.8 70.2 70.0 69.4 38.9 
Aged providing financial support to their children: 
URBAN 
Males, 1992 44.0 30.5 16.8 38.0 114.9 
Males, 2000 67.5 62.9 47.8 64.3 190.7 
Females, 1992 34.4 17.6 9.7 27.4 87.6 
Females, 2000 64.3 47.8 34.8 55.7 124.8 
RURAL 
Males, 1992 19.5 11.2 11.5 16.2 41.2 
Males, 2000 41.7 32.3 19.1 37.0 39.6 
Females, 1992 15.8 9.0 9.8 12.9 35.2 
Females,2000 35.8 22.0 18.3 28.5 20.8 
Note 
<•> Children include grandchildren. 
But is the change in attitudes to family support implied by the results in Table 
10.6 also reflected in any change in the degree of intra-family support actually 
provided? This issue is examined in Table 10.7, which shows the patterns of 
informal financial support that flow between the urban and rural aged and their 
children in each year. In order to keep the results manageable, only the 
aggregate results across all living arrangement categories are presented.8 
Although they refer to financial (cash) transfers only, these results highlight 
the very important and ongoing role of private, inter-generational, intra-family 
support in China. Transfers between young and old operate in both directions 
and represent a significant element of the social support system - so significant 
that any analysis that omits them will be incomplete and likely to produce 
potentially misleading conclusions. In terms of the incidence of financial 
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support, Table 10.7 indicates that there are marked differences by age, gender 
and location. As the aged get older, they become less likely to provide support to 
their children but increasingly more likely to receive it. Compared with the 
urban aged, the rural aged are much less likely to provide support to their 
children and far more likely to receive it - reflecting the urban/rural differential 
in living standards among the aged that was apparent from earlier results (Tables 
10.2 and 10.3). 
Within urban areas, aged males are less likely to receive support from 
children than females but are more likely to provide cash support to children -
this probably reflecting the higher average incomes of males. A similar pattern 
holds in rural areas, although the gender differences are less marked and the 
overall incidence of transfers from the aged to children is much lower. Finally, 
in terms of changes over time, the incidence of transfers from children to their 
parents has grown, while the incidence of transfers from the aged to their 
children declined. The same general pattern holds across all age and gender 
categories, and is apparent in both urban and rural areas. 
In terms of the average monthly amounts transferred, Table 10.7 shows that 
(among those who make a positive transfer) the amount transferred from the 
aged to their children exceeds that from children to their aged parents in urban 
areas (particularly for males), whereas the opposite is the case in rural areas. On 
average, the value of transfers received by the urban aged from their children 
represents a small portion of male aged incomes, but represents a more 
significant contribution to female incomes (Table 10.2). In 2000, the size of the 
net monthly cash transfer from the aged to their children was around 155 RMB 
for urban males, 64 RMB for urban females, virtually zero for rural males and 
minus 18 RMB for rural females. These net figures clearly reflect the relative 
ability of different groups of the aged to provide support to their children, as 
reflected in the figures presented earlier. For the urban male aged, the size of the 
gross cash transfer to children is of a similar order of magnitude to average 
monthly expenditure on food, and well in excess of combined spending on 
housing and clothing (Table 10.3). 
10.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined a variety of different aspects of the living conditions 
of the aged in China and the attitudes held by the aged in an era of rapid 
economic and social change. The results presented have been derived from the 
1992 and 2000 National Surveys of the Aged Population in China, which 
contain a wealth of data about the material circumstances of the aged, as well as 
their activities, values and attitudes. They show that although there have been 
obvious and substantial improvements in living conditions and economic 
prosperity, there are still marked age, gender and location differences in the 
economic circumstances of the aged. There is also evidence that while their 
objective economic circumstances have improved, the proportion of the aged 
who are concerned about their future economic security increased over the 
1990s. The results also demonstrate that the family still plays a major role in 
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supporting its aged members, but that they too provide extensive financial 
support for their children. 
Although much of the debate over the response to China's rapidly ageing 
population has understandably focused on the need to reform the pension 
system, the results presented here indicate that this discussion needs to pay 
greater attention to the role of another major institution in Chinese society: the 
family. Unless this is done, there is a danger that pension reform will fail to 
adequately address the needs of the population, both young and old. While 
pensions policy has focused almost exclusively on the nature and role of the 
formal pension system as described in Section 10.2, such analysis also needs to 
take account of the role and impact of the largely hidden informal social support 
system if it is to become more relevant to the lives of the Chinese population and 
less concerned with the budgetary challenges facing government. 
Together, the results in the latter part of the chapter (specifically in Tables 
10.5, 10.6 and 10.7) shed light on the importance of China's informal system of 
support for the aged and the strongly held values and attitudes that underlie it. It 
is clear that the majority of the current generations of the aged still regard the 
family as the principal means of support in old age, followed by private saving. 
Social insurance is seen as a factor, but almost no one among the aged sees a 
role for private (commercial) insurance. More than three quarters of the aged 
also believe that their children are filial, although the percentage is declining. So 
too is the percentage who report receiving financial assistance from their 
children, and the amount provided is also falling. But the results also show that 
informal intra-family support for the aged remains important in China - for men 
and women, younger and older groups among the aged, and among both urban 
and rural aged. The institutional reform agenda in China needs to recognize and 
respond to these realities. 
Notes 
This chapter is part of a broader project on The Role and hnpact of the Social Support System 
on the Well-Being of the Elderly in China that is financed by the Australian Research Council 
under Discovery Project Grant DP0209592. The authors acknowledge the advice and assistance 
provided by their colleagues on the broader project Xiaoyuan Shang (at SPRC) and Zhang Kaiti, 
Guo Ping and Chen Gang (at CRCA). The usual caveats apply. 
Throughout this chapter, results are presented disaggregated by age and gender and, in some 
instances, living arrangements. In some cases, this results in small cell sizes, particularly among 
the 80+ age group. 
The provinces/cities included in both the 1992 and 2000 surveys are: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, 
Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hubei and Sichuan. 
The estimates in Table 10.2 refer to those provinces that were included in both surveys. 
The Consumer Price Index was equal to 253.4 in 1992 and 476.6 in 2000, so all mean incomes 
(and expenditures - see below) in 1992 have been inflated by 476.6/253.4 = 1.881 to obtain 
(approximate) purchasing power parity with year 2000 incomes. 
The ratio of food expenditure to total expenditure has declined even further, indicating a larger 
increase in living standards. 
The results in Table 10.4 may also be a statistical artefact, reflecting the changed wording of the 
survey questions - particularly the shift from three response categories to the 'satisfaction' 
question in 1992 to only two in 2000. Although a number of respondents selected the 'unclear' 
category in 1992 (16.7 per cent of the urban sample and 19.6 per cent of the rural sample), there 
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is no way of knowing how these people would have responded if this option had not been 
available. Even if half of these respondents had chosen the 'Unsatisfactory' response had it been 
available, the 2000 figures would still have been above those for 1992. 
The results in Table 10.6 are based upon only those provinces that were included in the survey 
in both years. 
The disaggregated results add relatively little to the aggregate patterns described. 
11 Globalization and occupational health 
and safety regulation in China 
Chris Nyland, Russell Smyth and Cherrie Jiuhua 
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11.1 Introduction 
Establishing and sustaining a sophisticated social protection regime is an 
important and necessary part of the process of globalization. This proposition 
has gained widespread appreciation as a result of the social instability generated 
by the financial crises that have afflicted Mexico, Southeast Asia, Russia and 
Argentina since 1995. As a consequence of these crises, together with the failure 
of big bang reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, even the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) concedes that globalization strategies of nations need to 
include social protection measures that can insure populations against the 
volatility that characterizes global markets (IMF 2001). The term 'social 
protection' here refers to 'policies and programs designed to reduce poverty and 
vulnerability by promoting efficient labour markets, diminishing people's 
exposure to risks, and enhancing their capacity to protect themselves against 
hazards and interruption/loss of income' (ADB 2002a). 
The fact that there has emerged a heightened appreciation of the positive 
contribution that social protection can make to the capacity of nations to 
globalize is a significant development. The evidence generated by advocates of 
this perspective is providing an important counterweight to the literature that 
holds that globalization constitutes a serious threat to the viability of the welfare 
state (Tanzi 2002). However, when the two literatures are considered 
simultaneously, what becomes apparent is that there exists a risk that 
globalization may be undermining its own social foundations. In other words, 
the opening of economies may be self-retarding because it tends to generate 
incompatible levels of competition, output, and income disparity. What is less 
appreciated, however, is the danger that globalization may undermine its own 
long-term viability. It could do this, for example, by raising the level of global 
competition to a point where governments believe that they cannot sustain the 
social protection pillars that are needed to preserve the dynamism of the 
globalization process. 
As observers have become aware of this danger they have started to explore 
the character of the social protection regimes (both those extant and those being 
constructed) in countries that appear to be globalizing successfully (Gu 2001a, 
Song and Chu 1997, Smyth 2000a). In this chapter we extend this exploration 
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through focusing on the occupational health and safety (OHS) regime currently 
being established in China. We focus on OHS in China for three reasons. First, 
it is one aspect of China's social insurance (shehui baoxian) package that has 
been largely under-researched. This is in spite of the fact that the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) has warned that globalization has a double-edged effect on 
OHS. While globalization has tended to improve this aspect of working life, in 
many instances there is a danger that it is inducing governments to dilute the 
legal, institutional and cultural bulwarks that protect workers' health. 
A second reason for focusing on OHS reform in China is that in recent times 
there has been a succession of mining disasters highlighted in the Chinese and 
international media, which have put OHS issues in China in the spotlight (see 
for example Pan 2002; Schauble 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). In September 2000, 
Muzhong coal mine (the fourth largest coal mine south of the Yangtze River) 
exploded, killing 161 workers. This was the largest coal mining accident in 
China since 1949 (Lam 2000: 3). In June 2002 a gas explosion in the Chengzihe 
coal mine in Heilongjiang resulted in 115 deaths. In the same month a gold mine 
explosion in Shanxi killed 46 miners and a coal mine explosion in Jilin resulted 
in 39 deaths (Schauble 2002a). A third reason for this study is that there are a 
series of major reforms addressing OHS issues in China, which are very recent. 
On the inspectorate side there have been two major national laws passed in the 
last few years dealing with prevention of occupational diseases (October 2001) 
and with occupational safety (June 2002). On the insurance side a set of new 
regulations came into force in January 2004. 
The concurrence of the emphasis on OHS and the tendency to reduce such 
protections due to globalization enables us to explore how the reform of an 
important area of social protection is being managed in a country that is actively 
seeking to expand its presence in the global economy. In considering this 
development, we examine how China is handling the contradiction inherent in 
the fact that the new regulations are meant to curtail the threat to the health and 
safety of workers generated by the processes of marketization and globalization, 
and at the same time to assist China to extend the marketization and 
globalization of its economy. The remainder of the chapter is set out as follows. 
First, we outline the concerns that have been expressed in the literature 
regarding the link between globalization and OHS, and how the WHO has 
responded to these concerns. We then proceed to examine the competing 
tensions underpinning OHS and workplace and insurance reforms due to 
increasing marketization and globalization in China. Finally, in the conclusion 
we speculate about the extent to which the government has been effective in 
managing these tensions and the implications for effective social protection in 
China. 
11.2 Globalization, the World Health Organisation and occupational 
health and safety 
The link between globalization and workers' health and safety has become an 
issue of concern for OHS scholars and practitioners because many observers 
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have become convinced that open market policies have the capacity to both 
enhance and undermine the health of populations. Cornea (2001: 834), for 
example, has argued that while the removal of trade and financial barriers has 
improved the level of health enjoyed by the populations of some nations, it has 
produced stagnating health indicators in a great many others. Informed observers 
in both the developed and developing world have endorsed the notion that 
globalization is having this mixed or Janus-faced impact (Holkeri 2001). The 
only authors of note who have failed to acknowledge this trend are market 
fundamentalists such as Dollar (2001). He simply insists that as open market 
policies are a powerful force for raising the incomes of poor countries, and 
increased income has been shown to be associated with improved health, we can 
be confident that globalization is having a positive effect on health. This cavalier 
perspective has not been endorsed by the WHO, which accepts that at the very 
least it must be conceded that globalization has induced both increased health 
benefits and health risks. Consequently, they have advised that it is vital that 
appropriate domestic and global regulations and strategies be developed and 
enforced that are capable of promoting the benefits of globalization while 
containing the risks. 
The concerns expressed by the WHO regarding the link between 
globalization and health have also been manifest in the OHS literature. For 
instance, Loewenson (2001) has warned that globalization has both positive and 
negative OHS dimensions. He advises that 'to reduce the adverse effects of 
global trade reforms on occupational health, stronger social protection measures 
must be built into production and trade activities, including improved 
recognition, prevention, and management of work related ill-health' (Loewenson 
2001: 863). London and Kisting (2002) have echoed these concerns and in so 
doing note that market openness has increased the relative significance of the 
informal sector. They warn that this is a matter of concern because workers' 
health in this sector is notoriously difficult to regulate and consequently is 
characterized by very high levels of workplace injury and disease. In 
emphasizing this point, London and Kisling (2002) also warn that the trend for 
nations to make privatization of public services a central aspect of a broader 
globalization strategy is also a matter of great concern. The reason is that a 
shortage of well-trained public officials has been shown to contribute to the 
failure of health and related services to control the occupational disease burden. 
As the WHO has come to accept that globalization has both positive and 
negative OHS dimensions, it has joined with the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) in the building of a campaign targeted to alert nations to the 
need to incorporate health and safety into their globalization strategies. In 2001 
it played a prominent role in an international conference in Helsinki on 'Work in 
the Global Village'. The conference was opened by Harri Holkeri, the President 
of the 55th General Assembly of the United Nations, who warned that 
globalization poses a threat to the quality of workers' lives and working 
conditions in the developed states and even more so in the developing and 
transition countries. In so doing he observed: 
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Governments need more co-operation and partnerships with regional 
and international organizations, but also with civil society actors to 
alleviate poverty and harmonize minimum labour standards and safety 
for workers. The private sector and investors should include into their 
social code support for a safe and healthy work environment. 
Nationally, legal framework, policies, service delivery, and access to 
education are means to ensure the realisation of human rights. 
Internationally, the rights-based approach to development needs a 
particular focus on occupational health and safety of the poor. (Holkeri 
2001: 45) 
Goldstein et al. (2001) from the WHO stress that there is an acute need to 
alert globalizing nations to the importance of OHS. They observe that while the 
global burden of occupational disease and injury is on a par with the burden 
from malaria, occupational health programmes receive only a tiny fraction of the 
resources devoted to combating malaria. Goldstein et al. (2001) add that the 
need to be aware of OHS costs has become even greater with the more flexible 
work practices that tend to be associated with globalization. These authors make 
the further point that there is a great fear that the stress of global competition 
may lead employers to view the prevention of occupational injuries and 
protection of workers' health not as an integral part of quality management, but 
as a barrier to trade (Goldstein et al. 2001: 56). 
11.3 OHS and occupational insurance reforms in China 
The increasing pace of China's economic reforms and associated challenges to 
its state-owned sector, coupled with China's accession to the WTO, has made 
social welfare reform a pressing issue. In this section we critically examine how 
the Chinese government has managed the tension in the OHS area between 
fostering the framework needed to underpin the dynamism required to compete 
in global markets and creating an institutional mechanism to protect workers 
from the negative side effects of globalization. The information is based 
primarily on a series of interviews with key stakeholders conducted by the 
authors in Beijing in July 2002. Interviews were conducted with senior officials 
from the State Administration of Work Safety, the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security and the ILO in Beijing. These interviews with policymakers 
were supplemented with a case study of a large multinational enterprise in 
Beijing, also conducted in July 2002, to ascertain how the OHS and work injury 
insurance reforms operated in practice. 
The Chinese government is clearly aware of the need to create a more 
competitive environment to enable it to compete in global markets and also of 
the importance of sharing the costs of social protection as part of this process. 
As market transition gathered speed, there was a widespread recognition that the 
danwei-based ( organization-based) welfare system was inadequate. It impeded 
the development of the service sector, hindered labour mobility and represented 
a huge financial burden on the state sector. As a result there has been a shift 
Globalization and occupational health and safety regulation in China 181 
towards an institutional welfare state (Titmuss 1974), which is underpinned by 
welfare pluralism (Gu 2001a: 109). This is part of a general trend towards 
reforming the 'iron rice bowl' and 'iron armchair' of lifetime employment for 
cadres. Drawing on interviews in 10 large and medium-sized state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) between 1995 and 2000, Morris et al. (2001: 711) report that 
some managers in SOEs were being employed on three-year contracts, which 
could be terminated for failure to meet performance criteria. At the beginning of 
2003, the Chinese government announced that employment contracts would be 
introduced for all SOE workers over the course of the next three years. 1 
China is an active collaborating member of the WTO's Global Strategy, and 
indeed the first network meeting was held in Shanghai in 1992. The Chinese 
government insists that this involvement is part of China's 'trend toward 
globalization'. It argues that globalization will help improve the OHS regime 
and that accession to the WTO will enable China to meet the economic costs 
associated with OHS as well as making it necessary for stakeholders to show 
they are meeting the new international obligations they have assumed. This was 
a point stressed in January 2002 by Yang Fu, director of the Technological 
Improvement and Equipment Department under the State Administration of 
Work Safety Supervision, when announcing the national government's intention 
of establishing a 'standardized workplace-safety system' in Chinese enterprises 
(Fu 2002). To further this process, in April 2002 the government introduced a 
new national standard for occupational health and safety management systems -
the GBff 28001-2001 national standard. At the time it was issued, Shi Baoquan, 
deputy administrator of the State Administration for Standardization, declared 
that this standard 'will be effective in making enterprises aware of health and 
safety and maintaining their awareness' (Li 2001). 
The association between marketization, globalization and industrial health, 
though, is a 'controversial topic' (Wong 2000) in China. The problem is that the 
new institutional welfare state with its emphasis on mutual responsibilities is 
still at an embryonic stage. Thus it is questionable whether or not it is able to 
protect workers from the vicissitudes of globalization. Our interviews suggest 
that in the OHS area the main problem rests with monitoring and enforcement of 
standards. In particular, the marketization and globalization drive has created a 
large floating migrant workforce in the eastern seaboard of China. Consistent 
with London and Kisting's (2002) views about the effect of globalization on 
enforcement of labour standards in the informal sector, protecting the OHS 
rights of migrant workers has been particularly troublesome. The State 
Administration of Work Safety has been running an educational campaign to 
increase awareness of OHS issues. However, in line with Goldstein et al.'s 
(2001) concerns cited above, workers' health and prevention of occupational 
injuries in China are still not seen by employers as an integral part of quality 
management, but as a factor driving up the cost of business. 
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11.4 Some figures on OHS in China 
Numerous observers have argued that globalization and marketization have 
intensified the problem of occupational accidents in China. The empirical 
evidence supports this conclusion. Table 11.1 presents official statistics on the 
number of work-related fatalities and work-related major injuries in China 
between 1979 and 1998. The figures on work-related injuries and work-related 
fatalities prior to 1993 are for SOEs and collective-owned enterprises (COEs) at 
the county level and above. From 1993, the figures also include collective 
township and village enterprises (CTVEs). Since 1994 the official statistics on 
work-related injuries show a downward trend, but casual observation suggests 
that this is not believable. 
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Figures prior to 1993 are for state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises at the county 
level and above. From 1993 the figures include township and village enterprises. 
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While the official statistics on fatalities might be reasonably accurate, they 
almost certainly understate the prevalence of serious accidents. This is widely 
accepted among observers (see ILO 1998: 10, Lam 2000: 3). According to Table 
1 I.I, since 1993 the number of work-related fatalities has been greater than the 
number of work-related major injuries. The ILO official that we interviewed 
pointed out that normally the number of work-related fatalities and major 
injuries should be like a pyramid: in other words, far fewer people die than are 
injured at work. However, the statistics in China look like an upside-down 
pyramid, with more fatalities being reported than injuries. This indicates that 
workplace injuries may only be reported when fatalities occur, while work-
related injuries could be substantially under-reported.2 
The statistics in Table 11.1 are based on reports of accidents to the State 
Administration of Work Safety, which enforces the OHS laws and administers 
penalties to firms which are in violation of those laws. It is well known in China 
that firms under-report accidents to the State Administration of Work Safety in 
order to minimize applicable penalties. Officials in the State Administration of 
Work Safety openly acknowledge this.3 The Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security, which administers work-related injury insurance, has more realistic 
figures because these are based on actual claims by workers. However, as 
discussed in more detail later in the chapter, the problem is that the coverage of 
the insurance scheme is limited to 40 per cent of urban enterprises, so reasonably 
reliable figures are therefore only available for a relatively small subset of total 
enterprises. 4 
Traffic accidents are the most common form of work accident (74.96 per 
cent) in China followed by mining accidents (8.85 per cent) (He 2002). The 
official number of fatalities in mining accidents in China has hovered around 
10,000 per annum since 1990 (ZLTN, various). According to the ILO, fatalities 
due to mining accidents in China constitute 60 per cent of the fatalities due to 
mining accidents worldwide.5 Table 11.2 compares the number of mining deaths 
per million tonnes of coal produced in China with equivalent figures for the 
United States, India, Russia, South Africa and Poland. The figure for China is 
11 times higher than for Russia and 182 times higher than for the United States. 
Table 11.2 Fatalities in coal mines 
Coal Produced Fatalities 
( million tonnes) 
China 1396 10015 
United States 975 38 
India 294 137 
Russia 264 172 
South Africa 213 48 
Poland 203 45 
Source: China State Coal Industry Bureau, reported in Schauble (2002b) 
Note 
Figures are for 1996. 
Deaths per Million 
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While poor OHS standards exist in large state-owned coal mines (Lam 2000), 
the worst offenders are usually small-scale coal mines which are owned 
privately or by CTVEs (He 2002). The number of work-related fatalities in 
CTVEs is higher than in SOEs. A survey by the Ministry of Labour in the mid-
1990s found that the number of work-related fatalities in CTVEs was four to 
five times higher than in SOEs (cited in ILO 1998: 10). 
Coal mines are the major cause of pneumoconiosis (a lung disease associated 
with dust) in China. Silicosis and coal miners' pneumoconiosis account for 
about 85 per cent of all recorded cases of pneumoconiosis in China (Zou et al. 
1997, He 2002). The cumulative number ofrecorded cases ofpneumoconiosis in 
China between 1949 and 1996 was 524,759, of which 134,678 proved fatal (Zou 
et al. 1997: 1). The annual number of official new cases of pneumoconiosis 
reported each year is in the range of 8,000 to 9,000, which understates the extent 
of the problem because of under-reporting by small mines (ILO 1998, Liang et 
al. 1998). Lam (2000: 4) suggests that a more accurate figure would be 15,000 
to 20,000 new cases of pneumoconiosis each year; and even this is likely to be a 
conservative estimate. 
In 2000, the number of verified cases of pneumoconiosis was 42,500 (He 
2002: 2), but a further 520,000 workers who have been exposed to dust are 
suspected of having silicosis (Liang et al. 1998: 2). Physical examinations of 
workers in 30,000 CTVEs across 15 provinces in 1990 found that 4.4 per cent of 
the workers had one of seven occupational diseases: silicosis, coal worker's 
pneumoconiosis, asbestosis, chronic lead poisoning, benzene analogs poisoning, 
chronic chromium poisoning or noise-induced hearing loss. A further 11 per 
cent had illnesses suspected of being, though not proven to be, due to 
occupational exposures (Su et al. 2000). The ILO (1998: 11) states: 'Official 
figures of occupational diseases in CTVEs should ... be regarded as the tip of 
the iceberg.' The reason for this is that as most CTVEs have only been 
established since the 1980s, the period of workers' exposure to hazards has not 
yet been long enough to develop into diseases such as pneumoconiosis, but this 
could occur in the future. 
11.5 Recent reforms in the regulation of OHS 
Prior to 1998 OHS was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security (which was called Ministry of Labour at that time). In 1998 
responsibility for occupational health was transferred to the Ministry of Health 
and responsibility for safety was transferred to the State Economic and Trade 
Commission (SETC). In 2001 the SETC established the State Administration of 
Work Safety and State Bureau of Coal Mine Safety to oversee occupational 
safety in all enterprises under its supervision. Thus there are now three types of 
workplace inspections. These are safety (which is under the jurisdiction of the 
State Administration of Work Safety), health (which is under the jurisdiction of 
the Ministry of Health) and general labour inspections. The latter cover issues 
such as child labour, working hours and general working conditions (which are 
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still the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security). There are 
two problems with having multiple agencies carry out inspections. One problem 
is that there is a lack of coordination and cooperation between the agencies. The 
other is that having to receive different agencies for related inspections increases 
the costs to the firm. 
There are a myriad of laws and technical standards on OHS, which have been 
issued in a piecemeal fashion. These include the Regulation of Work Safety for 
Mining Industries (1982); Rules on Occupational Health Services for CTVEs 
(1987) and the Labour Law (1994) (for a more complete list see Liang et al. 
1998: 4). The Labour Law is too broad. As an ILO Report puts it, 'it stipulates 
that management is responsible for ensuring workers' health and safety', but it 
'does not specify the concrete measures needed for enterprise action' (ILO 
1995). Since the Labour Law was enacted, two national laws dealing with 
prevention of occupational diseases (passed in October 2001) and occupational 
safety (passed in June 2002) have come into force. 
11.5.1 Monitoring and enforcement is problematic 
While the government has put the legal framework in place to provide protection 
for workers' health and safety, in order to be an effective safeguard in the face of 
increasing levels of marketization, the laws must be enforced. As it stands, 
monitoring and enforcement are the major challenges facing OHS legislation. 
Under the occupational safety laws passed in June 2002, if a firm does not 
implement the safety laws, the State Administration of Work Safety under the 
direction of the SETC can prosecute the firm and, if need be, close it down. 
There are, however, a number of difficulties hindering the effective 
implementation of the occupational safety laws. 
The first problem is that there are large numbers of small and medium 
enterprises outside the reach of the State Administration of Work Safety given 
the small number of inspectors relative to the number of enterprises. In the mid-
1990s there were about 12,000 OHS inspectors at the provincial, prefectural and 
county levels (ILO 1998). As a result, the ILO (1998: 17) notes: 'Even in 
counties which assign priority to TVE inspection, collectively and individually 
owned small TVEs are outside the scope of inspection.' These firms often just 
pay lip service to safety requirements or ignore them altogether. This is 
illustrated by the situation in the Fuqiang mine in Jilin Province. According to 
one media report: 'Safety laws pinned to the walls are ''just for show". . .. 
While someone is detailed to monitor the gas levels, even when they reach high 
levels the miners are not allowed to leave until they have finished their shift' 
(Schauble 2002a). 
The State Administration of Work Safety's task in enforcing the safety 
regulations in CTVEs is also made more difficult because local governments 
provide protection to their CTVEs.6 One reason for this is that fiscal 
decentralization in China has starved local governments of revenue and created a 
linkage of interests between local governments and enterprises (Wong 1992). In 
this fiscal environment, CTVEs have been a major source of local government 
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revenue (Deng and Smyth 2000). Thus if CTVEs are forced to implement higher 
safety standards this will increase their costs, diminish their profits and reduce 
revenue flows to local government. Local government obstruction has also been 
exacerbated by a State Council Resolution (Document No. 302, issued in 2001). 
This Resolution puts obligations for major work accidents on local officials, 
which creates incentives for local officials to cover up work accidents.7 
The State Administration of Work Safety has established branches at 
province and county levels to oversee safety inspections consistent with the new 
laws, but in order to fill these new posts it has had to recruit a number of new 
staff, who lack experience and possibly commitment.8 In the interviews we 
conducted, representatives from the State Administration of Work Safety 
admitted that, given resource constraints, sometimes investigations of breaches 
are only in response to media pressure. The representatives of the State 
Administration of Work Safety gave the concrete example of the gold mine 
explosion in Shanxi in June 2002, which had occurred in the month prior to the 
interviews. Initially the owner had reported that there were two deaths, and had 
attempted to conceal the bodies of other miners who had died in the explosion; 
but the media reported 37 deaths prompting the State Administration of Work 
Safety to investigate.9 
A further problem is that even where the State Administration of Work Safety 
inspectors possess the commitment, enterprises often ignore the compliance 
order. Lam (2000: 3) states: 'Local media often report that after the labour 
department investigated workplaces where serious accidents happen, some 
factories simply ignore the Notes for Compliance.' An example is the 
Dingsheng coal mine in Heilongjiang Province, where an explosion in July 2002 
killed 44 people. The mine had failed a safety inspection earlier that year, had 
its licence suspended and had been ordered to stop operations just a week prior 
to the explosion (Schauble 2002a). There are various reasons why enterprises 
might ignore compliance orders. In some cases, particularly in small enterprises, 
the problem is either that there is a lack of awareness of relevant laws or that 
enterprises do not have the resources to make the relevant changes. 10 An 
inevitable consequence of globalization is that small CTVEs are under 
increasing pressure to keep costs down, and maintaining OHS standards is often 
regarded as a barrier to trade. Increasing marketization has also generated 
opportunities for corruption. Lam (2000) suggests that corruption and abuse of 
authority are important factors in firms' avoidance of compliance. He states: 
'Some [firms]'are powerful enough to bypass inspections and safety 
requirements even where the hazards are obvious' (Lam 2000: 3). 
11.5.2 Protection of migrant workers is problematic 
Marketization and more flexible labour markets have created opportunities for 
migrant labour from rural areas to flood into China's cities and wealthier coastal 
regions in search of work and higher incomes. The influx of foreign direct 
investment as the Chinese economy has opened up has facilitated this process 
through creating job opportunities. The floating population of migrant workers 
Globalization and occupational health and safety regulation in China 187 
in China has been estimated to be between 120 million and 150 million people 
(Pan 2002). Many of these work in CTVEs or joint ventures in the coastal 
provinces in special economic zones (SEZs) such as Xiamen (Fujian) and 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou (Guangdong). While migrant workers provide 
cheap labour that fuels the globalization process, the existence of large pools of 
migrant labour makes it easier for firms to avoid their obligations under the OHS 
legislation. This is because migrants are often either unaware of the legislation 
or willing to work without the correct occupational protection. 
This impedes the government's efforts to create the social protection 
mechanism appropriate to curtailing the adverse effects of globalization, because 
it takes OHS issues outside the legal framework that has been put in place to 
protect workers' rights. While they are illegal, 'life or death contracts' (where 
workers agree to work without OHS safeguards) are prevalent in small CTVEs 
and private firms. 11 Migrants often receive lower wages than local workers, but 
are willing to accept these conditions because they can still earn much more than 
in their communities of origin (Hare 1999, Knight et al. 1999). Where workers 
are injured, under-the-table payments where the injury is not even recorded are 
common. 12 In these circumstances, it is normal for factories to give injured 
workers a lump-sum compensation payment, which is usually less than the legal 
minimum, and to force the workers to leave (Lam 2000: 4). 
The ILO (1998: 14) estimates that there are 30 million migrant workers in 
China working in substandard conditions. These workers typically work long 
hours. A survey of migrant workers (75 per cent of whom were female) in the 
Pearl River Delta in the mid-1990s found that most were working 12 hours a day 
(cited in ILO 1998: 15). There are several reports of cases in Shenzhen and other 
SEZs where workers have not been given proper instructions on how to operate 
machines, resulting in disablement and loss of limbs (Chan 2001, Ash 2002, 
Lam2000). 
Migrant workers also constitute a disproportionate number of those working 
in hazardous industries such as coal mining and construction. In the major coal-
mining province of Shanxi, it is estimated that 50 per cent of coal mine workers 
are migrants from other provinces such as Anhui and Sichuan (ILO 1998: 14). It 
has also been reported in the Hong Kong media that owners of private 
companies that employ migrant workers frequently change their employees 
before they start to show the symptoms of occupational diseases. 13 One of the 
major reasons that protecting migrant workers is problematic is that their social 
status is lower relative to local workers and their occupational status is transient 
(Li and Han 1994, Lee 1995, ILO 1998, Knight et al. 1999). Migrant workers 
also have fairly low awareness of trade union activities. The survey of migrant 
workers in the Pearl River Delta that was mentioned above found that only 14.6 
per cent were aware of trade unions in their factories (cited in ILO 1998: 14). 
11.5.3 The role of employer groups and trade unions 
The trade unions were consulted in drafting the new OHS laws through input 
from the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), and the laws set out 
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obligations of the trade unions. Where workers feel too intimidated to report 
accidents or unsafe work practices, it is considered the role of the trade unions to 
report these things. In all joint ventures with more than 25 workers the 
workforce is entitled to join a trade union. In other countries, trade unions have 
often been at the forefront of protecting workers' rights in the face of greater 
globalization. As a reflection of the shift towards embracing the concept of an 
institutional welfare state, the Chinese government proffers a similar role for 
trade unions in firms with foreign involvement in China. The view was 
expressed in the interviews that the government encourages a strong union 
presence in joint ventures and foreign-owned firms to act as its watchdog on 
health and safety issues. 14 
The ACFTU is a top-down establishment, however, and this curtails the role 
that it can play in effective enforcement (Lam 2000: 2). One of the main 
difficulties has traditionally been a lack of membership. Of the 2.4 million 
foreign-funded enterprises, private enterprises and CTVEs, according to the 
ACFTU's figures only 12 per cent have trade unions (Lam 2000: 2). Most of 
these are in large CTVEs. For example, in Nanjing about 70 per cent of large 
CTVEs have trade unions (ILO 1998: 19). This means that in most small CTVEs 
and private firms, often where workers are most vulnerable to poor OHS 
standards, there is no trade union involvement. These surveys were conducted 
prior to an amendment to the Trade Union Law (2001) which granted trade 
unions the legal rights to formally monitor workplaces, and precipitated a 
campaign to increase the level of unionization. The expanded role for trade 
unions is outlined in the ACFTU's Blue Paper published in January 2003. The 
Blue Paper touches on the protection of workers' rights in nine areas including 
OHS (ACFTU 2003). This paper was released after we had completed the 
fieldwork for this project, however, and, at the time of writing, it is still too early 
to gauge its effect. 
While the functions of trade unions have been fairly limited in OHS, 
employer groups were not even part of the process of drafting the new OHS 
laws. 15 As long as the SETC still has an important policy role it is difficult for 
strong employer associations to evolve. Thus employers have little or no input 
into the formulation of labour policies. 16 The OHS activities of those employer 
groups which do exist, such as the Chinese Enterprise Directors' Association, 
are limited (ILO 1998: 19). Thus when the occupational safety laws were passed 
in June 2002, it was taken as given that employers would need to meet their 
commitments according to the legislation. 17 
It might be argued that the SETC represented employer groups in drafting the 
laws, but with their myriad of policy responsibilities (Johnston 2002), the SETC 
is not an effective voice for employers in any real sense. This is problematic 
because it is difficult for the State Administration of Work Safety to enforce the 
safety laws effectively when one of the key stakeholders is more or less 
excluded at the law formulation stage. Excluding employers makes it difficult 
for the government to tell them in a top-down fashion that they should be 
treating OHS as an integral part of quality management, rather than as a barrier 
to integrating into global markets, when they were not involved in the 
consultation process. 
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11.5.4 Policies to increase awareness 
The State Administration of Work Safety is focusing on increasing awareness of 
safety laws as the key to reducing workplace accidents. Thus complementing 
efforts to increase the number of workplace inspections, it is attempting to create 
a culture of improved work safety through a range of measures designed to 
increase awareness of safety issues. First, all senior managers have been given a 
copy of the safety law passed in June 2002, and senior managers in all 
enterprises are required to take training seminars on OHS. Second, the State 
Administration of Work Safety has sponsored a series of seminars given by 
prominent legal academics and practitioners designed to explain the operation of 
the laws to enterprises. Third, the central government has introduced 'safety 
month' to publicize particular issues in occupational safety. 18 The problem, 
however, is that in practice most of the training programmes are restricted to 
large firms and do not extend to small CTVEs or private firms where little 
information on OHS is available. Moreover, most of the training programmes 
focus on legal requirements of the law rather than giving practical guidance on 
how to improve safety levels (ILO 1998: 18-19). 
11.6 Workplace accident and injury insurance reforms 
11.6.1 Recent legislative developments 
Prior to the 1980s, industrial injury insurance was governed by the Regulations 
on Labour Insurance in China (1951 ), which provided for enterprise-based 
insurance. The problems with the Regulations on Labour Insurance included low 
coverage, lack of legal enforcement and lack of scientific criteria for the 
assessment of injuries and compensation (Liu 2000: 14-15). The main problem 
with the danwei-based insurance approach, however, was that the level of 
treatment an injured worker received was tied to a firm's performance. Thus 
workers in poorly performing firms received less compensation than they 
deserved (Liu 2000, Tang 2001). In the late 1980s, under the pressures of 
greater marketization and faced with mounting losses in the state-owned sector, 
these arrangements were no longer sustainable. This method of funding 
workplace accident compensation started to change as part of broader reforms to 
the workplace-based welfare system (see for example Leung 1994, Croll 1999, 
Gu 2001a, Liu 2000). 
Under the Interim Regulations on Occupational Injury and Disease Insurance 
passed in 1996 a social pooling fund was established and administered by the 
Social Insurance Administration in the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. 
Under the Interim Regulations, enterprises contributed a percentage of their 
payroll to the fund and the benefits were paid out of the fund to workers who 
suffered work-related injuries. Contributions to the fund were transferable 
between enterprises. In 2001 the Ministry of Labour and Social Security started 
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revising the Interim Regulations; new regulations were passed in 2003 and came 
into operation at the start of 2004. 
11.6.2 The definition of a work-related injury 
Once an accident has been reported, the State Administration of Work Safety 
identifies the cause of the accident and determines whether or not it was a work-
related accident. Following this, the Social Insurance Administration in the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security determines the appropriate level of 
compensation based on a table of maims. An important issue in this process 
relates to how the State Administration of Work Safety decides what is a work-
related accident. This is particularly true in problematic grey areas such as 
injuries incurred in travelling to and from work, which are covered under the 
definition of work-related accidents. The ILO (2002: 77) is critical of the ability 
of the State Administration of Work Safety to make the right decision in cases 
such as this given the lack of experience of the staff and the absence of internal 
guidelines. 
The Interim Regulations defined a work-related accident broadly to include 
work-related stress. The term 'work-related stress' is vague, making it relatively 
easy for workers to claim compensation as job-related. The revised regulations 
make it much clearer which injuries/diseases can be claimed as work-related, in 
an attempt to narrow the scope. 19 The coverage of the insurance scheme has also 
been reduced by the introduction of related legislation since the Interim 
Regulations were enacted. For instance, medical insurance schemes now cover 
many diseases, which were originally covered by the Interim Regulations. 
11.6.3 Rates of contribution and social pooling 
Enterprise contributions to the social pooling fund consist of a fixed ( or 
industry) rate and a floating (or firm) rate. The fixed rate, which is broken into 
four categories depending on the occupational risk in the industry, varies 
between 0.3 per cent and 3 per cent of the payroll, with the average being 1 per 
cent (Liu 2000: 156). It is reviewed every five years. Prior to 1998 industrial 
injury insurance was industry based. Thus all workers in the same industry had 
the same coverage. However, from 1998 industrial injury insurance has been 
geographically based, and rates differ between geographic regions. The central 
government draws up the general guidelines and it is left to municipalities to 
implement them. One problem with this approach is that people working in the 
same industry in different geographic regions have different levels of coverage.20 
There is also considerable variation in the manner in which fixed rates are 
determined at the local level. In some provinces, such as Liaoning, fixed rates 
are determined at the pool level. In other provinces, such as Guangdong, the 
same rates are used for all of the province. For example, in Guangdong there are 
three rates (0.5 per cent, 1 per cent and 1.5 per cent). The advantage of setting 
the fixed rates at the pool level, as in Liaoning, is that this can better handle the 
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industries that are prevalent in each pool and differences in industries across the 
province (ILO 2002). 
The floating rate, which varies from year to year depending on accidents in 
the previous year, is between 5 per cent and 40 per cent of the fixed rate (Liu 
2000: 157). The Social Insurance Administration Bureau in the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security maintains a record of funds contributed and funds 
expended for each enterprise. This is used to judge the firm's performance 
record and assess whether the floating rate should be increased or decreased.21 
Under one novel approach to insurance reform, which is being trialled in some 
areas, but at this stage has not been earmarked for the national regulations, 
initially the floating rate is reduced to zero if the firm has no accidents over a 
certain period of time. Once the floating rate is reduced to zero, if the firm 
continues to be accident-free, it is permitted to contribute below the fixed rate.22 
Social pooling is restricted to the town/county level. A percentage of 
contributions from each pool is transferred to the city and to the province, which 
is used to cross-subsidize pools which are in an unfavourable financial position 
(ILO 2002: 78). In practice, cross-subsidization occurs between richer and 
poorer areas correlated with the level of economic development. 23 The main 
problem is that the level of pooling is too low and, as a result, some provinces 
have many small pools that are difficult to manage. The ILO (2002) notes: 'A 
major advantage of large pools is their financial stability. The experience is 
more predictable and the fund can protect against annual fluctuations with a 
relatively modest reserve.' For instance, Guangdong has more than 100 pools, 
with many small pools that are forced to protect themselves against fluctuations 
through reinsurance. While some developed countries such as Canada also have 
small pools, this increases the cost of administration to the fund (ILO 2002: 78). 
11.6.4 Limitations of coverage 
The 1996 Interim Regulations only applied to urban enterprises, and only 40 per 
cent of urban enterprises participated in the insurance scheme. 24 At the end of 
2001, 43.5 million workers out of 107.9 million employees in the urban area 
were covered by the industrial injury insurance scheme (White Paper 2002: 4). 
In contrast, in 2000 104.5 million employees in urban areas were covered by 
pension insurance and 103.3 million employees in urban areas were covered by 
unemployment insurance (ZLSHBZN 2001: 697-702). Given that China's 
workforce in the secondary and tertiary industries is approximately 365 million, 
this means that only about 12 per cent of them were covered by industrial injury 
insurance, while 28.6 per cent and 28.3 per cent were covered by pension and 
unemployment insurance respectively. 25 In Guangdong, where industrial injury 
insurance coverage is relatively high, more people were covered by industrial 
injury insurance than pension insurance; in other provinces, however, coverage 
was patchy.26 
One of the problems with the Interim Regulations was that they only said that 
'enterprises' should join the scheme. The term 'enterprises' is ambiguous and it 
was not clear whether this extends to CTVEs. 27 Thus most of those workers who 
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were covered were in the state-owned sector,28 while workers in private 
enterprises, which have flourished in the marketization process, largely lay 
outside the reach of the scheme. This is significant because the private sector 
share of the gross value of industrial output jumped from almost zero at the start 
of the reforms to over 35 per cent in 2000, and the private sector employs over 
100 million people (ZTN 2001 and Xiao 2001). The revised regulations clarify 
the meaning of 'enterprises' and give the provinces the power to extend 
coverage to workers in rural areas (ILO 2002: 76). 
One of the main reasons for the low level of coverage is that under the 
regulations there is no compulsion for the enterprise to contribute to the fund. In 
contrast, under the safety laws, if a firm does not meet the required safety 
standards it can be prosecuted and closed down. Thus under the safety laws the 
level of legal obligation is higher.29 Under the insurance regulations the risk is 
placed on the firm. If the enterprise chooses not to join the scheme it is liable for 
meeting the costs of industrial injuries to its workers (White Paper 2002: 4). The 
amount which firms that have not joined the scheme are expected to pay to their 
injured workers is specified in the regulations and, in theory, the firm cannot 
avoid these obligations through declaring bankruptcy.30 
If a firm that has not joined the insurance scheme is unable to pay its injured 
workers it can be prosecuted, but this is up to the central government. The 
government can either provide compensation to the injured workers itself or 
close down the firm and sell off its assets. 31 The latter might be a viable response 
if the reform process was taking place in a vacuum; but the reform process in 
China is not taking place in a socio-political vacuum. The interaction between 
institutional and non-institutional factors (such as the ideological setting) affects 
the speed of reforms and helps shape the political course of the reforms (Thelen 
and Steinmo 1992, Gu 1997). One of the main implications of marketization is 
that there has been an escalation in the number of laid off (xiagang) workers 
from the state-owned sector. According to official figures there were 26 million 
workers laid off between 1998 and 2002 (Armitage 2003). This is a major social 
problem, and it is being exacerbated by the process of globalization as China's 
SOEs are faced with increased levels of competition following its accession to 
theWTO. 
The problem is that China's embryonic social security system does not have 
the capability to cope with further redundancies, particularly in the worst 
affected areas in the 'iron rust belt' of China's industrial north-east.32 In the 
interviews we conducted, the senior officials in the Work Injury Insurance 
Division of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security admitted when pressed 
that closing down firms was not really an option given the need for political and 
social stability.33 Hence, the political realities of the reform process mean that in 
the end the government takes responsibility for the injured workers in firms that 
have not joined the scheme. 
Within this process there is a very limited role for private insurers. The 
regulations encourage enterprises to take out supplemental private insurance in 
addition to the state-sponsored scheme. This was not clear in the Interim 
Regulations issued in 1996, but is made clearer in the Revised Regulations. Thus 
it is envisaged that supplemental private insurance should top up compensation 
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under the state scheme. In better performing enterprises which can afford it, 
particularly foreign-owned firms and joint sino-foreign ventures, motivation for 
taking out supplemental private health insurance might be to create a better work 
environment to attract potential employees. However, in the interviews with the 
Work Injury Insurance Division we were told that 'very few' enterprises take out 
supplemental private insurance.34 
11.7 OHS and work accident imurance in a multinational enterprise 
11.7.1 Background to the case study 
In order to examine how the OHS laws and workplace accident insurance 
scheme worked in practice, we conducted an in-depth case study in a subsidiary 
of a multinational electronics enterprise. The firm where we conducted the case 
study is located in the Beijing Tianzhu Airport Industrial Zone (hereafter 'the 
industrial zone') near Beijing Capital Airport. In July 2002 we conducted 
interviews with both representatives of the industrial zone and the human 
resources manager who is in charge of OHS issues in the enterprise.35 
The central government offers firms that set up factories in the industrial zone 
tax-free status for their first two years and then half normal tax rates for the next 
three years of operation. Up to December 2001, there were 94 enterprises in the 
industrial zone with investments totalling $US 1.22 billion. Of these, 70 per cent 
were multinational enterprises and 15 were Fortune 500 companies. Within the 
industrial zone there are five 'parks' catering for electronics, logistics, industrial 
materials, biotechnology and returned overseas Chinese startups. As of 
December 2001 there were 21 electronics companies in the industrial zone, 
including well-known multinational companies such as Ericsson, NC, Motorola 
and Panasonic. 
The firm where we conducted the case study was established in 1989 as a 
50/50 joint venture, but in 1997 it became a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary. It 
produces predominantly for the domestic market in China, with annual sales of 
over 30 million RMB. In 1989 the firm initially had 20 employees, but by the 
time it became wholly foreign-owned this number had doubled and at the time 
of the interviews it had 130 employees. The male/female staff ratio in the 
enterprise is about one to one. The wage structure in the enterprise consists of a 
base amount and bonuses. The base wage at each level is transparent, but the 
bonuses are confidential. 
11.7.2 Insurance and safety issues in the industrial Zone 
As discussed earlier, the national regulations on workplace accident insurance 
do not make it compulsory for enterprises to join the scheme. However, under 
the legislation establishing the industrial zone, all enterprises in the zone must 
join the state-sponsored workplace accident insurance scheme as a condition of 
setting up there. The industrial zone has an enterprise service department which 
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is responsible for the implementation of safety laws in the zone. The enterprise 
service department performs a dual role with respect to safety. First, it is 
responsible for monitoring and enforcement. It carries out safety inspections on 
each enterprise in the industrial zone every quarter. There is also a joint 
inspection of the enterprise service department and State Administration of 
Work Safety, which occurs once a year during safety month. As part of its 
monitoring and enforcement role the enterprise service department also operates 
a hotline service where workers can phone in and voice safety concerns or report 
accidents in their workplace. Second, the enterprise service department performs 
an educational function. It runs regular seminars covering the nature and 
implementation of the safety laws. Attendance at the seminars is compulsory for 
the CEOs and other senior managers of enterprises in the zone. 
11.7.3 Insurance and safety issues in the electronics firm 
The enterprise participates in the state-sponsored workplace accident insurance 
scheme, but does not have supplementary private insurance. Before the 
government introduced the state insurance scheme, the enterprise had private 
insurance coverage, but it gave this up when it joined the state scheme. The firm 
provides safety orientation for all new recruits which outlines the firm's policy 
on safety and provides relevant training. During the interviews we focused on 
three questions: how are the laws implemented in practice? Do foreign firms 
bring a different culture on safety? Do OHS standards differ between ownership 
forms? 
11.7.4 How are the laws implemented in practice? 
The inspection process at the enterprise consists of three stages: self-inspections, 
quarterly inspections by the industrial zone, and annual inspections required by 
the central government. In the local council area in which the industrial zone is 
located, all safety inspections are carried out by a safety work committee, which 
is a lower tier of the State Administration of Work Safety. All employees of the 
enterprise are required to have an annual medical check-up, which is enforced 
by the Ministry of Health. The three kinds of annual workplace inspections -
health, labour and safety - required by the central government are performed at 
the same time each year. If the inspections find a problem the firm is issued with 
a directive (colloquially referred to as a 'red-head document') to fix it within a 
specified time, which is usually a week. If the firm fails the inspections it can be 
given a financial penalty or, in the case of blatant abuses, closed down. 
11. 7.5 Do foreign firms bring a different culture on safety? 
When the joint venture was first established, all managers in the new JOtnt 
venture did a training course in the multinational enterprise's home country. 
While the training course covered safety issues, it focused only on the technical 
aspects of safety. The parent company has not made a conscious attempt to 
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implement safety standards from the home country in its Beijing subsidiary. 
However, management from the parent company has made recommendations 
from time to time on where safety could be improved. These have included 
suggestions such as the need for stronger lights for soldering and more visible 
safety notices. These recommendations have been implemented. Interestingly, 
all safety notices in the factory are in both Chinese and English. The safety 
notices in English are purely for the benefit of management from the parent 
company when they visit the plant. Other foreign companies have also had an 
influence on the firm in terms of safety issues. For example, the case enterprise 
also manufactures products for General Electric, which puts emphasis on work 
safety and the prevention of industrial accidents. The firm must maintain a good 
safety record in order to receive further contracts from General Electric. 
11.7.6 Do OHS standards differ between ownership forms? 
The human resources manager at the enterprise had worked for the firm when it 
was a joint venture, before it became a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary. He 
also had experience working in SOEs. In the interview we asked him whether 
the switch from joint venture to wholly foreign-owned subsidiary had had any 
effect on addressing safety issues in the firm. He was of the view that since the 
firm had become wholly foreign-owned there was less freedom to address OHS 
issues. In a joint venture or an SOE, it is much easier to get the funding to fix 
problems specified in a 'red-head document' issued by a government 
department, as Chinese managers seldom question or challenge the 
government's directives. However, once the firm became wholly foreign-owned 
he needed to provide more justification than a directive from a government 
department such as a local State Administration of Work Safety Bureau as to 
why changes to the working environment were needed. This is mainly for two 
reasons. First, a foreign company will generally not blindly follow the 
instruction given by a government department if it is not sufficiently explained. 
Second, in a foreign-owned company every dollar used has to be justified, rather 
than just spending money to satisfy the government's requirements. 
11.8 Conclusion 
In the first part of the chapter we argued that marketization and globalization 
have a dual effect on OHS. On the one hand, providing an effective social 
protection mechanism is a precondition for further marketization and opening up 
to the outside world. On the other hand, providing the institutional mechanisms 
to protect workers' occupational health and safety is an integral part of 
protecting workers from the negative aspects of globalization. In the second part 
of the chapter we examined how the Chinese government has managed this 
tension in the OHS area. 
We have argued that the Chinese government recognizes the importance of 
providing an effective social protection mechanism as an essential part of 
building competitive enterprises. This is reflected in the shift from the mini-
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welfare state to the establishment of an institutional welfare state based on 
welfare pluralism where the individual, enterprise, state and society share the 
costs of providing the social safety net (Leung 1994, Gu 2001a). The opening 
up of markets to global competition has had an important role in necessitating 
the shift to an institutional welfare state. Since its recent accession to the WTO, 
China has been trying to 'get on track with the international community' (gen 
guoji jiegui), which indicates China's preparedness to have its economy and 
society further subjected to the discipline of global markets. 
The real issue is whether the social protection mechanism which China has in 
place is able to protect workers from the vicissitudes of global competition. As 
one scholar from the Guangdong Academy of Social Science has noted, Chinese 
enterprises should not only get on track with international economic practices 
which have been made a priority, but also with the protection of workers' 
interests and rights.36 On this score, while the institutional and legal framework 
for protecting OHS standards exists, monitoring and enforcement is proving 
difficult. The process of globalization has contributed to making it hard to 
monitor and enforce OHS laws through creating an informal sector in the 
wealthier coastal cities where migrants from rural areas are willing to work in 
sub-standard conditions because the returns are greater than in their communities 
of origin. Under these circumstances there is an obvious role for trade unions to 
protect workers' rights and for employer groups to take the lead in promoting 
OHS standards as an important aspect of quality management, rather than as a 
barrier to trade. The problem, however, is that employers' groups do not have 
an effective voice in China and were not even involved in drafting the OHS 
laws, while the value of the ACFTU is hampered through lack of membership. 
Trade union membership is concentrated in large firms, while in most small 
private firms, where workers are particularly vulnerable to poor OHS standards, 
there is no trade union involvement. 
This has more general implications for the success of the institutional welfare 
state. As globalization has increased competition in China, employers have been 
forced to contain their costs through reducing the protection offered to 
employees. The result is the potential for 'demoralization on the shop-floor' as 
workers are squeezed between the demise of the iron rice bowl system and the 
state's failure to provide a new social safety net (Lee 1999: 66). This has led to 
mass demonstrations, in particular in the Southwest and Northeast of China 
(Morris et al. 2001: 705-706). Since the economic reforms started in the late 
1970s, the Chinese government has largely dropped the Mao-era rhetoric of the 
virtues of the working class and their right to lead industry and state. However, 
in protesting the demise of the iron rice bowl, the workers themselves continue 
to use the old formulations about being the leading class, which is proving 
uncomfortable for the Chinese state (Morris et al. 2001: 709). Given this, 
Frenkel and Kuruvilla (2002: 390) argue that the government needs to take pre-
emptive action to effectively protect employees' rights so as 'to limit potential 
political instability and maintain working-class support'. Providing effective 
protection from the volatility of global markets would seem to be a precondition 
for such continuing working-class support. 
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As has always been the case with market economies, the provision of 
effective OHS services invariably comes at a cost to employers, employees and 
the state; and trade-offs must be made. In making these decisions, vested 
interests will invariably influence what the respective stakeholders deem to be 
acceptable economic and health costs. A common response by those who would 
place the emphasis on the economic dimension is to insist that of course 
workers' health is important, but that this issue cannot be accorded a high 
priority until the society has reached a very high stage of development. This is a 
claim that is commonly advanced by China's non-state employers and by many 
officials, often with the rider that OHS only became an issue in the nations of 
the developed world once these nations had developed. This is a response that is 
morally and historically incorrect, for in the West workers' organizations and in 
many cases the state were able to become effective agents of OHS at a much 
earlier stage of development than currently characterizes much of China. 
Globalization has radically accelerated the extent to which China has been able 
to reap the gains from the marketization process that has been ongoing since the 
late 1970s. If the marketization process is to be extended and the benefits of this 
windfall fully realized, then globalization needs to be secured. One important 
way in which this can be achieved in China is by ensuring that workers perceive 
that they are benefiting from the process not only economically but also in terms 
of their health and security. 
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12 China's entry to the WTO 
Effects of reducing tariff and non-tariff 
barriers and endogenous productivity growth 
YinhuaMai 
12.1 Introduction 
The effects of China's entry to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have been 
vigorously studied in recent years. A rich body of literature estimating the 
effects of China's accession commitments in tariff reductions using CGE models 
has emerged (for examples see Zhai and Li 2000, Li and Lejour 2001, Lejour 
2001, Fan and Zheng 2001, Ianchovichina and Martin 2001, Li et al. 2001, 
Frarn;ois and Spinanger 2002, Mayes and Wang 2002, and Mai et al. 1998). In 
these analyses, the estimated benefits from reductions in tariff and non-tariff 
barriers are generally low. For example, the tariff reductions are estimated to 
elevate China's real GDP by only 0.8 per cent in Li and Lejour (2001), 0.08-
1.66 per cent in Lejour (2001), 0.06-0.62 per cent in Fan and Zheng (2001), 2.2 
per cent in Ianchovichina and Martin (2001), and about 1 per cent (in real Gross 
National Expenditure) in Mai et al. (1998). The absence of endogenous 
productivity growth has been listed in the literature as one possible reason for 
the generally low estimates (lanchovichina and Martin 2001, and Mai et al. 
1998). However, not much work on the effects of trade liberalization under an 
assumption of endogenous productivity growth has yet been published. This 
study is therefore devoted to comparing the effects of China's WTO tariff 
commitments with and without the assumption of endogenous productivity 
growth. The study shows that the percentage increase in real GDP due to the 
tariff reductions could be doubled when endogenous productivity growth is 
assumed. Furthermore, this study shows that the impact of the tariff reductions 
on employment in different regions in China can be quite different with and 
without the assumption of endogenous productivity growth. 
Endogenous productivity growth occurs when local producers survive import 
competition by seeking input-saving technologies and production practices. A 
liberalizing industry has a good chance to experience endogenous productivity 
growth when it has existing economies of scale (especially in exporting) and 
when it resides in a country that lies far from technology frontiers. The latter 
factor enables it to import advanced technologies that are readily available in the 
rest of the world. 
In this chapter the effects of China's commitments in reducing tariffs and 
tariff equivalents of non-tariff barriers are analysed using a Computable General 
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Equilibrium (CGE) model of China. In Section 12.2 I introduce the analytical 
framework, the PRCGEM model, and changes to the model made for this 
analysis. In Section 12.3 I present estimates of the effects of reducing tariff and 
non-tariff barriers with and without endogenous productivity growth. In Section 
12.4 - 12.6 I present the macroeconomic, industry and regional effects on 
different regions for China. Section 12.7 contains concluding comments. 
12.2 The modelling framework 
The analytical framework used in this analysis is an enhanced version of 
PRCGEM, a comparative static CGE model of China (see Zheng and Fan 1999 
for details about PRCGEM). The core CGE structure of PRCGEM resembles 
that of the ORANI model (see Dixon et al, 1982 and Horridge 2001). The effects 
of policy changes on different regions in China can be simulated with a top-
down regional extension. 
In this analysis, PRCGEM is adapted to run in a recursive dynamic fashion. A 
system of equations and variables that captures shifts in technology and 
consumer tastes was added so as to develop a baseline of practical use (see 
Dixon and Rimmer 2002 for how to develop such a baseline). The effects of any 
policy changes are represented as deviations from the baseline. 
In the baseline simulation, historical data and forecasts for macroeconomic 
indicators published by specialist forecasting agencies including the World 
Bank, Economist Intelligence Unit, China Bureau of Statistics, and Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences are incorporated into the model. These indicators 
include growth in real GDP, consumption, investment, employment, exports and 
imports at the macroeconomic level, and output for aggregated sectors at the 
industry level (Table 12.1). The trend of changes in technology and consumer 
tastes estimated from historical Chinese data is also incorporated into the 
baseline. 
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The policy scenarios are simulated under long-run assumptions for factor 
markets. Labour is mobile between industries, but economy-wide labour supply 
is constrained by long-run population growth. Capital, on the other hand, is 
mobile between countries and industries within a country. Capital flows into and 
out of China in response to its rate of return on capital. Within China, capital 
flows into the industries that have higher rates of return. 
To capture endogenously the effects of the trade-liberalization induced 
productivity improvements, extra data and equations are added into PRCGEM. 
The calculation is based on the Productivity Commission' s time series estimates 
(Chand et al. 1998), taking into account the distance of a country from the 
technology frontier represented by the United States, and a country's revealed 
comparative advantage in a certain product (see Mai 2003 for more details). 
Figure 12.1 shows the endogenous productivity growth induced by the 
reductions in tariffs (and tariff equivalents of non-tariff barriers) simulated in 
this study for the clothing and motor vehicles industries respectively. Although 
the Mmtor vehicles industry has a larger reduction in border protections, the 
induced productivity growth is much smaller for the Motor Vehicles industry 
than for the clothing industry. This is because China is a well established 
exporter in clothing. On the other hand, the motor vehicle industry in China 
serves mainly the domestic markets. 
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12.3 Effects of tariff reductions and endogenous productivity 
China's WTO commitments of reductions to tariffs and the tariff equivalents of 
non-tariff barriers are well summarized in Mayes and Wang (2002) and are 
simulated in this study for agricultural and manufactured products (see 
Appendix A, Table A.1, p. 208). I assume the reductions in tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers to be implemented over the five years 2002 to 2006. 
The tariff reductions are simulated under two scenarios: 
Scenario 1: tariff reductions with endogenous productivity growth; and 
Scenario 2: tariff reductions without endogenous productivity growth. 
The results for the two simulations are presented in Tables 12.2 to 12.5. 
12.4 Macroeconomic effects 
Table 12.2 shows that, as a result of the tariff reductions, China's real GDP is 
likely to be 2 per cent higher than the baseline by 2006, taking into account the 
endogenous productivity growth induced by the tariff reductions. Without the 
endogenous productivity growth, China's real GDP is likely to be 1 per cent 
higher than the baseline by 2006 (Table 12.2). China's gain in real GDP from 
the tariff reductions is much higher with the endogenous productivity growth 
than without it. 
The tariff reductions lead to lower import prices. As investment goods are 
import-intensive, the prices of capital creation fall, leading to a higher rate of 
return on capital in China. The resulting increases in investment and capital lead 
to a higher real GDP under both scenarios. 
Table 12.2 Macro effects of reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers; percentage deviation from 
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Furthermore, under Scenario 1, the gain in real GDP also has endogenous 
productivity growth as a contributing factor (Table A.1 in Appendix A shows 
the endogenous productivity growth induced by the tariff reductions simulated). 
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Under the circumstance of Scenario 1, primary factors are used more efficiently 
compared with the case of Scenario 2. China therefore gains more from the tariff 
reductions under Scenario 1, where removing protection prompts firms to 
improve their productivity. 
The higher level of real GDP allowed Chinese consumers to enjoy a higher 
level of consumption. As a result of the higher levels of consumption and 
investment, China is importing at a higher level compared with the baseline 
(Tables 12.2 and 12.4). Another factor behind the higher imports is a 
substitution away from domestically produced goods and towards imports as 
post-duty import prices fall following the tariff reductions. 
Table 12.2 shows that exports increase following the tariff reductions. This is 
due to a real depreciation. China's real exchange rate, defined as the ratio of CIF 
import price index (the pre-duty price) over the GDP price index, depreciates 
following the tariff reductions. This is because the tariff reductions lead to lower 
post-duty prices of imports that, in tum, lead to lower production costs and 
therefore a lower GDP price index. 
12.5 Industry results 
The effects of tariff reductions on individual industries are governed by a 
number of factors. The lower (post-duty) import prices following the tariff 
reductions lead to substitution away from domestically produced goods and 
towards imports. Industries that serve primarily domestic markets therefore 
suffer. On the other hand, the real depreciation benefits industries that supply to 
export markets. Furthermore, the endogenous productivity growth induced by 
tariff reductions helps industries that achieve those productivity improvements 
to become more competitive in both domestic and export markets. 
Clothing is a typical industry that serves both export and domestic markets. It 
is, however, more export oriented compared with heavy manufacturing 
industries such as the motor vehicle industry. It has therefore gained 
significantly from real depreciation. Furthermore, because of the large tariff 
reductions on clothing and its existing economies of scale in exporting, the 
clothing industry is also a good candidate for achieving endogenous productivity 
improvements when faced with import competition. Its gains from the real 
depreciation and productivity improvements therefore offset its loss in domestic 
markets. Tables 12.3 and 12.4 show that the output and exports of the clothing 
industry rise significantly above the baseline as a result of the tariff reductions. 
The gains to the clothing industry in terms of output and exports are much 
higher when endogenous productivity growth is taken into account (Tables 12.3 
and 12.4). 
The motor vehicle industry, on the other hand, was almost entirely oriented 
towards domestic markets before China's accession to the WTO. Its loss in 
domestic markets is therefore great and is not offset by any gains in exports. 
While there are large reductions in tariffs on motor vehicles and parts, its lack of 
economies of scale in exporting prohibits the motor vehicle industry from 
achieving large productivity gains induced by the tariff reductions (see Table 
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A.1 in Appendix A). The motor vehicle industry therefore stands out as the loser 
from the tariff reductions in terms of output and exports (Tables 12.3 and 12.4 ). 
Table 12.3 Effects of reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers: sectoral output; percentage 
deviation from baseline by 2006 
With endogenous Without endogenous 
productivity improvement productivity improvement 
Agriculture 0.38 -0.44 
Mining 0.92 0.65 
Manufacturing 2.25 0.92 
Cotton textile 7.19 2.23 
Clothing 13.38 5.49 
Bricks and tiles 2.07 1.49 
Iron and steel 0.73 0.44 
Machinery NEC 1.02 0.70 
Motor vehicles and parts -9.68 -9.94 
Electronic appliances 6.00 4.38 
Construction 2.32 1.97 
Services 2.28 1.24 
Source: Policy simulations. 
Table 12.4 Effects of reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers: exports and imports by 
commodity; percentage deviation from baseline by 2006 
Exports Imports 
With Without With Without 
endogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous 
productivity productivity productivity productivity 
im2_rovement im2_rovement ime.rovement ime.rovement 
Agriculture -5.03 -2.33 23.86 18.49 
Mining -0.20 1.50 3.35 1.93 
Manufacturing 9.67 6.61 11.45 9.90 
Cotton textile 12.57 6.80 17.89 14.86 
Clothing 18.44 8.15 15.36 16.31 
Bricks and tiles 3.14 3.50 5.35 3.93 
Iron and steel 2.54 3.05 7.41 6.26 
Machinery NEC 3.34 3.75 11.75 10.45 
Motor vehicles and -0.73 -0.20 36.68 35.23 
parts 
Electronic appliances 13.26 11.99 19.36 17.73 
Source: Policy simulations. 
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12.6 Regional effects 
The PRCGEM model has a top-down regional extension that allows the 
calculation of the effects of any policy changes on different regions in China 
according to their shares in the national output for different industries. The 
effects of the reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers on different regions in 
China are presented in Table 12.5. 
Table 12.5 Effects of reducing tariff and non-tariffbaniers: gross output by region; 
percentage deviation from baseline by 2006 
With endogenous productivity Without endogenous 
improvement productivity improvement 
Output Employment Output Employment 
Liaoning 1.56 -0.12 0.76 -0.06 
Jilin 0.81 -0.44 0.02 -0.56 
Heilongjiang 1.24 -0.02 0.59 -0.19 
Beijing 1.83 -0.24 0.88 0.05 
Tianjin 2.04 -0.23 0.99 0.08 
Hebei 1.79 0.12 0.85 -0.01 
Shandong 1.76 -0.01 0.81 -0.01 
Shanghai 2.12 -0.57 0.97 0.10 
Jiangsu 2.27 -0.20 1.07 0.19 
Zhejiang 2.51 -0.12 1.22 0.31 
Guangdong 2.28 -0.02 1.19 0.21 
Fujian 1.99 -0.04 0.97 0.04 
Hainan 1.46 0.29 0.68 -0.08 
Shanxi 1.87 0.53 0.99 0.20 
Shaanxi 1.70 0.14 0.81 -0.01 
Henao 1.71 0.26 0.79 -0.03 
Anhui 1.68 0.17 0.75 -0.04 
Jiangxi 1.50 0.11 0.58 -0.17 
Hubei 1.44 -0.18 0.48 -0.26 
Hunan 1.50 0.17 0.62 -0.14 
Guangxi 1.38 0.06 0.50 -0.24 
Sichuan 1.48 0.14 0.63 -0.12 
Guizhou 1.30 0.22 0.45 -0.24 
Source: Policy simulations. 
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While all regions registered pos1t1ve output deviations from the baseline 
following the tariff reductions, some regions' gains are above the national 
average and some below. The regions that have above national-average 
increases in regional output are Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Guangdong, and Fujian (Table 12.5). These regions accommodate export-
oriented light manufactures that, as discussed above, benefited substantially 
from tariff reductions. In particular, Guangdong, which hosts the lion's share of 
the export clothing industry, registered the highest output deviation from the 
baseline, especially when the trade liberalization-related productivity growth is 
taken into account (Table 12.5). 
The effects of endogenous productivity growth on regional employment have 
the most significant policy implications. When a region achieves a higher level 
of output following tariff reduction, we would expect it to also generate more 
employment. This is indeed the case without the endogenous productivity 
growth. The fourth column of Table 12.5 shows a pattern of labour force being 
drawn from relatively more agriculture-intensive regions to where the export-
oriented industries are located, primarily the six regions that registered above 
national-average output gains. However, when the trade liberalization-induced 
endogenous productivity growth is taken into account, those six regions show 
negative employment deviation from the baseline (the second column of Table 
12.5). This is mainly because that improved productivity means firms in these 
regions employ fewer primary factor inputs (including labour) per unit of output. 
12. 7 Concluding comments 
This study suggests that China's tariff reductions for its WTO entry will lead to 
a much larger increase in real GDP if firms seek to improve their productivity 
when confronted with import competition. However, the regions that achieve 
larger (than national average) increases in output may not generate more 
employment as firms in these regions seek to use inputs (including labour) more 
efficiently. 
While the gains from tariff reductions could be doubled by the presence of 
endogenous productivity growth, the estimated benefit is still only about 2 
percentage points increase in GDP. Furthermore, the magnitude of the gains 
from the tariff reductions is likely to be much smaller than that presented in this 
study if various duty exemptions are taken into account. 
The author believes that the real gain from China's WTO accession does not 
come from reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Tariff reductions 
represent only a small part of the policy reform in the context of China's 
accession to the WTO. The most important reform for the WTO accession is 
investment liberalization in the heavy manufacturing and key services industries 
(that is, the opening up of the industries currently dominated by state-owned 
enterprises to domestic as well as foreign private investment) (Mai 2001). The 
gains from the investment liberalization are much more dramatic (Mai et al. 
2003). Compared with the benefits of investment liberalisation, the gains from 
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tariff reductions are almost negligible. While tariff reductions deliver negative 
impacts on the motor vehicle industry, investment liberalization does the 
opposite. Investment liberalization in the context of China's WTO accession will 
deliver significant benefits to the heavy manufacturing industries, including the 
motor vehicle industry (Mai et al. 2003). 
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Appendix A 
Table A. I Reductions in tariffs and tariff equivalents of non-tariff barriers and endogenous 
productivity improvements; percentage change between 2002 and 2006 
Reductions in tariffs and Endogenous productivity 
tariff equivalents improvements 
Grains -6.81 n.a. 
Other crops -8.26 n.a. 
Forestry -10.02 n.a. 
Livestock -6.57 n.a. 
Other agriculture -8.26 n.a. 
Fishing -9.19 n.a. 
Crude oil -2.08 n.a. 
Natural gas -0.95 n.a. 
Logging -6.33 n.a. 
Grain (milled) -9.84 5.54 
Meat processing -7.04 3.03 
Egg and dairy products -7.04 0.13 
Fish processing -9.47 3.30 
Sugar refining -4.95 0.60 
Other food products -5.52 1.90 
Wines -20.23 4.23 
Other beverages -11.94 2.40 
Tobacco -11.94 2.40 
Cotton textile -8.12 8.03 
Wool textile -9.93 9.82 
Hemp textile -2.92 2.88 
Silk textile -8.36 8.26 
Knitting mills -11.12 11.00 
Other textile manufacturing -10.85 10.73 
Clothing -8.77 14.69 
Leather products -2.67 6.64 
Sawmill products -7.42 2.73 
Furniture -9.79 3.63 
continued 
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Table A. I Reductions in tariffs and tariff equivalents of non-tariff barriers and endogenous 
productivity improvements; percentage change between 2002 and 2006 
(Continued) 
Reductions in tariffs and Endogenous productivity 
tariff equivalents improvements 
Paper products -8.91 1.03 
Printing and publishing -2.08 0.23 
Sports equipment -7.79 10.96 
Petroleum refining -1.34 0.16 
Coking -1.49 0.18 
LNG -1.49 0.18 
Basic chemical products -2.57 0.64 
Pesticide -1.69 0.42 
Organic chemical products -3.79 0.95 
Household chemical -8.73 2.23 
products 
Synthetic chemical -4.13 1.04 
products 
Other chemical products -4.13 1.04 
Pharmaceuticals -6.10 1.54 
Chemical fibre -12.75 3.31 
Rubber products for -2.43 0.60 
industry use 
Rubber products for -2.43 0.60 
household use 
Plastic products for -6.19 1.57 
industry use 
Plastic products for -6.19 1.57 
household use 
Cement -0.35 0.17 
Cement products -1.59 0.76 
Bricks and tiles -2.52 1.21 
Glass products -2.82 1.35 
Ceramic products -11.57 5.70 
Fireproof products -3.55 1.71 
Other non-metallic mineral -3.79 1.83 
products 
continued 
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Table A. I Reductions in tariffs and tariff equivalents of non-tariff barriers and endogenous 
productivity improvements; percentage change between 2002 and 2006 
(Continued) 
Reductions in tariffs and Endogenous productivity 
tariff equivalents improvements 
Iron and steel -4.27 1.15 
Non-ferrous metal products -1.19 0.16 
Metal products for industry -3.16 1.78 
use 
Metal products for -3.16 1.78 
household use 
Boilers -6.48 2.01 
Metal work machinery -1.84 0.56 
Special machinery -6.57 2.04 
Agricultural machinery -5.38 1.66 
Household machinery -6.57 2.04 
Other special equipment -1.54 0.47 
Other machinery -6.57 2.04 
Railway equipment -9.01 1.89 
Motor vehicles and parts -21.27 0.66 
Ships and boats -8.12 1.70 
Aircraft -9.52 2.00 
Other transport equipment -11.35 2.40 
Generators -5.33 1.65 
Household electrical -7.70 3.24 
equipment 
Other electrical machinery -6.05 1.87 
Computers -11.39 4.85 
Electronic appliances -10.07 4.26 
Other electronic equipment -6.29 1.95 
Meters -3.55 1.09 
Other industry machinery -5.95 8.40 
Other household machinery -5.95 8.40 
Source: Policy simulations. Column one is the author's calculation based on Table 4 in Mayes and 
Wang (2002). 
13 Raw entrepreneurship and the rise of 
the new private sector in western 
China 
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13.1 Theoretical framework 
The work of Joseph Schumpeter on entrepreneurship has been severely 
neglected in recent decades. It is almost as if his prediction that the 
entrepreneurial function would become routine (and therefore no longer 
'entrepreneurial' as he originally conceived of it) also became his own death 
wish in academic discourse. In fact, Schumpeter's predictions about the 'death' 
of entrepreneurship were not just premature but indeed based on a false 
conceptualization of the dynamics of late industrial and post industrial society. 
Despite the emergence of routine funding for R & D, advanced industrial 
societies today have not provided a routine solution for the problem of how this 
R & D can be commercialized and serve the function of increasing productivity, 
which Schumpeter insisted was the key role of the entrepreneur and the essential 
ingredient of exponential growth as distinct from arithmetic growth. Exponential 
or dynamic growth requires innovative combinations of the factors of 
production, in contrast to arithmetic growth that arises from simply increasing 
the volume of inputs into production. 
Schumpeter also had no idea how the Soviet planning model was going to 
influence development strategies in India and China after WWII. That pervasive 
planning model came to dominate development in the two largest and most 
populous economies in the world for the first thirty to forty years of the 
postcolonial era between 1950 and 1980/1990. During this period, the state itself 
emerged as the chief entrepreneur. Beyond building the basic infrastructure 
needed by undeveloped economies, this model proved to be insufficiently 
dynamic to take the large peasant economies of the world to the next stage of 
development. By the late 1970s China began to abandon the hallmarks of state 
planning for a new policy that stressed market mechanisms, trade liberalization 
and the rise of the private sector. India followed with similar policies about a 
decade later. As a result, during the last ten to twenty years, the private 
entrepreneur in China and India has re-emerged as the key catalyst for economic 
change and development. Schumpeter's predictions about the growing 
irrelevance of the traditional entrepreneur have proven to be spectacularly 
wrong. His predictions of the tendency of the capitalist order to 'destroy itself 
and the 'likely heir apparent' being a socialist economic order are also very 
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wrong today, although when he wrote his paper 'The March into Socialism' in 
1950 it did look as if socialism in both the Keynesian and Leninist sense was the 
dominant global tendency (Schumpeter 1950: 448). 
Today, Schumpeter's conceptualization of the entrepreneur and the 
entrepreneurial function in development has never been more relevant. First, 
Schumpeter distinguished between 'static' and 'dynamic' growth. The former 
was cyclical and depended on the rise and fall of business cycles as economic 
systems tended towards equilibrium. In contrast to this, 'dynamic' growth was 
'spontaneous and discontinuous ... a disturbance of equilibrium, which forever 
alters and displaces the equilibrium state previously existing' (Schurnpeter 2002: 
64). Moreover static or cyclical growth depended on consumer tastes, in 
contrast to dynamic and discontinuous growth that was generated by 
fundamental changes in industrial and commercial production. For Schumpeter, 
it was the producer who created new consumer demands by changing the 
production system that could generate more commodities on an ever-expanding 
scale of inventiveness and efficiency. In seeing the relationship between the 
consumer and producer in this way, Schumpeter rightly predicted the rise of a 
whole new industry now known as 'marketing': 
. . . the producer . . . as a result initiates economic change, and 
consumers are educated by him [sic] if necessary; they are, as it were, 
taught to want new things, or things which differ in some respect or 
other from those which they have been in the habit of using. 
(Schumpeter 2002: 65) 
Schumpeter's definition of discontinuous change rested on the argument that 
dynamic development required new combinations of the factors of production 
and that such new combinations had to be more than minor, gradual adjustments 
to the production process. He insisted that development demanded the 
emergence of a 'new phenomenon' or combination of production processes that 
were innovative in terms of at least one of the following five areas: a new 
product or quality, an innovative production or marketing process, the 
development of new markets, the harnessing of new supplies and production 
inputs, an innovative organization of management (Schumpeter 2002: 66). In 
stressing the innovativeness of these five key areas, Schumpeter also stressed 
that merely bringing additional resources into employment in order to increase 
output was not going to lead to dynamic growth of the discontinuous kind. 
Schumpeter used the metaphor of the body to clarify his meaning: ordinary, 
cyclical growth was like blood flowing in the normal channels of the body, 
while discontinuous, innovative growth required the channels of production to 
change into new directions. In an economic system, these new channels were 
inevitably new firms. 
In Schumpeter's view, the factors that enable dynamic growth to occur were 
credit and entrepreneurs who act as the agents of change - they are the 
individuals who understand the benefits of discontinuous, dynamic growth and 
are willing to bring together the factors of production in new and unconventional 
ways. The entrepreneur has a distinctive, innovative role to play in the 
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production process - namely to bring together new combinations of the inputs 
into production in order to raise productivity. As such the entrepreneur is 
different from a financier, manager, capitalist, factory owner, shareholder, 
creditor, risk bearer, promoter, or banker. All these other functions are 
distinctive from 'entrepreneurship' (Schumpeter 2002: 72-78). Moreover, the 
entrepreneur is not always entrepreneurial. He/she is only entrepreneurial at that 
point in time when he/she 'carries out new combinations' (Schumpeter 2002: 
78). The moment the entrepreneur reverts to routine management or other tasks, 
he/she ceases to be an entrepreneur. The entrepreneur, according to Schumpeter, 
does not therefore exist as a social formation; rather he/she is the embodiment of 
the 'entrepreneurial function' when that function is activated and not at any 
other time (Schumpeter 2002: 78). 
The final ingredient in Schumpeter' s definition of entrepreneurship was the 
psychology of the entrepreneur - how the entrepreneur overcame internal 
resistance within him/herself to innovation and the natural tendency to 
conformity, how the entrepreneur dealt with the resistance of society to the 
inconvenience and challenge of doing things differently and deviating from the 
norm, and how the entrepreneurial function attracted persons with leadership 
qualities although entrepreneurship was a unique kind of leadership that had 
'none of that glamour which characterizes other kinds of leadership' 
(Schumpeter 2002: 89). The lack of glamour was accompanied by the lack of 
those rewards that would appeal to hedonists (Schumpeter 2002: 92). The 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur was a remarkable creature: a social deviant driven 
by the need not merely to express his/her ego and ambitions, but to do so in a 
manner that radicalized the mundane production process and threw out the 
challenge to similar, dormant entrepreneurs to 'delight in change and new 
ventures' (Schumpeter 2002: 94). In summary, the Schumpeterian entrepreneur 
is a business leader who is willing to be a social-economic deviant for the short 
period of time required to introduce innovative, discontinuous changes in the 
production cycle in order to increase productivity and therefore generate 
dynamic growth as distinct from gradual, cyclical, static and incremental 
growth. Moreover, it is the entrepreneurial function within that 'entrepreneur' 
that is the primary consideration rather than that person's other economic 
functions that might range from management to financing and risk taking. 
Despite its many positive attributes, the big weakness in the Schumpeterian 
conceptualization of innovative, exponential growth was his assumption that this 
would be funded by bank credit or, in Higgins's terminology, 'monetary 
expansion rather than ... current (ex ante) savings' (Higgins 1968: 135). What 
he did not foresee was the underdeveloped nature of the banking systems of 
poor, peasant economies such as Russia under the Tsars, India after 
decolonization and China after Mao. In these countries, Gerschenkron's 
explanation for how and why the state played the role of the entrepreneur is 
unassailable (Gerschenkron 1966). However, as the state withdrew from that 
historic role, the banks of India and China remained inadequate to the historical 
mission that was required of them, with the result that entrepreneurial families 
resorted to their own internal funding for development. Nor have the stock 
exchanges of Asia's large peasant production systems filled the void. As we will 
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see, new firms in China today typically fund their original growth from their 
own internal savings. 'Internal' means personal savings and the savings of 
siblings, parents, members of the extended family, the clan and, where relevant, 
the caste. 
Schumpeter's great strength, on the other hand, was the way he envisaged the 
cumulative impact of entrepreneurship. Clearly a single business leader acting 
on his or her own as an entrepreneur was a necessary but insufficient condition 
for pulling up the whole economic system onto a more dynamic, discontinuous 
platform. The first leader, in other words, had to attract other business leaders 
in taking up the entrepreneurial function. That process could start in a modest 
way with a single innovative factory, but that example had to motivate others to 
respond to the challenge of innovation. For Schumpeter, entrepreneurship could 
become more generalized by the demonstration effect of 'high monopoly profits' 
for early entrants into the new market together with the prerequisite that 
innovation begins in periods of economic stability when the risk of undertaking 
new ventures is minimal (Higgins 1968: 135). As noted, for Schumpeter the 
prime mover in the innovative production processes is the entrepreneur 
him/herself rather than the desires of the consumer market, which remain 
circumscribed until the business leader points the way to new, unexpected 
consumer goods. It is the generalized nature of business leadership and 
entrepreneurship that then stimulates the movement of the whole economy up 
onto a new platform of innovative and accelerated economic development -
what Higgins describes as a 'swarming' or 'clustering' of entrepreneurial 
activity. According to Higgins, Schumpeter provides the best theoretical 
explanation of how 'upswings begin in business cycles' (Higgins 1968: 135). 
In this chapter, we use Schumpeter's theoretical framework because it 
provides the best insight into how and why new private enterprises have 
emerged in China. These 'green field' companies have nothing to do with state 
encouragement or the conversion of state-owned enterprises into new, non-state, 
collective enterprises. In particular, the social and psychological characteristics 
of the entrepreneur as described by Schumpeter are especially relevant to 
understanding why the Hope Group emerged once Deng Xiaoping made it clear 
that innovative business leaders would no longer be punished for being 
entrepreneurial. 
13.2 The growth of the private sector in post-Mao China 
The growth of the private sector in western China has been constrained by more 
than the usual difficulties. To begin with, in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region of China we have an economy that continues to be strongly controlled by 
the paramilitary or bingtuan, now called the Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps (hereafter XPCC). It has been estimated that at least 14 per 
cent of Xinjiang's GDP is generated by the XPCC. However, given the gross 
efficiencies of the bingtuan, this represents an underestimate of what the same 
investment of resources in alternative avenues might achieve. The XPCC has 
been the mechanism by which the state has pursued the 'black-white' economic 
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policy of Xinjiang, a policy that seeks to promote economic development 
through cash crops like cotton and a resources sector based on coal and oil. The 
rise of the private sector in Xinjiang has also been hampered by development 
policies that pay insufficient attention to the needs of entrepreneurs from 
minority communities. Western China, more than the central and eastern 
provinces, contains numerous minorities that present the PRC with unique 
development opportunities and obstacles. These will be addressed in a new 
paper, but it is important to mention this characteristic of development in 'the 
west' partly because the Hope Group that is studied in this chapter does not 
come from a minority background and so represents the entrepreneurial 
possibilities for mainstream families. We also note that in contrast to the 
economy of the bingtuan in Xinjiang, Sichuan has actually benefited by 
interventionist state policies that saw the relocation of strategic and military 
industries to Chengdu from the more prone central and coastal provinces during 
the 1960s. 
Southwestern China has been economically backward in relation to more 
prosperous northern and coastal regions, and the growth of the private sector 
there has been constrained by more than the usual difficulties. The Hope Group 
grew up in the relatively nurturing environment of Chengdu, which was given 
many industrial and trading privileges by the state. The timing of the rise of the 
Hope Group was also propitious. Riding on the backs of quails and pigs, the 
Hope Group developed into one of China's first private multinationals. As China 
increasingly becomes integrated into the international economy we can look 
forward to hearing much more about the pigs and pig-feed that continue to 
underwrite the success of the Hope Group. Sichuan is the center of China's 
swine industry and as such competition between China (the world's largest pig 
producer) and the USA (the world's second largest producer of pigs) will focus 
on that state and involve that company. This competition will have widespread 
significance given the importance of the hog-corn production cycle to US 
domestic politics and the role of farm subsidies in the survival of America's 
farm sector. 
The most recent survey of China's private sector states that between 1996 and 
2001 the total number of private enterprises in China grew by almost half a 
million to about 1.3 million. This reflects an average annual growth rate of about 
24 per cent. In the same five-year period, total private sector capital grew to 
1406.8 billion RMB (up from 304.3 billion RMB), representing fourfold growth. 
In other words, the growth of private capital investment was even faster than the 
growth in the number of new businesses: about 36 per cent per annum. Not 
surprisingly, total turnover by private firms grew even faster - more than 50 per 
cent per annum. Moreover, and this is critical for economic development, the 
fastest growth in the number of private enterprises occurred in manufacturing, 
where value addition is typically higher than in primary industry (see Table 
13.1). 
216 Marika Vicziany and Guibin Zhang 
Table 13.1 Breakdown of private enterprises by sectors in 2002 (percentages) 
SECTORS 1989 1992 1997 1999 2001 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery 1.9 2.3 5.6 
Mining 2.9 3.0 1.5 1.1 1.3 
Manufacture 66.4 59.4 41.0 36.8 38.3 
Construction and real estate 3.7 2.9 2.3 2.8 5.9 
Transport 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.1 2.5 
Foods 20.5 26.2 42.9 42.5 21.4 
Social services 3.8 4.3 7.1 8.8 5.6 
Research and development 1.7 2.1 
Others* 1.5 1.3 2.3 4.6 9.9 
Data missing in the original figures 7.4 
Source: Calculated from China Private Enterprises Survey in China Private Economy Yearbook 
2002, Figures 1-7. 
Note 
*Including consultancy services, such as accounting, auditing and business statistics. 
Table 13. 2 Geographical distribution of private firms (2001) 
Eastern China Central China Western China 
Number of private firms 953,000 230,000 140,000 
Regional distribution of private 72.0% 17.4% 10.6% 
enterprises in China as % of total 
private firms 
Annual growth of private sector as 31.1% 11.0% 18.2% 
measured by the number of new 
firms 
% of total land area of PRC 11.2% 17.6% 71.2% 
% of total population of PRC 37.4% 33.8% 28.8% 
Sources: Calculations based on Statistics from the State Statistics Bureau, scol.com.cn, June 2, 2003, 
http://www.scol.com.cn/economics/cjxw/20030602/20036285736.htm accessed 16 August 
2003. Area and population data calculated from 'China's Provinces' http://www.china-
club.de/english/chinaguide/prov.htm accessed on August 21, 2003. 
Note 
Includes all 31 provinces and regions in Mainland China but not Hong Kong. 
Private enterprise grew throughout China, but as Table 13.2 shows, western 
China has lagged behind the eastern and central regions. In 2001, just over 10 
per cent of the private firms of the PRC were located in western China, 
compared with 17 per cent in central China and 72 per cent in eastern China. 
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How did these private-sector growth figures compare with the demographic 
distribution of China's population? Western China accommodated about 29 per 
cent of China's total people. In other words, the private sector in western China 
was grossly under-represented relative to population. Indeed with only 10 per 
cent of private firms located in the west, we can say that the private sector was 
under-represented by some 66 per cent. The private sector in eastern China by 
contrast was over-represented relative to the proportion of population: 72 per 
cent of China's private firms compared with 37 per cent of China's population. 
The private sector in western China, in other words, is far smaller and less 
dynamic than the population of the region would predict. Given that, it is not 
surprising that the GDP growth rate of western China has also been at least a 
third lower than that of eastern China. Central China's GDP growth has been 
even lower than that in western China, reflecting the intractable problems that 
define this old industrial 'rust' belt. It is important not to be na'ive about China's 
regional problems: western China is not always the worst off by all criteria. 
The growth of the private sector in China has been paralleled by the 
development of civil society. Civil institutions in western China are less 
numerous and weaker than their counterparts in the eastern coastal region. 
Recent work by Zhang Ye documents the proliferation and growing 
independence of Chinese NGOs, associations, international foundations and 
multinationals in China (Zhang 2003). For Beijing alone Zhang lists more than 
260 NGOs of various kinds, the largest group being professional associations, 
trade unions and university associations (Zhang 2003: 13). Though he provides 
no breakdown of the total number of Chinese and foreign NGOs, the greater 
economic power of the Chinese military and paramilitary alone suggests that 
these institutions are much more constrained in western China. 
The vast majority of private firms in China are the product of economic 
reforms undertaken in the state sector rather than totally new entrepreneurial 
ventures. The best explanation of this process is given in the International 
Finance Corporation Report (hereafter IFC) on the new policy adopted by 
central government in 1995. In official documents this was described as the 
zhuadafangxiao policy or 'keep the large ones and let the smaller ones go' (IFC 
2000: 14 ). This policy required reforms at two levels: rationalization of the large 
firms that remained in the hands of the state, and conversion of small-scale 
public sector firms into private firms by restructuring their ownership. The latter 
gave rise to the 'gaizhi' or new non-state firms. The process of converting from 
state to private ownership involved various mechanisms, including contracting, 
leasing, the sale of firm assets to new private owners, and the establishment of 
cooperatives and private firms in which the previous employees had shares (IFC 
2000: 14). As the IFC report argues, the process of reform was not inevitably 
based on privatization: privatization did occur, but not necessarily in all cases 
where employees shared in the assets and management of former state-owned 
enterprises. This is where foreign observers have become very confused, as it 
has typically been assumed that the end of state control and ownership must give 
rise to privatization. In the Chinese model, however, a third possibility exists: 
joint ownership of firms that are no longer state owned. This last can best be 
described as 'employee shareholding' or 'employee-held companies'. Moreover, 
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many of these 'employee shareholding companies' are not managed by the 
employees but rather by the state - in which case they are not fully within the 
private sector as understood in the market economies of the west. 
These distinctions are important because the present chapter about the Hope 
Group is a case study of a totally new private company that in the beginning had 
no connections at all to former state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. The 
Hope Group represents raw entrepreneurial talent engaged in innovative 
business developments and meets all the Schumpeterian definitions of 
entrepreneurship. In this chapter we use the notion of 'raw entrepreneurship' to 
distinguish between the new firms that form the most dynamic aspect of China's 
emerging private sector and those 'private firms' which were former state-
owned enterprises. Once the company accumulated significant capital to 
diversify production it could benefit from the state sector by purchasing 
bankrupt state enterprises and from time to time encouraging state-backed 
organizations to invest in the business. But critically, in the Hope Group, we are 
discussing raw entrepreneurship unrelated to state enterprise, state capital, state 
management or even state encouragement. 
13.3 Chengdu's industrial growth and the private sector 
As noted, the Hope Group emerged in Chengdu, Sichuan province. Like much 
of western China, Chengdu has served important strategic interests since the 
revolution of 1949, after which Mao declared it to be the inland city to which the 
central government would retreat in the event of war. This was the 'Third Front' 
strategy, and the cold war mentality that gave rise to it has survived into the 
present day. When the heat of Beijing becomes unbearable and the water crisis 
severe, Beijing residents talk of the central government relocating to Chengdu. 
The early industrialization of Chengdu was given a boost with the relocation 
of important strategic and military industries to this city during the 1950s and 
1960s. Today this western city of about 10 million people is ranked the sixth 
most important city in the PRC. Located at the crossroads of the southernmost 
section of the ancient 'Silk Road', Chengdu has a long history of private 
entrepreneurship spanning hundreds of years; but all this was buried and 
forgotten until the late 1970s when the household responsibility system began to 
replace the Maoist communes. Deng Xiaoping, the architect of the reforms in the 
post-Mao era, came from near Chengdu and returned China to the familiar pre-
revolutionary tradition of private enterprise. According to Li Bing, Chief 
Secretary of the Private Association of the City Industrial and Commercial 
Management Bureau, the contribution of the private sector to Chengdu's GDP 
had risen to 41 per cent by the end of 2001 ('Chengdu: capacity building for 
private enterprises' 2003). This is an increase of 11 per cent since the 30 per cent 
figure reported by the International Finance Corporation's study in 1998 (IFC 
2000: 3). The IFC report also gave a breakdown of the spread of private firms, 
which we can assume has not changed much since 1998. Chemicals, food and 
garment production each represented about 20 per cent of the total private 
enterprises in Chengdu, followed by metal and non-metal producing firms (14 
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per cent), electronics (10 per cent, machinery (11 per cent), primary industries 
and miscellaneous industries each representing about 5 per cent (IFC 2000: 4, 
Table 1.1). 
In 1990, Chengdu became one of China's first cities to be allowed to engage 
in foreign trade and attract foreign direct investment. As Kennedy notes, 
Chengdu grew by all indicators: foreign investment, GDP and urbanization. 
During the 1990s, the urban area of Chengdu virtually trebled (Kennedy 2003 
Chapter 1). Many foreign countries established trade offices in Chengdu during 
that time - including the Australian Trade Commission, which opened a 
Chengdu office in 1998. 
In 1994 the provincial government of Sichuan embarked on a policy of 
creating gaizhi - that is, converting SOEs into private firms. Four years later 
almost 70 per cent of the targeted government enterprises had been restructured 
and moved into the 'private sector'. According to the IFC, the restructuring 
process was dominated by the creation of cooperatives and employee 
shareholding firms - about half went in this direction. Another '19 percent were 
sold to other firms; 15 percent were contracted out or leased out, and 7 percent 
were liquidated' (IFC 2000: 16). 
Behind the restructuring of state-owned enterprises, a more dynamic 
capitalism was also at work both in Chengdu and more generally in China. The 
geti gongshang hu or firms with a single proprietor (distinct from group, 
collective or communal ownership) were growing in importance. Legally, only 
small enterprises with no more than 8 employees could register as a geti 
gongshang hu, but after 1988 larger firms were permitted to do so (IFC 2000: 
8). Despite this, the ongoing ambiguity about the legal status of genuinely 
privately owned enterprises placed a premium on the private sector hiding 
behind collective enterprises. The IFC report discusses a number of ways in 
which entrepreneurs could benefit from displaying a 'collective' face to the 
banks and other state-controlled institutions that were resistant to privatization 
and therefore likely to stand in the way of entrepreneurial success (IFC 2000: 
20-21). 
We have cited the IFC study at length because it provides such a lucid 
account of how an economic system dominated by state owned enterprises has 
transformed itself quite rapidly into an increasingly private sector economy. 
What the IFC study does not address, however, is how, when and where totally 
new start-up and innovative individual private sector enterprises emerged -
namely firms that did not grow out of the transformation of state-owned 
enterprises. This is the great achievement ofTsai's Back-Alley Banking (2002), a 
book that addresses how the original accumulation of capital has happened in the 
new start-up private sector firms and how private entrepreneurship has won out 
over the ongoing obstacles presented by the state-owned sector or semi state-
owned and managed sector. Specifically, Back.Aalley Banking has identified a 
wide variety of legal, semi-legal and illegal ways in which new start-up private 
sector firms funded their initial growth: interpersonal lending, trade credit, credit 
assoc1at1ons, pawnshops, rural cooperative foundations, shareholding 
cooperative enterprises, financial societies and capital mutual assistance 
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associations, professional brokers and moneylenders, private money houses, and 
pyramid investment schemes. 
13.4 The rise of the Hope Group - a case study in raw 
entrepreneurship 
The Hope Group of companies is amongst the richest private companies in 
China today, and the four brothers and one sister that founded it and remain its 
CEOs are among China's richest individuals. In 2001, Rupert Hoogewerf 
compiled the third list for Forbes Magazine of 'China's Richest 100'. In that 
year, the Hope Group's Liu family displaced CITIC Pacific, which had been 
previously ranked as No.I ('Blooms Amid the Boom' 2001). Less than twenty 
years earlier the Hope Group had begun by taking Deng Xiaoping's slogan 'to 
get rich is glorious' very seriously. The production and eating of quails had been 
banned under Mao as bourgeois indulgence, but in the early 1980s the ban was 
lifted and the company began to raise quail for meat and eggs. In developing 
their quail business the company focused on the local market of Sichuan. In the 
following sections we explain how the company expanded into pig feed 
production and how this formed the basis of their diversification into other areas 
of economic activity that eventually took them to the highest level of 
entrepreneurial activity and made them into the largest shareholders of China's 
only private bank. 
Phase 1: Entrepreneurship and the role of the local market 
In 1983, when the Liu brothers started their business of producing quail eggs, 
quail meat and quail stock, they were responding to Deng Xiaoping's assurances 
that economic liberalization in farm production and trade had become an 
essential plank in the official reform policies of the Communist Party of China. 
Moreover, the liberalization of trade and marketing in the livestock sector 
preceded liberalization of other areas of trade in farm produce (Bingsheng 1997: 
4). In line with Schumpeter's predictions, these announcements by Deng 
Xiaoping had two immediate effects: first, the high risk associated with private 
production in China before the early 1980s vanished and second, the prospect of 
monopoly profits loomed for the first producers that dared to enter this formerly 
prohibited area of production. 
The Liu brothers registered their business in the name of Yuxin Liangzhong 
Chang. The name was partly based on the name of one of the brothers (Yuxin) 
while the word Liangzhong Chang literally means a farm that raises 'an 
excellent breed (of quails)' (Interview, 20 August 2003). The original capital 
investment of 1,000 RMB or US$120 was raised by the brothers and one sister 
selling their own watches and bicycles. The quail business grew very rapidly 
from the small capital investment that quails required. In this it was aided by the 
rapid growing cycle of quail: they mature within 35 days. 
The early success of the Liu brothers was based on their use of the local 
market, where they quickly established a brisk retail business in baby quails and 
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quail products. Again in line with Schumpeter's predictions, innovative 
production began with the imagination of the Liu brothers and their sister who 
saw the opportunities that market reforms had opened up. The buyers in the 
local markets were in no position to influence decisions about production, 
because the whole business of eating quails and quail products had been firmly 
stereotyped as a ' bourgeois' indulgence by the previous Maoist regime. That 
regime's ultimate destructiveness had been expressed in the violence of the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, where people who painted their 
fingernails, admired Buddhist artefacts, read western literature, and behaved in 
other ways that Maoist extremists determined to be reflective of corrupt western 
or Mandarin cultural practices were victimized and even killed. China had not 
recovered from the trauma of the Cultural Revolution when the Liu brothers 
decided to go into the quail business. In this sense, they were very 
entrepreneurial and willing to take the financial risks of doing this - provided 
the Communist Party of China was indeed willing to shield them from the 
Maoist accusations that had been rife in the previous decades. At the same time, 
the Liu brothers clearly saw the benefits of monopoly profits as the just returns 
to early entrants into the quail business. 
Just as Schumpeter's theory would predict, the example of the Liu producers 
in the Dong Qing Shu Free Market ( designated by the Communist Party as the 
official market at which perishable consumer goods could be sold to the 
consumers of Chengdu city) brought many other quail producers into the field. 
As this occurred, the early monopoly profits to the Liu brothers began to decline. 
For example, during the first year or so of their business, baby quails sold in the 
local market for about 10 RMB each. Thereafter the real price began to fall. 
Today baby quails still sell for 10 RMB per bird in the Chengdu markets, but the 
real price is about 1120th what it was two decades ago (Interview, 12 December 
2003). The financial returns to their initial investment allowed the Liu brothers 
to build a presence in the markets of other cities in Sichuan province. By 1986 
they had established an extensive sales channel within Sichuan province, and 
increased the total turnover more than ten times (Interview, 1 December 2003). 
By 1989, the firm's total investment had reached 10 million RMB or US$1.2 
million. This growth occurred solely through the reinvestment of the firm's 
profits. Ploughing back earnings to facilitate the accumulation of capital and the 
growth of business has been identified as the source of finance for about 90 per 
cent of China's private sector; even older businesses found themselves relying 
on this as the main or only funding source (IFC 2000: 32). Tsai's wonderfully 
detailed study of Back-Alley Banking identifies other sources of private-sector 
funding and the dangerously blurred line between legal and illegal methods 
(Tsai 2002), but at this stage of our research it is too soon to comment on 
whether any of these methods were also used by the Hope Group. For the 
moment, the rise of the Hope Group conforms to the familiar pattern of family-
based capital aided by growth and ploughed-back profits: the turnover and 
profits depended on the scale of the quail business; and large-scale production 
was possible because the firm involved five siblings who were willing to work 
together, share the burdens and reinvest their earnings. This early growth of the 
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Hope Company in Chengdu is no different from the evolution of small private 
businesses in other parts of the capitalist world. 
Phase 2: Entrepreneurship and pig feed production 
As more and more producers entered the business of producing and selling 
quails and quail products, declining monopoly profits encouraged the Liu 
siblings to look to new business ventures. In the late 1980s they moved into the 
production of pig feed. At that time, the pig feed industry in Sichuan was 
dominated by Charoen Pokphand, a Thai company, one of Asia's largest 
multinationals (Chengdu Zhengda Company Ltd 2003). Clearly, Charoen 
Pokphand were making monopoly profits, given that there were no local 
challengers because the development of agri-industries had been held back by 
Maoist prohibitions on private enterprise. 
Again, the Lius saw the opportunities for reaping monopoly profits. This time 
they had a sufficiently large capital base to take on the Thai multinational. The 
market entry strategy of the Liu siblings consisted of two main components: 
developing a new, highly nutritious pig feed that used quail droppings as an 
ingredient, and undercutting the local selling price of the Thai company's pig 
feed. In undercutting the Thai company's selling price, it is reasonable to assume 
that they were still making monopoly profits, because in Sichuan there were no 
other domestic Chinese firms capable of competing with the Liu siblings. The 
initial investment in the first pig feed factory established by the Hope Group was 
10 million R..MB, the total savings accumulated from their previous business in 
quail production. The first factory covered an area of 30 or 40 mou (about 2 to 
2.6 hectares) with a special workshop area of about 2 thousand square meters 
(Interview, 20 August 2003). During the initial period of expansion every 
additional factory set up by the Hope Group required an additional investment of 
about 15 million RMB, of which about 2 - 3 million RMB was set aside for R & 
D to improve the quality of the pig feed (Interview, 20 August 2003). 
Liu Yongxing has stated that the company always believed in research. He 
has cited his own college education in mathematics to explain why the Hope 
Group places a high value on knowledge, something that they believe gave the 
firm an edge over other farmers ('China's Richest Man' 2002). As Schumpeter 
suggests, spending money on routine R & D is not an entrepreneurial function. 
However, the early belief in establishing R & D within the Hope Group system 
was a highly innovative idea and enabled the company to develop a mass market 
for pig feed at a time when farmers preferred to allow their pigs to eat any 
rubbish they could find by foraging. In this sense, then, Schumpeter's definition 
of entrepreneurship certainly applies to this early stage when the Hope Group 
developed a research infrastructure. 
The timing of the Lius' entry into pig feed production was very important. 
Known as a chronic under-producer of grains before 1980, during the 1980s and 
1990s China was generating regular grain surpluses. Given that grain is an 
essential input into the pig feed industry, these surpluses meant that the risks to 
pig feed production from crop failure were minimal. Farmers throughout China 
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began to feed their pigs with grains, a policy encouraged by the Chinese 
government as a way of dealing with the grain surpluses. However, only a 
handful of innovative producers entered the modern pig feed industry at this 
time, largely because private firms in China lacked the capital base needed to 
establish factory production. The result of these combined factors was an 
enormous growth in swine production. According to Bingsheng, livestock as a 
share of total agricultural output doubled from 15 per cent to 30 per cent 
between 1975 and 1995 (Bingsheng 1997: 2). Most of this growth occurred in 
the swine sector. China produces more pigs and has more pig farmers than any 
other country in the world. That is partly because of the huge domestic demand 
and partly because some 80 per cent of China's 180 million farmers each have 
on average between two and three pigs (Bingsheng 1997: 2). Moreover, Sichuan 
has the country's largest concentration of pig farmers and is a net pig exporter to 
other provinces. The Lius had, in other words, located themselves in the middle 
of China's swine industry. Large-scale producers specializing in pig farming 
were also growing and already producing 20 per cent of total output by the time 
of Bingsheng's report in 1997. However, small-scale production continued to 
remain important and profitable for a number of reasons. Despite the grain 
surpluses pigs continued to eat the unwanted parts of the rice crop and sweet 
potato; they cleaned up the local scraps and rubbish; and they supplemented 
farmers' income. In Sichuan, pigs generated about 20 per cent of the cash 
earnings of local farmers (Bingsheng 1997: 3). 
Pig meat production in China today continues to have the world's lowest 
input of grain feed. Despite this, the success of the Liu siblings was based on 
persuading enterprising farmers that investing in modern pig feed was worth the 
extra cost because the pigs grew faster, had fewer illnesses, and grew bigger 
than those feeding on conventional scraps and forage. The faster production 
cycle that produced more edible pork more than covered the costs of Hope 
Group pig feed and generated attractive net profits for enterprising farmers. As a 
result, the Hope Group sold modern pig feed to both small individual farmers 
and larger, commercial producers including the state farms that remained on the 
outskirts of China's cities.1 
The details of modern pig feed production and husbandry were not known to 
China's small-scale pig feed producers and ordinary farmers during the 1980s. 
To create a new mass market for pig feed, the Lius had to turn their innovative 
skills in the direction of modern marketing. As Schumpeter proposes, 
entrepreneurship is not restricted to any particular economic activity; and in the 
case of the Liu siblings, mass marketing was an essential strategy if they wanted 
to expand their business beyond Sichuan. Their marketing campaign resorted to 
cheap advertising in the form of painted slogans on buildings in Sichuan and 
highway billboards between China's provincial capitals. The company's logo 
captures the essence of their two-pronged marketing strategy: 'If your pig eats 
one kilogram of Hope feed he will grow by two' (Erickson and Mooney 1997). 
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Table 13.3 The economic cost of material and energy in the production of Hope pig feed 
Material and 
Energy 












Information about the role of quail droppings in this breakdown of the constituents of Hope pig feed 
is not available. 
The Lius also developed a mystique about their pig feed formula. Legend has 
it that Hope Group pig feed is more successful than the feeds of competitors 
because it has a secret ingredient based on quail droppings. By linking their pig 
feed business to their earlier spectacular rise in the quail industry, the Liu 
brothers also created their own history of corporate success. The other 
ingredients of the Hope Group pig feed are familiar to global pig producers and 
include commercial grains (Table 13.3). Recent reports in Britain have analysed 
the economics of pig feed production and confirmed the experience of the Hope 
Group. Growing larger pigs is more productive than having more pigs because 
the meat yield can be increased without increasing overheads: for example, a 
large pig can live in a pen no different from a small pig or a number of small 
pigs yet the final pork output is higher. In other words, the advertising campaign 
of the Liu brothers was based on their own insightful observations about the 
logistics of housing and breeding pigs in confined spaces. 
The decision to enter the pig feed market was, in retrospect, a rather 
spectacular one because it moved the Liu siblings into one of China's largest 
domestic markets and indeed one of the world's most competitive areas of 
production. About 80 per cent of the meat produced in China is pork. The 
strategy was dramatically successful. Within a year the Hope Group's monthly 
sales in Chengdu had risen to 4,500 tons, three times the volume sold by the 
Thai competitor. Thereafter the Thai competitor continued to face strong 
opposition from Hope in Chengdu. In 1997, Charoen Pokphand began a second 
price war with Hope, but lost heavily at a time when its other activities inside 
China were threatened by the Asian Financial Crisis (Vatikiotis et al. 1998).2 
Pha.se 3: Entrepreneurship, diversification and globa/ization3 
Once the Hope Group was well established in Sichuan's pig feed industry, 
they had the capital base to diversify beyond Sichuan - provided that their 
entrepreneurial ideas still had the momentum they displayed at the beginning of 
their business ventures. They clearly had not abandoned their entrepreneurial 
drive, and by purchasing 25 state-owned animal feed manufacturing plants 
throughout China they quickly established a national presence in agri-industry 
by 1997 (Erickson and Mooney 1997). Converting unprofitable state-owned 
enterprises into profitable private-sector factories demonstrated the managerial 
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flair that the Hope Group had acquired. In the process they also developed 
expertise in related areas of economic management including real estate, hotel 
management and plant machinery, and a knowledge of the wider China market. 
This expertise provided the essential knowledge base on which to build further 
market diversification into, amongst other things, China's financial markets. By 
1996, a mere 13 years since its foundation, the Hope Group was able to buy into 
the Mingsheng Banking Corporation, China's first private bank. Today they 
remain the bank's largest shareholder. Their banking venture also demonstrates 
how by 1996 the wealth and expertise of the Liu siblings were being taken very 
seriously by the Chinese government, which made the ultimate decision about 
whether a private firm might join the bank and, if so, which firm might do so. 
Perhaps the Liu siblings' knowledge about their original Thai competitor in 
Sichuan province also made them more aware than other emerging Chinese 
entrepreneurs about the possibilities of business beyond national boundaries. In 
2000, the Hope Group became a transnational business when it established two 
modem pig feed factories in Ho Chi Min city and Hanoi. The initial investment 
is estimated at US$9 million. Today the company remains 100 per cent owned 
by the New Hope Group. The Vietnamese market exposed the Hope Group to 
opportunities to produce air-conditioning equipment. Their new company, Great 
Star Air Conditioner, imported components from China, assembled and then 
sold the final products in Vietnam. Within 12 months, New Hope had diversified 
into the Philippines market by setting up the Philippine Biotop company in 
2001. Unlike other private sector initiatives, this was a joint venture with a local 
Philippines firm. It began production that year by generating a wide range of 
high quality animal, poultry and aquatic feed. The success of these cumulative 
diversification strategies was reflected in the doubling of the earnings of the 
Hope Group between 1992 and 2002 from 300,000 RMB to 550 million RMB 
(US$66 million). 
13.5 Conclusion 
Schumpeter insisted that entrepreneurship was not a long-term phenomenon 
even in the case of the most entrepreneurially minded business leader. There was 
only 'the moment of entrepreneurship', a short-time period during which a 
business leader assumed an entrepreneurial function by combining the factors of 
production in such a way as to catapult output to unprecedented levels. Using 
this very strict Schumpeterian definition, one can say that the Liu siblings have 
acted as entrepreneurs again and again during the last twenty years. Their 
successes are based on thousands of entrepreneurial acts. Moreover, their 
willingness to embark on a wide range of adventurous and imaginative 
enterprises first in Sichuan, then in China and finally in the Asian region has 
required them to be entrepreneurial across a wide range of functions including 
finance, acquisition of real estate and other property, factory and asset 
management, exporting and importing, marketing, R & D and even reforming 
and making productive former state-owned factories. Over a period of two 
decades they have sustained their energy and willingness to embark on risky 
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business ideas, provided that the general policy climate in China remained 
favourable to the growth of private initiative. As such the emergence and 
successes of the Hope Group are a role model that should provide inspiration to 
other families in western China. The Hope Group and similar firms also need to 
be distinguished from other new private firms that are reformed state enterprises 
now managed by collectives of various kinds. In this way, the Hope Group 
represents the rise of raw entrepreneurial talent in modern China. 
Despite the role of private entrepreneurship, there is still room for state 
policies to play a special role, especially in western China. The Liu siblings, as 
members of the Han ethnic group, did not suffer from any of the disadvantages 
that affect minority nationality groups wishing also to benefit by the new 
opportunities to 'get rich quick' in China. Special state policies and incentives 
are needed for minority communities. 
Notes 
These state fanns persisted longer than others as a way of guaranteeing that the cities of China 
would be supplied with meat and other produce. 
The CP group has bounced back in the Chinese market since the end of the Asian Financial 
Crisis. With 104 feed mills of a diversified kind, it is China's largest animal feed producer 
(Achara Pongvutitham 2003). 
For a more detailed analysis of the diversification, internationalization and changed company 
structure of the Hope Group see Vicziany and Zhang (2003). 
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